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Russia Eternal: Recalling The Imperial Era In Late- And Post-Soviet Literature And 
Culture 
Abstract 
The return of Tsarist buildings, narratives and symbols has been a prominent facet of social life in post-
Soviet Russia. My dissertation aims to explain this phenomenon and its meaning by tracking 
contemporary Russia’s cultural memory of the Imperial era. By close-reading both popular and influential 
cultural texts, as well as analyzing their conditions of production and reception, I show how three 
generations of Russian cultural elites from the 1950s until today have used Russia’s past to fight present-
day political battles, and outline how the cultural memory of the Imperial epoch continues to inform post-
Soviet Russian leaders and their mainstream detractors. Chapters One and Two situate the origin of 
Russian culture’s current engagement with the pre-Revolutionary era in the social dynamic following 
Stalin’s death in 1953. I first discuss how the pre-Soviet past was inherited by the post-Stalin liberal elites 
and amplified by the expansion of a mass ‘technical intelligentsia,’ the burgeoning of media, and the 
growth of political and affective links between the educated masses and the cultural elites who would 
represent them. I then examine how late Soviet conservatives used the pre-Soviet past to dispute the 
liberal hegemony and to forge anti-liberal alliances with state power. Chapter Three shows how the 
memory of the late Imperial era and its Revolutionary terminus has informed the capitalist, liberal-
conservative ‘homo faber’ rhetoric of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia coalition that brought first Yeltsin and 
then Putin to power, and legitimated an undemocratic and increasingly repressive post-Soviet state. 
Chapter Four examines several vectors of a more thoroughly liberal humanist counter-discourse on the 
pre-Soviet past. I claim that this counter-discourse was always productively skeptical of Soviet liberal and 
conservative models of historical inheritance, and that it arose simultaneously with the Perestroika and 
proceeded to reappear for two decades, though more in a potential, rather than a fully articulated way. I 
conclude by suggesting that in the wake of the 2011-2012 mass protests, the pre-Soviet past has lost its 
consensus appeal, indicating the end of a sixty-year-long Russian discursive trend and the beginning of a 




Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
Graduate Group 
Comparative Literature and Literary Theory 
First Advisor 
Kevin M. Platt 
Keywords 
Eidelman, Govorukhin, Okudzhava, Pelevin, Ulitskaya, Voroshilov 
Subject Categories 
Eastern European Studies | English Language and Literature | European History | European Languages and 
Societies 
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2894 
RUSSIA ETERNAL:  
 
RECALLING THE IMPERIAL ERA  
 






In Comparative Literature and Literary Theory 
 




Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 










Kevin M. F. Platt, Edmund J. and Louise W. Kahn Term Professor in the Humanities, 
Professor of Russian and Eastern European Studies 
 
 









Ilya Vinitsky, Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures (Princeton University) 
 




RUSSIA ETERNAL:  
 
RECALLING THE IMPERIAL ERA  
 











This work is licensed under the  
Creative Commons Attribution 
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0  
License  
 




















In memory of my grandfather 
Yakov Khazanov (1922-2017), 
who answered every question 
and always expected me  






























The initial inspiration for this dissertation took place in Rossen Djagalov’s and Kevin 
Platt’s seminar on contemporary Russian culture. One of the readings from that course, 
Ludmila Ulitskaya’s “Queen of Spades” made it into the present manuscript. The other 
major brainstorm moment took place on the sidelines of “After Censorship, Before 
Freedom,” a workshop on post-Soviet literature at Princeton University in 2014—special 
thanks to Serguei Oushakine for inviting me to participate in this event and others, all of 
which were extremely productive for my work. Kevin could not have been a better 
supervisor and mentor all these years. I am also very grateful to Mark Lipovetsky and 
Ilya Vinitsky for serving on my committee on this project. Additionally, Gabriel 
Rockhill’s suggestions at the prospectus stage greatly helped crystalize my thinking. 
Thanks to the presenters, discussants and organizers at ASEEES and AATSEEL over the 
last few years, where I tried out arguments for this dissertation: Maria Sidorkina, Fabrizio 
Fenghi, Jane Sharp, Irina Anisimova, Beach Gray, Nancy Condee and Chloë Kitzinger. 
Thanks also to Sibelan Forrester for inviting me to speak about What? Where? When?—
much of the material for that lecture ended up shaping Chapter Four of this dissertation. 
A special shout-out to Hammam Aldouri, who has served as a philosophical therapist for 
this project over the course of the last year, when the argument of the dissertation was 
finalized. The Mellon Council for European Studies graciously funded the dissertation 
during my last year of graduate school. Julia Verkholantsev, Peter Holquist, Ben Nathans, 
Maria Alley, Peter Steiner, Emily Wilson, Mitchell Ornstein and Alina Yakubova 
provided enormous support, advice and patience during my graduate career.  
 
To my fellow graduate students, past and present, at Penn and beyond: Maya Vinokour, 
Alex Moshkin, Matt Mangold, Jason Cieply, Helen Stuhr-Rommereim, Julia Dasbach, 
Jacob Feygin, Sam Casper, Courtney Doucette, Iuliia Skubytska, Alex Hazanov, Josh 
Neese-Todd, Igor Dombrovsky, Adam Leeds, Raquel Salas Rivera, Alison Howard, 
Maria Pape, George MacLeod, Sarah Nicolazzo, Avi Alpert, Nesrine Chanine, Devorah 
Fischler, Joe Liew, Jerry Chang, Daniela Tanner, Jenia Ulanova, Ari Resnikoff, Gabe 
Sessions, Sonia Gollance, Shari Gottlieb, Ari Gordon, Harry Schley, Jacob Feeley and 
many, many others—getting through these six years would have been quite unlikely 
without your friendship and camaraderie. Without JoAnne Dubil I and my fellow 
complitters would have been lost.  
 
Finally, I am grateful to my family—my mom, my dad, Eugene, Esther, Shlomo, Sarit 
and Jonathan. Your contributions to this project, to my time in grad school and my life as 
a whole have been innumerable.  
 









RUSSIA ETERNAL:  
 
RECALLING THE IMPERIAL ERA  
 




Kevin M. F. Platt 
 
The return of Tsarist buildings, narratives and symbols has been a prominent facet 
of social life in post-Soviet Russia. My dissertation aims to explain this phenomenon and 
its meaning by tracking contemporary Russia’s cultural memory of the Imperial era. By 
close-reading both popular and influential cultural texts, as well as analyzing their 
conditions of production and reception, I show how three generations of Russian cultural 
elites from the 1950s until today have used Russia’s past to fight present-day political 
battles, and outline how the cultural memory of the Imperial epoch continues to inform 
post-Soviet Russian leaders and their mainstream detractors.  
Chapters One and Two situate the origin of Russian culture’s current engagement 
with the pre-Revolutionary era in the social dynamic following Stalin’s death in 1953. I 
first discuss how the pre-Soviet past was inherited by the post-Stalin liberal elites and 
amplified by the expansion of a mass ‘technical intelligentsia,’ the burgeoning of media, 
and the growth of political and affective links between the educated masses and the 
cultural elites who would represent them. I then examine how late Soviet conservatives 
used the pre-Soviet past to dispute the liberal hegemony and to forge anti-liberal alliances 
with state power.  
 vi 
Chapter Three shows how the memory of the late Imperial era and its 
Revolutionary terminus has informed the capitalist, liberal-conservative ‘homo faber’ 
rhetoric of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia coalition that brought first Yeltsin and then Putin 
to power, and legitimated an undemocratic and increasingly repressive post-Soviet state.  
Chapter Four examines several vectors of a more thoroughly liberal humanist 
counter-discourse on the pre-Soviet past. I claim that this counter-discourse was always 
productively skeptical of Soviet liberal and conservative models of historical inheritance, 
and that it arose simultaneously with the Perestroika and proceeded to reappear for two 
decades, though more in a potential, rather than a fully articulated way. 
I conclude by suggesting that in the wake of the 2011-2012 mass protests, the pre-
Soviet past has lost its consensus appeal, indicating the end of a sixty-year-long Russian 
discursive trend and the beginning of a new, more future-oriented form of mainstream 
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Как в прошедшем грядущее зреет, 
Так в грядущем прошлое тлеет  
Страшный праздник мертвой листвы. 
 
      Just as the future ripens in the past, 
      So too in the future, the past smolders 
      A frightful feast of fallen leaves. 
 
Anna Akhmatova, Poem Without a Hero1 
 
In the 1990s, the Tsarist double-headed eagle replaced the Communist hammer 
and sickle, and the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow replaced the world’s largest 
swimming pool. At the time, many Russian cultural and political elites celebrated the 
country’s return to ‘normalcy’ after a seventy-year-long Soviet utopian experiment that 
they perceived as having been misguided. This story of historical and political 
‘normalization’ was just one of many narratives that were generated during this decade, 
as most ordinary Russians struggled to make sense of a reality in which the country’s 
basic social institutions were collapsing. ‘Normal’ social life never quite arrived in 
Russia, but the nineteenth century has maintained a privileged foothold in state imagery 
and mass culture. Today, Putin’s ideologists promote the pre-Revolutionary era as a 
glorious moment from Russia’s past. Meanwhile, many prominent opposition liberals 
continue to imagine social life in terms inherited from Tsarism, such as a ‘Westernizing’ 
intelligentsia, a despotic state, and the ‘folk’ (narod). The apparent longevity of such 
terms has led Russian cultural figures like the celebrity author Dmitry Bykov to claim 
that Russian history is a theatrical play set to repeat ad nauseam.2 Bykov’s formulation 
indicates the need to look for origins of the ‘post-Soviet era’ long before the events of 
	 2	
1991. The precipitous fall of the USSR took place against a background of continuous 
Russian cultural processes that are still not fully understood. At the same time, as 
scholars of cultural history and as those who wish a better future for Russia we must 
insist that nothing in social life is ever fated or perennial. With that in mind, my 
dissertation aims to answer two broad questions: when did the Tsarist past start acquiring 
its present-day cultural value and authority? And how does the continuity of this cultural 
discourse underpin Russia’s post-Soviet social order and political institutions?  
To begin to understand how the discourse on the pre-Soviet past took shape, it is 
necessary to understand the political matrix within which it has been operating over the 
course of Russia’s recent history. How should we define the ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ 
poles in this discourse, and what is their origin? How did Soviet ‘liberalism’ and 
‘conservatism’ transform as a result of Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the advent of post-
Soviet Russia? The task of this introduction is to clarify and give a historical overview of 
these definitional concepts, and also to show how a discourse on the pre-Soviet era 
influenced the formation of both Soviet and post-Soviet liberalism and conservatism. 
 My dissertation’s account begins in the 1950s, with destalinization. Until not so 
long ago, it was a mainstay of Soviet historiography, and with good reason, that Stalin’s 
death on March 5, 1953 initiated a process of ‘liberalization’ of the Soviet cultural 
sphere. Between the Leader’s burial and Khrushchev’s famous denouncement of Stalin’s 
“cult of personality” at his not so Secret Speech at the XX Party Congress in 1956 there 
transpired a number of very noticeable developments that gave everyone the 
unmistakable feeling of a new wind blowing in the Soviet Union. Even so, it was quite 
obvious to many people at the time that the change of tone in the immediately post-Stalin 
	 3	
Soviet public sphere had limits.3 More recently, there have been convincing arguments 
about the Secret Speech as an important part of the state’s post-Stalinist trajectory of 
enforcing those limits. Khrushchev’s performance crystallized what had de-facto already 
been Soviet discursive policy with respect to the “disavowal” of Stalin. The actual 
practice of the half-secret enunciation and dissemination of the Secret Speech 
inaugurated the complicated system of State-officiated silences and censorship that would 
go on to be part and parcel of destalinization throughout the 1960s and also more 
generally of Soviet practices of dealing with the Soviet past all the way until Perestroika.4 
Meanwhile, on the level of the Soviet state’s mechanisms of social control, as Oleg 
Kharkhordin has argued, post-Stalinist society was actually subjected to more effective 
and methodical state repressions than we have generally been led to believe. The veneer 
of society’s apparent liberalization hid beneath it complicated mechanisms of mutual 
surveillance, which were all the more effective due to their subtlety.5 Bearing in mind all 
of these caveats, ‘liberalization’ is still an important word for thinking about late Soviet 
culture, for at least three reasons: 1) due to the recommitment to liberal subjectivization 
practices in post-Stalinist cultural discourse; 2) due to the de facto liberalization of 
discursive power in late Soviet society; and 3) due to liberalization through consumer 
modernity, a trans-national post-War force that also penetrated Soviet boundaries. 
 Firstly, late Soviet cultural discourse liberalized in a humanistic sense of the term. 
As Jochen Hellbeck has argued, Stalinist culture had been characterized by a strong top-
down and grassroots mass commitment to the forging of a new Soviet person with 
“Revolution on her mind,” and this person’s subjectivity was to be essentially “illiberal.”6 
The ideal Stalin-era Soviet subject pursued a process of personal becoming that was 
	 4	
about merging all personal thoughts with the ‘general line.’ Unvocalizable depth of 
subjectivity was viewed as a threat to the Soviet project, and Soviet men and women 
sought to expurgate as much of that interiority as possible, by filling it up with the 
discourse of the Party. To be sure, this form of subjectivization did not actually reign 
supreme in Stalinist culture, which, due to its partially Thermidorian nature, was caught 
up in profound bad faith about its aims, and as a result ended up producing what Andrei 
Siniavsky coyly called the “half-classical half-art of (not particularly) socialist (and 
definitely not) realism.”7 Even so, illiberal subjectivization constituted the core of the 
image of a Stalinist.  
In contrast, post-Stalinist culture was born out of the discourse of “sincerity,” 
which rejected the Stalinist form of illiberal subjectivization. This dynamic appeared as 
early as 1953, in Vladimir Pomerantsev’s bombshell Novy mir article, “On Sincerity in 
Literature,” which took Zhdanovite “conflictless” literature to task not so much for the 
poverty of its ideological content, but for the implausibility of its characters and its 
narration, in which “we do not feel the soul of the author […], we do not recognize his 
own thoughts. We are reading only that which is too well known, that which is not 
permeated by an emotional origin, and which is on top of that also fertilized with the 
protagonist’s cult of personality.”8 We can observe another powerful argument for post-
Stalin liberal humanist subjectivity in the late 1950s writings of the early television critic 
Vladimir Sappak. Both Pomerantsev and Sappak offered models of subjects for 
emulation that were diametrically opposed to the kinds of ‘true Soviet men’ that 
abounded in officially sanctioned literature. Sappak, more explicitly than Pomerantsev, 
tied his anti-Stalinism to a commitment to humanist subjectivization according to a depth 
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model taken from Stanislavskian realist theater, in which genuine, honest people and 
television personalities would be expected to perform and project an unspoken 
“secondary plane,” carefully letting their audience in on the existence of emotional depth 
within their ‘souls,’ and thus assuring us of their humanity.9 
 Secondly, through the work of Claude Lefort, Alexei Yurchak and George 
Faraday we can observe how the death of Stalin initiated an implicit liberalization of 
discursive power in Soviet society. Using Lefort’s analysis of the “genesis of ideology” 
in totalitarian societies, Yurchak has argued that Stalin’s death initiated a “performative 
shift” in Soviet ideology, where the solipsism of the Party’s totalitarian control of 
discourse on social reality met the post-Stalinist Party leaders’ enlightened self-interest.10 
Khrushchev and his coterie didn’t want a return to terror, but neither did they want to lose 
power in the frenzy of anti-Stalinist denunciations. In order to skirt either possibility, they 
proliferated clear rules of performative utterances through which all Soviet social circles 
would know “how to sing from the same hymnal,” to borrow Natalia Baranskaia’s 
expression.11 Then, in return for a correct performance of ‘Sovietness’ all participants 
would be assured of their relative inviolability. Thanks to the latter development, a whole 
social order with diffuse holders of social power emerged and crystallized. On the one 
hand, this order remained unrepresentable within USSR’s ideological discourse; on the 
other hand, it was omnipresent not only in USSR’s cafes and kitchens, but also in the 
country’s officially policed mass media and the non-media public sphere, both of which 
were full of influential late Soviet celebrities and their mass audiences.12 Self-defined 
groups of social and political elites fought over cultural capital, as well as collaborated in 
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the general rules governing that capital’s circulation within the Soviet public sphere and 
also through non-public networks of socialization.13 
 Thirdly, post-Stalinist Soviet society underwent certain trans-national 
transformations having to do with the growth of mass consumer societies in the 
industrialized world. There exists a well-known narrative of the Soviet Union losing the 
‘peaceful competition’ to a more enticing Western post-War modernity. The Soviet 
demise was at least partly a result of industrial socialism’s inability to keep up with the 
West in a new ‘information economy’ and its attendant social structure of educated 
professionals with growing consumer demands. The output of raw tonnage of steel was 
no longer a reliable measure of national success among the industrialized powers.14 
However, scholars like Kristin Roth-Ey have also told a story of Soviet demise that was, 
in a way, a case of defeat through its own success. In her study of the Soviet “prime-
time” film and television empire’s explosive growth in the 1950s-1980s, Roth-Ey 
concludes that this entertainment behemoth ‘lost the cold war’ precisely because it 
became indistinguishable from its Hollywood counterpart, in that both industries 
ultimately ended up being driven by a de-ideologized logic of consumer demand and 
satisfaction and, as a result, by the 1980s they were churning out very similar kinds of 
products.15 Moreover, perhaps the most significant mass social development of the Soviet 
1960s-1980s was the rise of private living space as a result of late Soviet urban residents 
moving into first Khrushchev’s gloriously ugly pre-fabricated concrete apartment boxes, 
and then Brezhnev’s slightly less ugly ones.16 These apartments installed a notion of 
privacy as an inalienable attribute of late Soviet socialist off-brand modernity, which in 
turn enabled the growth of the late Soviet culture industry, especially television. Private 
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accommodations also enabled the rise of other consumer electronics, leading to the 
growth of samizdat and magnitizdat—“extra-Gutenberg” modes of circulating dissident, 
semi-dissident and even officially tolerated cultural products among far-reaching social 
networks, which were further expanded by post-War urbanization.17 
 The Thaw era’s combination of the advent of Soviet consumer modernity, 
structural liberalization and also humanist liberalization altogether posed the era’s central 
political question: what kind of discourse would make sense of Soviet Russia’s new 
situation, empower a new generation of leaders and forge links between the leaders and 
their audiences? The late Soviet liberal versus conservative divide originates precisely 
out of this problematic. At first it was not yet obvious that a liberal/conservative split 
would take place. What was immediately obvious, however, was that the Thaw-era 
creative elite (“the last Russian intelligentsia,” to borrow Vladislav Zubok’s terminology) 
was particularly well-positioned to take advantage of the post-Stalinist ‘liberalization.’18  
The elite’s extant independent networks of socialization had not been entirely snuffed out 
by Stalinist purges and in the case of the hard sciences were actually supported by the 
Stalinist establishment; quite often those independent networks included the golden youth 
of the Soviet high political cadre.19 For another thing, the intelligenty by virtue of their 
official Soviet definition as creative elites, had the best access to the networks of 
information production and exchange. Finally, the official policy of destalinization itself 
privileged the Soviet elites, rather than the many other victims of Stalin’s rule. After all, 
the denunciation of the ‘cult of personality’ had been initiated by the top party echelon in 
order to take the possibility of further purges of themselves off the table. As a result, 
Stalin’s “gross violations of revolutionary legality” were largely defined by his Great 
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Terror campaign, which had mostly been directed at the Soviet political, technical and 
cultural class. The repressions against the peasantry, the aggressive industrialization and 
de-kulakization campaigns that were accompanied by devastating mass starvation—the 
Party did not wish to discuss these examples of Stalin’s doings, and neither was the Party 
interested in rehabilitating the ‘deviationists’ Bukharin and Trotsky, who had been 
repressed precisely for proposing alternatives to the bloody general Party line that 
initiated the Great Break of 1929 and all of its attendant consequences. Eventually, by the 
early 1960s, topics pertaining to the sorry state of the Soviet countryside began to be 
broached by the Village Prose writers, but the state really preferred to constrain its policy 
of official post-Stalinist reckoning to the task of rehabilitating the victims of fabricated 
political conspiracy trials, which was as much the story of the party avant-garde as of the 
cultural intelligentsia. 
 The empowered intelligentsia at first did not perceive itself as split along liberal 
and conservative flanks. If a question of political positioning were posed, it would be 
answered in terms of Stalinist vs anti-Stalinist value systems, and given the official neo-
Leninist, ‘socialism-with-a-human-face’ rhetoric of  the Khrushchevan state, social unity 
on the anti-Stalin front seemed self-evident, as did consensus on what seemed like core 
anti-Stalinist values. The widespread rhetoric of sincerity and subjective depth combined 
to celebrate the humanist ideal of an independent personality, an integral person with her 
own thoughts, emotions and—more often than not—a rich inner world composed of post-
war trauma.20 That humanist ideal was also tightly associated with valorization of pre-
Revolutionary Russian literary canon, with special emphasis on Russian classic 
literature’s tradition of psychological realism.21  
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 However, while some level of commitment to humanist rhetoric was universal in 
the post-Stalin era, political divisions soon emerged and had to do with the question of 
linkage between destalinization and political empowerment. During the Thaw and 
especially towards its end, it became clear that the divide between late Soviet liberals and 
conservatives would turn on the potential for mass impact that official humanist rhetoric 
and late Soviet urbanization and professionalization trends afforded specifically to the 
liberal side of the Soviet intelligentsia. Perhaps the clearest expression of this feeling was 
encapsulated by the liberal dissident Grigorii Pomerants in the late 1960s.22 In a polemic 
with the conservative dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Pomerants argued that Soviet 
urbanization had eradicated the authentic folk [narod] as it had been originally 
understood by pre-Soviet intelligentsia ideologists. For Pomerants this was good news, 
because it meant that Soviet cultural elites could continue their enlightenment mission by 
concentrating on the ‘new narod’—the urbanized, educated, professional masses, who 
were far closer in their worldview and comportment to the liberal intelligentsia than the 
peasant masses of yesteryear. The millions of college educated individuals who would 
now comprise the by-now substantial cadres of the class of Soviet ‘Engineering and 
Technical Workers’ (inzhenerny i tekhnicheskie rabotniki, collectively referred to by their 
acronym, ITR), were well positioned to be the Soviet liberal intelligentsia’s junior 
partners. Values like freedom of speech and freedom of association, and most importantly 
creative and intellectual freedom—all attributes of what Zubok has called the 
“intelligentsia ethos”—would percolate down from the intelligentsia elites to the mass 
‘technical intelligentsia.’23 Most importantly, the mass ‘technical intelligentsia’ would 
also think of itself as a kind of spiritual elite, distinguishing itself from the unenlightened, 
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brute, repulsive and for those reasons inherently Stalinist ‘working masses’ so extolled by 
Soviet dogma and discursively referenced by Soviet nomenklatura as the ‘real narod’ 
who didn’t much like the liberals.   
Anti-Stalinism thus became a liberal political matter—love of Russian canon, 
love of free expression, love of the human individual personality, and a form of elitist 
comportment would define the post-war educated collective, and it would be juxtaposed 
to the collective of the ‘philistine’ Stalinist nomenklatura and the similarly philistine 
narod, who were all presumed to hate all such spiritual refinements. The liberal elites and 
their junior partners in this way acquired an ideology of power. They were certain that the 
full measure of destalinization would only be achieved by the enfranchisement of the 
intellectually and spiritually superior creative and scientific class, over and against the 
existing holders of power—namely, the philistine Soviet apparatus and the presumably 
philistine worker and peasant masses, among whom the apparatus supposedly drew its 
cadres.24 
At first, the enormous state bureaucracy, ideology and security apparatus was 
disoriented in the battle over cultural hegemony, which the liberals seemed to be 
winning. However, it had the discursive options and ample state resources to contest the 
rise of late Soviet liberalism and to make a case for the state’s continuing rule—which is 
precisely what the state’s representatives began to do as the liberal-dominated discussion 
of destalinization began to look more threatening. A state strategy of maintaining 
discursive power while initiating destalinization had already been articulated at the XX 
Party Congress. The scapegoating formula of “gross violations of revolutionary legality” 
attributed almost entirely to just Stalin and Lavrentii Beria was combined with slogans 
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like “a return to Leninism,” “the struggle for world peace,” and a pivot towards 
inaugurating a comfortable socialist consumer modernity. All of these proclamations and 
policies were designed to burnish the moral and political authority of the Party and the 
Soviet state, both domestically and internationally. However, this strategy was still 
proceeding within the frameworks of the official Soviet totalitarian view of the social 
field, even as the liberal challenge to state power was gaining steam on the level of the 
de-facto liberalized Late Soviet public sphere.  
A different tactic would be necessary to challenge liberal hegemony over 
destalinization on its own discursive grounds. Some of that tactic appears in 
Solzhenitsyn’s response to Pomerants. Solzhenitsyn argued that Pomerants was a typical 
privileged toady working in a state-sponsored NII (Scientific Research Institute), too 
cowardly to stand up to the state, but deluded enough to cover his cowardice up with 
hifalutin claims of enjoying an ‘inner freedom.’ Moreover, Solzhenitsyn was skeptical of 
Pomerants’ belief in the world historical mission of the new educated professional class, 
which he derisively called an ‘obrazovanshchina’—a neologism meant to get at these 
people’s self-satisfied, privileged and unreflective semi-educated philistinism. Soviet 
petty bourgeois consumers were, in Solzhenitsyn’s view, simply too morally suspect to 
take on the role of a new culture-bearing ‘folk.’ In short, the likes of Pomerants were not 
the prophetic, unblemished moral leaders that Solzhenitsyn believed the Russian nation 
required, and the ITR masses—‘new narod’— were also hardly representative of the 
authentic Russian nation.  
Solzhenitsyn was, of course, a dissident thinker; however, the general line of 
ascribing moral culpability to liberals and spiritual emptiness to their educated mass 
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audience did become a centerpiece of both official and unofficial Soviet conservative 
discourse. The basic argument took shape as an accusation that the Soviet liberals’ 
desires for enfranchisement were not being articulated in good faith vis-à-vis the Russian 
nation. Meanwhile, under conservative editorship Stalinism would be re-read as a fatally 
flawed liberal idea—a reign of tyranny by a westernization-and-modernization-obsessed 
intelligentsia against the Russian peasant masses.25 The Western leftist ideology at the 
heart of the Soviet project would in this way be condemned. Meanwhile, the Soviet 
Union in its present, post-War form would appear as another iteration of a ‘Russia 
Eternal,’ the continuation of a civilization that had for centuries been defined by its 
perennial opposition to the imperializing West and its Russian liberal dupes. 
The major claim of my dissertation is that a discourse on the pre-Soviet past was a 
crucial component of the liberal and the conservative ideological formations described 
above. In Chapter One, I show how nineteenth-century terms of the social imaginary, 
such as ‘intelligentsia’ and ‘narod,’ were inherited by late Soviet liberals within their 
new social context. I begin Chapter One with the figure of the poet Anna Akhmatova, a 
representative of the old, pre-Soviet intelligentsia who survived well into the Thaw and 
became the new era’s living embodiment of the reestablishment of the reign of the 
‘empire of poets’—that is, a conceptualization of the creative intelligentsia as culture-
bearing and culture-producing body that is independent from the state and that is 
answerable only to a body of cultural tradition that it itself creates. Next, I consider the 
figure of Yuri Lotman, the famous Soviet semiotician who was on the one hand a 
‘citizen’ in the ‘empire of poets,’ but on the other hand tried to think about how 
inheritance and transmission of the intelligentsia’s cultural values would work, 
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overcoming both state censorship and temporal distance. Third, I engage with Natan 
Eidel’man, a late Soviet popular historian, who in his works allegorically articulated the 
possibility of inheriting the nineteenth-century intelligentsia’s liberal political ideals and 
conceptions—especially, their never fully realized dream of a legalist society with 
‘liberal institutions,’ as well as their conceptualization of Russia’s social conflict as a 
struggle between autocrats on one side and democrats on the other. Fourth, I track the 
deployment of the pre-Soviet past in the films of Vladimir Motyl and El’dar Riazanov. I 
argue that these filmmakers instinctively responded to the social transformation outlined 
by Pomerants and were for this reason able to bring Akhmatova’s ‘empire of poets’ to the 
middle-brow educated masses, in the process turning the classic cultural canon into an 
intellectually easy and emotionally appealing Gestalt image of Imperial Russia.  
I round out Chapter One with the figure of Bulat Okudzhava, who in my reading 
marks out a critical limit of late Soviet liberal discourse. Bulat Okudzhava was the 
consummate late Soviet liberal intelligent. As a poet from Moscow’s historic Arbat 
district he promoted himself as belonging to the ‘empire of poets.’ As a historical fiction 
writer, Okudzhava had the historical-allegorical liberal sensibilities of Eidel’man. As a 
singer-songwriter with a mass technical intelligentsia following he was attuned to the 
semiotics of transmission of intelligentsia values in the context of state censorship. And 
lastly, as a late Soviet celebrity who wrote a number of wildly popular songs for films 
(including Motyl’s Star of Captivating Happiness) Okudzhava was well aware of the 
dynamics of mediatized mass consumer appeal. With all of this in mind, I argue that 
Okudzhava’s 1971 historical fiction novel, A Gulp of Freedom both displays a mastery of 
late Soviet liberal intelligentsia discourse and also critiques the model of liberal 
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heritability of the pre-Soviet category of ‘intelligentsia.’ 
Chapter Two examines how the pre-Soviet past was used by late Soviet 
conservatives in order to dispute the liberal discursive hegemony and to forge various 
kinds of tactical anti-liberal alliances. I open with the early Thaw era and discuss the case 
of Vasilii Shulgin, an ‘evil twin’ of Akhmatova, discursively-speaking. Shulgin was an 
octogenarian monarchist who in the 1950s and 1960s managed to forge a tenuous 
conservative alliance with the KGB, thanks to security and censorship apparatus’s 
suspsion of parts of the official narrative regarding the late Imperial and early Soviet past, 
so as to re-style itself into a late Soviet conservative institution. I then switch attention 
from the state to the more independent anti-liberal intelligenty of the 1960s cultural 
sphere and examine how the painter Ilya Glazunov and the writer Vladimir Soloukhin 
articulated a vision of a late Soviet conservative concept of ‘culturedness,’ understood in 
terms of the need to reconstruct and preserve Russia’s unique, authentic national aesthetic 
heritage, which reached the peak of its development in the late Imperial era. Together, 
Glazunov and Soloukhin create the late Soviet discourse on ‘the Russia that we have 
lost’—the pre-Revolutionary era as an appealing, glittering wonderland that can be 
recovered aesthetically and pitched as a spiritual antidote to the drab aesthetics of both 
Western and late Soviet modernity.  
I conclude Chapter Two with an investigation of the way in which a reading of 
the pre-Soviet past informed the late Soviet conservative conceptualization of politics as 
a perpetual stalling of evil and pointless liberal desires. To that effect, I examine how the 
neo-Slavophile critics Vadim Kozhinov and Iurii Loshchits, as well as the widely popular 
filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov, inventively re-interpreted the late nineteenth-century 
	 15	
literary canon in order to articulate notions of conservative political subjectivization that 
would dispute the moral value of future-oriented collective action driving the liberal 
discursive hegemony. I focus in particular on the reinterpretation of the figure of Ilya 
Oblomov, the famous protagonist of Ivan Goncharov’s 1859 novel. I argue that Loshchits 
re-reads Oblomov as a story of Russian conservatism’s perennial quixotic battle against 
liberal Western modernity, personified by Oblomov’s best friend and now definite 
villain, Stolz. Then, Mikhalkov’s adaptation of Oblomov for the screen marks out a kind 
of limit case of Soviet conservatism. With his mastery of the neo-Chekhovian style that 
informs his mass-appeal cinema, Mikhalkov instinctively recognizes the dynamic 
described by Pomerants, in which the new narod are the urbanized middle-brow masses 
who find much in common with Chekhov’s puttering aristocrats. In this way, Mikhalkov 
almost appears as a late Soviet liberal (and at the time was often mistaken for one). 
However, Mikhalkov is not interested in his audience’s political empowerment. For this 
reason, his interpretation of Oblomov follows Loshchits and highlights the powerlessness 
of individuals like Stolz and his friend Olga, and ipso facto the evil and pointlessness of 
westernizing designs for Russia, whose unique national essence (symbolized by a 
sublimely lazy quasi-Buddhist Oblomov) perennially returns, and must be enjoyed and 
loved, rather than overcome. 
Chapters One and Two of my dissertation deal with the late Soviet decades; 
Chapters Three and Four move on into the post-Soviet era. In between lies Perestroika 
and the early Yeltsin transition. The major question for this watershed moment is: what 
happened to the liberal and conservative discursive matrix at this time? 
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To address this question in brief: firstly, the late Perestroika marked off the political 
defeat of the Village Prose variety of Soviet conservatism. Scholars like Yitzhak Brudny 
and Nikolai Mitrokhin, and to some extent Stephen Kotkin have all shown how the 
processes unleashed by Perestroika revealed the profound lack of broad social support of 
the Soviet nationalists, despite their systemic and cultural influence.26 When the last 
General Secretary made a move to what he thought would be a soft parliamentarianism 
by allowing competitive elections to the 1989 Congress of People’s Deputies (S’ezd 
narodnykh deputatov—SND), most conservative intelligentsia figures and also most 
apparatchiks failed to win elected seats in the new body. Meanwhile, the liberals who got 
elected or who ended up in the SND by way of various Soviet corporate bodies very 
quickly started organizing against Gorbachev and for more decisive reforms, through 
initiatives like the Interregional Deputy Group (Mezhregional’naia deputatskaia 
gruppa—MDG), which soon became the backbone of Yeltsinism.27  
 Was the Yeltsin coalition liberal or conservative? His supporters thought of 
themselves as anti-Soviet ‘democrats,’ and the Yeltsin coalition engaged in a lot of talk 
about European values, transition to Western liberal democratic institutions and social 
mores, ‘living in a normal country,’ and so forth. At the same time, the new wave of 
leaders preferred to describe themselves as conservatives, in distinction from the 
‘commu-nazi’ hordes perennially at the gates of the new order. Moreover, the new 
regime also carried out a number of concrete reconstructionist projects, especially the 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior, which had been the hobbyhorses of Soviet conservatives, 
such as Glazunov and Soloukhin. Later in the 1990s and the 2000s the Yeltsin and the 
Putin administrations invested state funds into ‘patriotic’ mass media projects, such as 
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high-budget cinema, which depicted glittering images of a beautiful pre-Soviet Russia 
‘that we have lost.’ The aesthetics of these films had been prefigured by both liberal and 
conservative Soviet cultural production, Moreover, the post-Soviet products looked 
‘liberal’ in the sense of their slick Western-style means of production and ‘conservative’ 
in the sense of their nationalist messaging. 
 Altogether, then, the post-Soviet state appeared as a “liberal-conservative” 
ideological amalgamation for a long time, and in some ways still promotes itself as such 
today.28 However, today it is also manifestly obvious that there is a left and a right to the 
mainstream political matrix, and that the supporters of the state occupy the latter pole, 
while those in opposition identify with the former. In order to understand both the 
assemblage of the Yeltsin-Putin consensus, and its subsequent divergence (which has 
clarified since the 2012 wave of protests), we have to return to Perestroika and analyze 
the discursive transvaluations that this period initiated. 
Without a doubt, the most important transvaluation of the Perestroika era was the 
point at which the wholesale transition to capitalism came to appear as the leading 
modernization project among the anti-Soviet ‘liberal democrats.’ This did not necessarily 
have to be so—there were late Soviet social democrats, such as Boris Kagarlitsky who 
had hoped that Perestroika would result in the replacement of the corrupt Soviet ruling 
elites by a new generation of leaders committed to broad democratization, but without 
scrapping Soviet socialism tout court. The social democrats lost. Meanwhile, the “anti-
Soviet” liberal democrats, despite their ostensible commitment to overturning ossified 
regime hierarchies, ended up incorporating a great deal of existing Soviet government 
cadres into the new regime. Ultimately, even though some mainstream Soviet 
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conservatives were made irrelevant by the 1991 Putsch, many (perhaps most) of the 
actual members of the Soviet power elites managed to maneuver their way out of their 
Soviet positions and straight into post-Soviet ones. Sometimes, they managed to do so 
without even leaving their office, as happened between August and September of 1991, 
when the Soviet government class defected en masse to Yeltsin’s Russian administration, 
even as Gorbachev nominally remained President of the manifestly defunct USSR.29 
Other former apparatchiks, like Yeltsin himself, or the 1990s mayor of Moscow Yuri 
Luzhkov, had to put in some effort to rebrand themselves. But rebrand themselves they 
did, by becoming exceptionally proficient at ‘pro-democracy’ and ‘anti-Soviet’ discourse. 
The ascendant democrats’ discourse was the outcome of Soviet liberal ideology, 
which was in fact quite conservative. After all, this discourse was primarily interested in 
righting the hierarchy rather than disrupting it. As Corey Robin, a scholar of Anglo-
American conservatism would say, the Yeltsinist turn was anticipated by his supporters 
as a moment in which “genuine excellence [would be] revealed and rewarded, true 
nobility [would be] secured.”30 ‘Democracy’ was posited as a value by the MDG and 
then the pro-Yeltsin parliamentarians, but it was understood in Soviet liberal terms, as a 
commitment to the end of censorship and expansion of civic freedoms. However, all of 
these freedoms were being enunciated from the perspective of an elitist comportment, in 
which the ascendant educated technical intelligentsia class saw itself as wresting power 
from the undeserving Party philistines, preventing the coming to power of the philistine 
proto-Stalinist narod, and installing social and economic power in the hands of the 
worthy, creative and for all those reasons capitalist-oriented individuals. As a result, 
Yeltsin’s and Putin’s “liberal-conservative” discourse has consistently appealed to the 
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well-to-do, decision-making segment of Russia’s populace, telling them that the post-
Soviet regime is a consensus outcome of the empowered capitalist homo faber ‘class’ (I 
take the term homo faber from Viktor Pelevin, as I explain in Chapter Three). At the 
same time, since the 1990s there have been various attempts to formulate a discourse of 
resistance to both Yeltsinism and Putinsim among the empowered, urbanized, educated 
Russians. For the purposes of my dissertation, the polarity of the post-Soviet political 
matrix is one in which the ‘liberal-conservative’ consensus predominates and occupies 
the post-Soviet political right. Meanwhile, the discourse of the post-Soviet well-to-do 
mainstream political left (which is ultimately not that left in the absolute sense) appears 
more as a possibility than a fait accompli—though the left side of the matrix has received 
a substantial boost since the 2012 protests. 
Just as in the late Soviet half of my dissertation, I argue that the discourse of the 
post-Soviet homo faber and also its critical counter-discourse both turn on a political 
imaginary in which the pre-Soviet past plays a significant role. Chapter Three tracks the 
development of the homo faber from the late 1980s until today, by way of the hegemonic 
historical imaginary of the late- and post-Soviet intelligentsia. The chapter starts by 
considering how the rhetoric of Stanislav Govorukhin’s nostalgia for “The Russia That 
We Have Lost” ended up informing the political discourse of the late Perestroika and the 
post-Soviet transition. I highlight Govorukhin’s new imaginary ideal subjects of post-
Soviet history, a “we” comprised of educated people of action, who are legitimated by 
“our” inheritance of the political and social ideals of worthy ancien régime aristocrats, 
most emblematically Petr Stolypin. After Govorukhin, I discuss the proliferation of an 
Imperial kitsch aesthetic among several marquee post-Soviet capitalist establishments, 
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focusing in particular on Russia’s ‘first business newspaper,’ Kommersant. Pushing 
beyond the manifest narrative of new Russian capitalism as a noble affair and a spiritual 
return of “The Russia That We Have Lost,” I focus on the social imaginary of the homo 
faber subject empowered by the post-Soviet transition and represented by institutions 
such as Kommersant. In this imaginary, the homo faber is part of a numerically small, but 
valiant and united collective of the “upper hundred thousand,” who had originated in the 
late Imperial era, were then killed off by the Bolsheviks, and have now returned to steer 
Russia towards necessary reforms and away from populist, neo-Bolshevik temptations. 
The middle section of Chapter Three discusses the “new normal” Imperial retro 
aesthetic that was practiced by Yeltsin’s state and also by Yuri Luzhkov (the mayor of 
Moscow) in the 1990s. The return of state symbols such as the Imperial double-headed 
eagle and the tri-color flag, as well as the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior, originated out of the aesthetics of late Soviet conservatives and liberals alike, who 
together had created a Gestalt image of pre-Soviet Russia as an appealing mass consumer 
object. I argue that it was particularly necessary to orchestrate this return in the 1990s, in 
order to generate an aesthetic of aspirational “normalcy” in Russia, without which 
consumer capitalism cannot function. The fourth section of the chapter transitions from 
‘Imperial retro’ state projects and examines the subjective discourse of the people behind 
them. The rightist, etatist essence of post-Soviet homo faber discourse becomes apparent 
as I examine the appropriation of the figure of Stolypin as a symbol of post-Soviet 
governmentality, especially in the Putin era. I argue that thanks to the late-Soviet efforts 
of Solzhenitsyn and his post-Soviet student Sviatoslav Rybas, Stolypin becomes the 
embodiment of a “competent manager” [krepkii khoziaistvennik], the ideal ego of all 
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confident and powerful post-Soviet leaders—Putin first and foremost. Stolypinism 
becomes the ideology of the homo-faber-in-charge: a powerful leader committed to 
aggressive reformist state action in the interests of economic modernization, mass 
enlightenment and the creation of effective institutions. Most importantly the post-Soviet 
Stolypinist leader is in principle committed to the rhetoric of transition to democracy, but 
with the caveat that this transition should be permanently delayed. A dual fear of populist 
revolutionary barbarians and Western vultures at the gates means that the democracy-to-
come must be deferred until the undetermined future date when all of Russia will finally 
be comprised entirely of capable homo faber citizens.  
I conclude Chapter Three with a discussion of the hybrid Westernist/Nationalist 
“Russian Idea” for the masses, produced by the rightist post-Soviet state. Specifically, I 
examine how Nikita Mikhalkov’s 1999 film, The Barber of Siberia formulates this 
conception by depicting a nostalgic image of Imperial Russia rendered through the finest 
Hollywood techniques. I argue that this image is desirable not only because it trades in 
nationalist nostalgia, but precisely because it appears as a quality product that is ‘good 
enough for the West,’ the epitome of what the writer Viktor Pelevin at the time called 
“Not-Cola for Nikola”—a desirable object that exists in the shimmering space of being 
both ‘Western’ and ‘our own.’ Importantly, this means that nationalist appeals to the 
Russian masses in the post-Soviet era happen not so much on the level of narrative, but 
on the level of means of production. Putinism’s omnivorous propagandistic historical 
imagination, with its appeals to a panoply of thoroughly incongruent moments of Russian 
greatness throughout the ages, only works as long as the objects of patriotic investment 
are rendered lavishly, in an effective consumerized Western style. Mikhalkov anticipates 
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this insight in the late 1990s; by 2014 it becomes the centerpiece element of Putinism’s 
capstone mass communication project, the Sochi Olympics. 
Chapter Four concludes the dissertation by marking out how the pre-Soviet past 
has informed four lines of critique against the homo faber discursive consensus described 
in Chapter Three. The first line of critique appears during the Perestroika and early post-
Soviet era of capitalist transvaluation. I examine how Alexander Pushkin’s classic story 
and Petr Tchaikovsky eponymous opera, “The Queen of Spades” was deployed in the 
1990s in Vladimir Voroshilov’s high-brow quiz show, What? Where? When? in order to 
sell the transition to capitalism as consistent with the liberal humanist ideals of the late 
Soviet intelligentsia. I then consider how the same classic story figures in Ludmila 
Ulitskaya’s 1990s short story, “The Queen of Spades.” In both Voroshilov’s and 
Ulitskaya’s cases I argue that this classic of the Russian canon ends up enunciating the 
repressed acquisitive bourgeois drive of the late-Soviet-turned-post-Soviet intelligentsia, 
whose liberal humanism was less about communion with Russia’s cultural traditions and 
more about using the canon to burnish cultural capital and maintain elite social status.  
The second critique of homo faber discourse belongs to Viktor Pelevin, the writer 
who coined this term in his 1993 essay, “John Fowles and the Tragedy of Russian 
Liberalism.” I first highlight this essay’s enunciation of the subject position of Pelevin’s 
ideal ‘homo non-faber,’ who satirizes post-Soviet reality from the standpoint of his 
withdrawal from the vanity of the world in general and from circular Russian history in 
particular. I then examine Viktor Pelevin’s 1998 novel, Chapaev and the Void and cross-
read this text against the writer’s overall oeuvre, arguing that Pelevin’s ideal Buddhist 
speaking subject’s critique is the result of a ‘false consciousness’ of someone who 
	 23	
perceives himself as an elite, even though this form of social identification is neither fully 
justified nor in any way preordained. I claim that Pelevin never fully clarifies this 
critique, but that it does arise from the “repetition compulsion” of his post-Soviet texts. 
The third critique of homo faber discourse is to be found, implicitly, in the 
writings of Boris Akunin. Akunin, who came to national bestseller prominence in the 
2000s epitomizes the comportment of the post-Soviet sislib (‘systemic liberal’), an 
individual who on the one hand wants to maintain oppositional footing vis-à-vis a far-
from-ideal regime, but on the other hand wants to participate in the work of righting that 
regime from within (and also at times from without). Akunin’s 1999 “political detective” 
novel, State Counsellor shows how the conflicted self-conscience of the post-Soviet 
Russian moderate liberal is informed and also greatly hampered by an inherited ‘future-
past’ of his imaginary late Imperial ancestors, who perished in the Revolution. I argue 
that through two subtle deus ex machine devices Akunin’s text comes to the threshold of 
realizing that fear of future chaos is not a good enough justification for the sislib’s 
collaboration with the semi-odious regime. In this way, the text (half-heartedly) disrupts 
the ‘liberal conservative’ consensus regarding the Revolution as the eternal telos of 
overly left-leaning politics in Russia. 
I conclude the chapter and the dissertation with the fourth, and thus far the most 
culturally successful post-Soviet critique of the historical imaginary underpinning homo 
faber discourse—namely the disruption of the conception of historical inheritance that 
underpins the “we” of Govorukhin’s influential affective formula, “the Russia that we 
have lost.” I first examine Alexander Sokurov’s 2002 art-house cinema masterpiece, 
“The Russian Ark,” a film that opposes the Mikhalkovan/Putinist glittering patriotic 
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treatment of Russia’s past by creating a different state-of-the-art aesthetic that serves to 
highlight the difficulty of inheritance. Sokurov’s film deploys the Gestalt cultural image 
of Imperial Russia formulated by Soviet liberals and conservatives; however, this image 
is presented not as an object of nostalgia, but as an object of culture understood as a “site 
of memory.” On one hand, Sokurov’s cultural encounter with the past of St. Petersburg’s 
Winter Palace emphasizes this site’s temporal and social foreignness for “us” today, but 
on the other hand it celebrates the possibility of ‘us moderns’ encountering the foreign 
past, making it newly meaningful, and thus preserving the cultural cycle. I then read a 
similar message, though this time pitched to a much wider audience, in the popular TV 
documentarian Leonid Parfenov’s 2013 film, “A Nation in Bloom.” I argue that Parfenov 
crystallizes the formula of ‘a Russia that they have lost’ as a counterpunch to the 
historical imaginary of the homo faber. I claim that Parfenov returns the image of the 
glittering Gestalt Imperial Russia back to its rightful owners, the Imperial elites who had 
produced it, and whose lifeworld and comportment cannot in any easy way be inherited 
as “our” own today. In this way, the contemporary influence of Russia’s Imperial past—
with its revolutionary terminus and its social imaginary (comprised of terms like 
“intelligentsia,” narod, and ‘power’)—is demystified. “We’re not from” this Russia, 
Parfenov concludes, “we’re from the Soviet one.”  Meanwhile, my dissertation concludes 
that Parfenov’s post-2012 stance regarding the pre-Soviet past is indicative of a tectonic 
shift in the cultural discourse of Russia’s liberals, who today are increasingly capable of 
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Pushkin is Our Everything:  
Russia’s Golden Age in Late-Soviet Liberal Cultural Production 
 
 
In the present chapter, I will examine the rendering of the pre-Soviet past by the 
‘liberal’ vector of Late Soviet intelligentsia. I put ‘liberal’ in scare quotes because the 
term is quite obviously problematic. To start with, it has been observed that in the early 
stages of the Thaw, Soviet elite cultural producers were not yet split into nominal liberals 
and conservatives, and that this split began occurring only later, in the 1960s.1 However, 
this claim should come with the caveat that in a certain sense late Soviet cultural 
producers were all liberal, because of the ‘liberalization’ of late Soviet subjectivization 
and socialization (see General Introduction, above). As for the appearance of self-
identified ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives,’ this division did begin to take place among the 
intelligentsia in the early 1960s, and was characterized by a general split between those 
who thought of themselves as Western-oriented cosmopolitans and the others, who 
thought of themselves as Russian nationalists. As Zubok has pointed out, this split was 
encouraged by the Soviet security and ideology apparatus, which viewed both sides with 
suspicion and cynically manipulated them in order to ensure social fragmentation. Even 
so, however, one could pass back and forth between the self-declared liberal and 
conservative poles and still have the ear and respect of the other side (the cross-over 
cases are too numerous to count, but just briefly, we might mention the Tarkovsky family, 
or the Mikhalkov brothers, or many Village Prose writers like Shukshin, or even someone 
like Yuri Trifonov). Moreover, both the liberals and the conservatives could often point 
to common ancestors, such as Anna Akhmatova, who anointed not only the elitist 
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‘internal immigrant’ poet Joseph Brodsky, but also the neo-Slavophile dissident 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn.2 Nevertheless, with all due caveats, let us for the moment accept 
the existence of heuristically distinct ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ late Soviet camps of 
cultural producers, and begin with examining the use of the pre-Soviet past among the 
former. 
In what follows, I consider the use of pre-Soviet past in the works of six liberal 
late Soviet cultural producers: Anna Akhamtova, Yuri Lotman, Natan Eidel’man, 
Vladimir Motyl’, El’dar Riazanov, and Bulat Okudzhava, in that order. And again, for 
heuristic reasons, I examine just one kind of pre-Soviet past—a cultural Golden Age that 
marked the birth of Russian intelligentsia, spanning roughly the period between the 
Decembrist revolt of 1825 and the late 1840s (both boundaries here are quite artificial 
and are dictated by my specific examples of late Soviet cultural products, rather than by 
any logic intrinsic to 19th century historical developments; it is also not by any means my 
intention here to confirm or deny either the existence or the ‘goldenness’ of this period as 
a coherent cultural epoch). I choose this particular part of Russian history for two 
reasons—one is because the story of the Decembrists appealed to many liberal 
intellectuals, including the dissidents and the semi-dissidents who often spoke of 
themselves as latter-day Decembrists3; and the other reason for my choice is that the 
Golden Age of Russian culture appealed to specifically liberal cultural producers because 
they were the ones who often claimed to be heirs of the pre-Soviet intelligentsia. 
Moreover, they were tasked by the Soviet state with the business of educating the broader 
masses in ‘culturedness,’ which was particularly characterized by a Sovietized 
knowledge of the classical Russian canon, with pride of place for Pushkin and his time.4 
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Moving from Akhmatova to Okudzhava, I will show an evolution in the 
deployment of the pre-Soviet past across a wide swath of late Soviet culture. By starting 
with an elitist author like Akhmatova and ending with mass culture artifacts, like 
Riazanov’s and Motyl’s 1970s and 1980s films, as well as Okudzhava’s popular 1971 
historical fiction novel, I draw an arc of inheritance of the pre-Soviet past, which follows 
the arc of late Soviet social developments, namely—the expansion of the ranks of those 
who called themselves an intelligentsia, as well as the related burgeoning of Soviet mass 
































I. The Empire of Poets: 
Anna Akhmatova, Pushkin, and Structural Liberalism 
 
“She might be thought of as the first lady of the Empire, isn’t it 
true? Isn’t it true that many of her expressions have a memoir-like 
character?” 
 
      ‘D.’ to Lydia Chukovskaia, May 1 19535 
 
 
  The first case for our examination of pre-Soviet past in late Soviet culture is that 
of Anna Akhmatova. Akhmatova, more than anyone else in the Thaw era, performed an 
imaginary linkage to the pre-Soviet past with her own person. Having been fortunate 
enough to survive (not unscathed) all of the waves of Stalinist purges, Akhmatova during 
the Thaw took on the role of embodying a direct connection to a by-gone culture. Most 
obviously, she was one of the last remaining representatives of the turn-of-the-century 
Russian modernist literary tradition. Less obviously, but more importantly, Akhmatova 
was also a prominent member of the group of the intelligentsia’s ‘elders’ [‘starye’], to 
borrow Lydia Chukovskaya’s term, whose networks of socialization had come about 
prior to Stalin’s rise.6 That ‘creative intelligentsia’ network had its own economy of 
prestige, its own way of determining cultural rank of its various participants—a notion 
that another surviving ‘elder,’ Viktor Shklovsky had described back in 1928 with the 
idiosyncratic term, “the Hamburg Score.”7 These ‘objective’ assessments were not 
always clear and unequivocal—for instance, Akhmatova kept her own ‘Hamburg Score,’ 
according to which she found Shklovsky wanting.8 However, the phrase itself expresses 
the presumption that cultural prestige should be determined within the circles of cultural 
producers themselves, as opposed to being controlled by outside influences, especially the 
state. In other words, ‘the Hamburg Score’ is what we might call, following Claude 
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Lefort, a structurally liberal idea. As Lefort has shown, the notion of the existence of an 
independent locus of discourse on reality—with reality in this case being the ‘objective’ 
quality of literature—runs quite counter to totalitarian logic, in which the Party is the 
only agent allowed to make these sorts of decisions. This is why Akhmatova saw her own 
poetic existence as quintessentially anti-Stalinist. And Akhmatova deployed the pre-
Soviet past along the same lines—to reinforce this notion of the baseline reality of 
cultural value, of poetic greatness, whose determination stands apart from the state and 
whose independence ultimately declares triumph over the history of Russia’s political 
power.  
To think about Akhmatova’s belief in the structural anti-Stalinism of her poetic 
existence, we might consider the following excerpt from Lydia Chukovskaya’s and 
Akhmatova’s conversation in late 1962, arguably at the apex of the Thaw (after the XXII 
Congress and the removal of Stalin from the Mausoleum in 1961, but just before 
Khrushchev’s colorful critique of non-figurative art at the Manége exhibition in 
December 1962): 
We discussed whether or not 1937 can repeat. “No,” Anna Andreevna said firmly, 
“and you know why? There is no background [fon] against which Stalin was 
whipping up all that horror. Here is some indirect evidence: the present young 
generation understands you and me, don't they? They are our pets, they’re our 
own [ruchnye, svoi] for us, but back then in 1929, 1930, there was a generation 
who didn’t even want to know me. ‘What! She’s also writing some kind of 
poetry!’ It was the kind of generation that had passed right over me, like over a 
shadow. Some old hags [tëtki] once used to like her diddles [stishki]! —and 
everyone kept waiting for a new poet to appear out of the blue and to speak his 
new Word, they even kept trying to slot Dzhek Altauzen into that role.”9  
 
In this encounter, we see a concatenation of Akhmatova’s sense of her own importance to 
Russian literature, her awareness of what forces crown her with this sort of glory, and her 
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understanding of the way in which both of those circumstances determine post-Stalinist 
society. For her, the very fact that she is now, in the 1960s, being admired and searched 
out by young new poets and writers like Joseph Brodsky, Bella Akhmadulina, Andrei 
Siniavsky, Iulii Daniel, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as well as young actors like Alexei 
Batalov (all of these people, and others too, are mentioned by name in Chukovskaya’s 
Notes on Anna Akhmatova), indicates that the underpinnings of Stalinism have been 
defeated. Akhmatova’s startling image of her sovereignty, in which she views herself as a 
queen and her young admirers as her “pets,” enunciates her belief in a structurally liberal 
intelligentsia that is a kind of ‘empire of poets,’ with its ruling writers and servitor critics, 
and with links of tradition that preserve the works of previous generations for new heirs, 
independently and in spite of political pressures from the state. Insofar as this empire 
exists, it presents an impediment to Stalinism, and Dzhek Altausen here serves as the 
ultimate foil to this notion, as a poet who launched into fame in the 1930s only thanks to 
his Bolshevik verses and cheerfully totalitarian politics.  
The notion of the existence of an ‘empire of poets’ is a major theme of 
Akhmatova’s mature verse, particularly A Poem Without a Hero—the most important and 
multiply rewritten text of her late life, whose new versions run like a leitmotif throughout 
Chukovskaya’s Notes, paralleling the leitmotif of the anti-Stalinist denouncements of the 
Thaw. A Poem Without a Hero’s central theme is the maintenance of memory of former 
members of Akhmatova’s poetic coterie, who are now long gone, lost to wars, emigration 
and repressions. But even prior to the advent of the Thaw, Akhmatova was already 
expressing a similar poetic ideology through her writings and verbal comments on 
Pushkin. Akhmatova’s personal poetic strategy of self-identification with Pushkin is well 
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known and not particularly unique to her. But Akhmatova’s writings on Pushkin go a bit 
beyond the question of self-identification. Chukovskaya called it her “newborn prose”—
“newborn” because Akhmatova really didn’t write much prose, and “prose” because 
Chukovskaya strongly felt that Akhmatova’s ostensibly scholarly writing on Pushkin’s 
Decembrist sympathies, as well as the courtly intrigues that forced him into a tragic duel 
with Dantes, transcended the boundaries of boring academic style.10 We can bring many 
examples of Akhmatova’s affected treatments of Pushkin, which in Chukovskaya’s notes 
go back to as early as 1952. For our purposes, let us take a look at one of the most 
extreme such cases—Akhmatova’s “A Word on Pushkin,” originally published in 1962, 
in the journal Zvezda. On its face, the very brief article celebrates Pushkin’s posthumous 
historical triumph over his murderers from the court of Nicholas I, and there is nothing 
particularly radical about this notion, which converges both with Akhmatova’s belief in 
the ‘empire of poets,’ as well as with the doctrinaire Soviet myth of Pushkin as a spiritual 
proto-Revolutionary nemesis of the Tsarist regime. But the emotional rhetoric through 
which Akhmatova makes her point reveals something beyond this basic understanding. 
Consider the penultimate run-on sentence of Akhmatova’s short essay: 
The Sovereign Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich in his white tights flaunts his stuff so 
grandly on the wall of the Pushkin Museum; the manuscripts, diaries, and letters 
become valuable as soon as the magic word ‘Pushkin’ appears within them, and 
what is scariest for them [i.e. Pushkin’s enemies- PK]—is that they could have 
heard from the poet [ot poeta]: 
 
 Don’t you worry, you won’t answer for me,   
Have yourselves some restful sleep for now.    
Might is right, and only your own children   
Will be cursing you on my behalf.11 
 
Just who exactly is “the poet” from whom “they could have heard”? The genre of this 
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essay gives the expectation that Akhmatova would sign off with Pushkin’s words, ideally 
some familiar and often-quoted ones. Moreover, it seems terribly immodest to refer to 
one’s self as “the poet,” especially when writing on Pushkin. But this bothers Akhmatova 
not at all—the essay’s only quatrain of poetry is her own. What gives her the right to do 
this? Akhmatova does not merely use a variant of ‘Aesopian language’ to speak about her 
own present-day situation vis-à-vis the Soviet state through the figure of Pushkin.  With 
this rhetorical insertion of her own poetry in this article she actually reaches quite beyond 
what we normally think of as ‘Aesopian language.’ Akhmatova inserts her verse to speak 
on behalf of “the poet.” Which is to say that given the rhetorical framing, it’s really 
Pushkin here, who speaks on Akhmatova’s behalf, in her words. She is Pushkin, and 
Pushkin is her.  
In her “Word on Pushkin,” Akhmatova not merely self-identifies with Pushkin, 
but merges with him, and this happens thanks to the ideology of the ‘great poet,’ in which 
she believes. To use her own words, a great poet is not just some lady “who also writes 
some kind of poetry”—she is a representative of a poetic tradition, and as such she is a 
symbolic representative of all great poets. That is what gives her the right to make poetry 
on Pushkin’s behalf. Which is to say that Akhmatova’s empire of poets is not only a 
structurally liberal ideology, but it is also an ideology shot through by the appeal to a past, 
whose significance is viewed as perennial. This is not say that the past simply and easily 
speaks to the present, and neither is it to claim that Akhmatova’s notion of the past is 
ahistorical. The point is only that an essential function of the intelligentsia in 
Akhmatova’s sense of the word (a word which, by the way, both Akhmatova and 
Chukovskaya prefer not to use) is to preserve the past’s importance, and to insist on the 
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need to preserve it via the mechanism of cultural tradition, in which all great writers are, 











































II. Soviet Intelligentsia and the New Narod: 
Yuri Lotman’s Decembrists and the Heritability of Culture 
 
This ability to relate in a natural and completely unaffected 
manner to visitors in a drawing-room, to peasants at the market 
and to children, constituted the cultural specificity of a 
Decembrist’s everyday behavior. It is akin to Pushkin’s poetry and 
it ranks among the greatest ever manifestations of Russian culture. 
 
Yuri Lotman, “The Decembrist in Everyday Life” (1975)12 
 
 
 As mentioned above, Zubok claims that the return of the pre-revolutionary 
heritage and its representatives to prominence was made possible by the survival into the 
1950s of a significant number of people who had been weaned on pre-Revolutionary 
humanist traditions. These older educated individuals—i. e. Chukovskaya’s “elders”—
“had […] been brought up in the nineteenth-century traditions of liberalism and 
humanism” and “could not help passing on to their students their manners, habits, ethical 
standards, and aesthetic attitudes—while keeping their political views to themselves.”13 
Zubok at times makes this transference of the pre-Soviet intelligentsia ‘culturedness’—
what he calls the “intelligentsia ethos”—seem easy. In truth, the heritability of such an 
ethos was much more of an open question for the people of the 1960s and 1970s, for a 
number of reasons pertaining to factors quite apart from the blunt force of Stalinist 
repressions. The most problematic issue was that the social structure of the Thaw period 
was radically different from the past in which the “intelligentsia ethos” had originated. 
Indeed, twentieth-century social transformations were, for better or worse, marked within 
official Soviet parlance, in which the word ‘intelligentsia’ denoted a social ‘stratum’ that 
included just about all educated professionals and managers. It has been argued that the 
introduction of this concept into Marxist-Leninist cosmogony was a sleight of hand, 
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designed to obfuscate the existence of the Soviet bureaucratic class.14 Be that as it may, it 
is nevertheless the case that Soviet Russia’s social world in the wake of industrialization 
and urbanization was vastly different from its pre-Revolutionary ancestor, and this fact 
was not lost on the intellectuals of the 1960s and 1970s, who were trying to come to 
terms with the role of an ‘intelligentsia’ in Soviet society.  
This was precisely the topic of the debate between Grigorii Pomerants and 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, that I introduced in the General Introduction, above. To recall, 
Pomerants argued that Soviet urbanization had eradicated the authentic folk [narod] as it 
had been originally understood by pre-Soviet intelligentsia ideologists. Instead, there now 
existed a ‘new narod,’ the intelligentsia’s collective junior partner in the urban 
professional class. Solzhenitsyn, meanwhile, was skeptical of both the moral fiber of the 
likes of Pomerants and of the spiritual quality of the soulless ‘new narod’ that was to be 
enlightened by the new crop of liberals. Despite their opposed positions, both Pomerants 
and Solzhenitsyn shared an anxiety regarding the applicability of traditional, pre-Soviet 
Russian cultural terms to the present situation. The intelligentsia and the folk are not who 
they used to be, so what is there to inherit, and for whom, and in what way, and to what 
end? These questions apparently didn’t concern Akhmatova, because her notion of 
cultural continuity was predicated on the existence of a perennial empire of poets that 
spoke for a system of essential, unchanging values and maintained its own enduring 
Hamburg Scorecard of cultural importance. In truth, it doesn’t even make sense to speak 
of ‘inheritance’ in Akhmatova’s view of the cultural system, because on some level no 
one ever really dies in it. Her great poets are like medieval monarchs with their two 
bodies—the body royal may come and go, but the body politic exists forever. The famous 
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semiotician and nineteenth-century historian Yuri Lotman, on the other hand, did worry 
about the question of inheritance. Lotman did not live in the empire of poets—he lived in 
the elite academic strata of a late Soviet social world in which he found some structural 
parallels to the repressive authoritarian social world of nineteenth-century Russian 
autocracy. In that situation, he was interested in studying the question of culturedness—
namely, this notion’s social effect and historical importance in a situation in which direct 
political engagement is proscribed. And with that in mind, I think it is not an accident that 
he wrote his most famous work on this issue, “The Decembrist in Everyday Life,” after 
the quashing of Prague Spring in 1968.  
Ludmilla Trigos in her study of “The Decembrist Myth in Russian Culture,” has 
grouped Lotman into a section entitled “The Decembrists and Dissidence.”15 Lotman’s 
engagement with Decembrist history was a typical semi-dissenting stance, which we 
usually assume to be the sine qua non of just about any late Soviet liberal intellectual. 
Lotman’s dissent, in Trigos’s reading, is marked by his decision not to rehearse 
Decembrism’s relationship to Bolshevik revolutionary pre-history.16 Moreover, we 
should point out that Lotman’s concentration on the “everyday” cultural semiotics of 
Decembrism resonates particularly strongly with the question of ‘semi-dissent’ in the 
Late Soviet social system. Lotman’s premise is that the Decembrists were able to 
communicate a sense of belonging to their circles through far more subtle and 
comprehensive means than direct speech. In fact, Lotman’s gambit is to claim that even 
though the Decembrists did speak (maybe even to the point of excess), their greatest 
impact on Russian culture was not actually in the realm of spoken ideas, but in the realm 
of establishing the ‘cultural type’ of the dissenting elite member of society, a ‘type’ that 
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was emulated by a great many people, most of whom were not at all involved in the 
events of December 14, 1825. The Decembrists established certain behavioral mores that 
set them apart from the rest of high society, and that also greatly empowered them in that 
society. In that story, the actual event of the (unsuccessful) Revolt takes a back seat.  
It doesn’t take much erudition to see how this idea tracks with late Soviet 
sociopolitical developments. On the night of the 21st of August of 1968, when news of 
Soviet troops’ entry into Prague came on the airwaves, the dissident singer-songwriter 
poet Alexander Galich wrote his famously despondent song, “Dare You Come Out to the 
Square?”17 Through a very unsubtle Aesopian allegorical reading of the past, Galich 
communicated in not so veiled terms the idea that present Soviet elite society was too 
cowardly to come out and openly revolt against the odious state. On the face of it, Galich 
was right—only a small handful of people ‘came out to the square’ the following 
morning, and they were promptly carted off to prisons and psychological wards.18 Zubok 
has described the Prague Spring as a moment of complete demoralization for the Thaw 
era intelligentsia—in his view, this episode actually spelled the end of this whole late 
Soviet socio-ethical formation, which was then followed by internecine conflict such as 
the debate between Pomerants and Solzhenitsyn. Lotman’s study of “Decembrism in 
everyday life’ responds directly to this situation. For Lotman, the willingness and ability 
of particular Northern and Southern Society members to ‘come out to the square’ is quite 
beside the point when considering the Decembrists’ cultural impact. Far more powerful 
than such direct actions was the Decembrists’ capacity to generate a coherent habitus of 
morally upstanding citizenship. Moreover, Lotman makes a case for the possibility of 
heritability and mass proliferation of this “school of citizenship.”19 And this conclusion 
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is interesting not only because of its late Soviet significance, implying optimism about 
the efforts of late Soviet repressed liberal elites, but also because it is a gambit of making 
the past directly relevant, of searching out in the past certain modes of social self-creation 
that are directly transferable.  
We can observe this point in the emotional epicenter of Lotman’s writing, when 
he discusses the Decembrists’ behavior in exile in Siberia, as well as the cultural impact 
of their return to European Russia in the reign of Alexander II. Lotman points out that the 
princes, counts and other noblemen who ended up thousands of miles away from all 
significant Russian population centers were so well-bred that they were able to converse 
comfortably with peasants at the bazaar, without making the latter feel inferior, because 
“truly good breeding of the cultured part of Russian nobility implied simplicity in 
conduct, as well as an absence of that feeling of social inadequacy and frustration that 
was the psychological basis for Bazarovite plebian antics.”20 He then goes on to declare 
more emphatically that “this ability to relate in a natural and completely unaffected 
manner to visitors in a drawing-room, to peasants at the market and to children, 
constituted the cultural specificity of a Decembrist’s everyday behavior. It is akin to 
Pushkin’s poetry and it ranks among the greatest ever manifestations of Russian 
culture.”21 Finally, Lotman mentions Leo Tolstoy’s memory of encountering a 
Decembrists and says that  
…speaking about Tolstoy’s relationship to Decembrist ideological traditions is a 
complicated, subtle matter, but what is absolutely obvious is the unmediated 
human continuity of the historico-psychological type of personality and type of 
behavior. […] Tolstoy’s conceptualization is very interesting. His thoughts were 
constantly drawn to the people of December 14—but precisely the people, who 




At this point, Lotman’s text has a line break, followed by a conclusion that signs 
off with a quote from Ryleev “breathing liberty” on the cobblestones of Senate Square on 
December 14, 1825. In my view, this conclusion is, to use the infamous Russian word, 
kazennoe [official]. With mention of Ryleev, Lotman safely ties his project back into the 
familiar Soviet ground of orthodox historiography about gentry revolutionaries who woke 
up the later raznochintsy radicals, and so forth; his real interest, I argue, lies in passage 
quoted above. Its emotional tenor speaks for itself. At no other point in the article would 
this meticulous researcher with fairly boring diction allow himself the luxury of claiming 
that the Decembrists’ behavior in Siberia is as important in the grand scheme of things as 
“Pushkin’s poetry.” Nor would Lotman otherwise allow himself so vehemently to 
denigrate “Bazarov’s plebian antics” [bazarovskie zamashki raznochintsa] in light of the 
noble Decembrists. With such open derision for Turgenev’s infamous fictional 1860s 
nihilist revolutionary, Lotman is actually implicitly condemning the Bolshevik in 
everyday life. Which is to say that Lotman argues for the ultimate historical and cultural 
superiority and cultural effectiveness of the politically ineffective noble Decembrists-in-
exile, over and against the far more politically effective but culturally inferior late-
nineteenth-century radicals, some of whom lived to see their projects bear fruit in the 
1917 Revolution. And Leo Tolstoy provides the gold standard of proof of the cultural 
effectiveness of the Decembrists’ “school of citizenship,” for Tolstoy’s placement here 
mirrors Lotman’s own. The writer was born after the Decembrist revolt, in 1828 (Lotman 
is born in 1922), and encountered former Decembrists only in the 1850s, when they were 
pardoned. After thirty years of Siberian exile and almost total disconnection from the 
Russian public sphere, nearly all of these returnees were out of touch in their political 
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views. But even so, Tolstoy believed he could inherit their behavior, if not their ideas. 
History had moved on, but Decembrist culturedness remained perennially relevant—that 
is the lesson that Tolstoy’s example holds for Lotman. 
Through the power of semiotic systems Decembrist mores affected a circle of 
people far beyond the Decembrists themselves. Lotman points out that even individuals 
who by force of circumstances had ended up on the opposite sides of the revolt in 1825 
nevertheless shared certain ideals that the Decembrists had put into cultural circulation 
years earlier.23 The Decembrists’ cultural impact also prepared the ground for Tolstoy’s 
veneration of them as people, decades later. It is precisely this mechanism that, according 
to Lotman, can be applied in the late Soviet situation. Culturedness, far more than 
concrete actions of political dissidence, ultimately can give the Soviet liberal elites the 
semiotic tools through which to come together and recognize each other, the tools to 
cultivate a sense of post-1968 ‘inner freedom’ from the impositions of the repressive neo-
Tsarist late Soviet state, as well as the tools through which to exert their influence on the 
late Soviet masses. Which is quite an optimistic message to take out of the Decembrist 
















III. The Past as Liberal Political Message: 
Natan Eidelman’s Lunin 
 
A history of one is a history of all. But that is why 
everything is connected far more than we usually 
imagine… 
 
     Natan Eidel’man, Lunin (1970)24 
 
 
In the two sections above, I describe the deployment of the past by two elite 
members of late Soviet society who are quite different from each other, but who are both 
similar in the sense of not really being concerned with the question of mass reception of 
their ideas. Akhmatova, as I have argued, saw herself as belonging to the empire of poets, 
and though she saw the existence of such a structurally liberal institution as an inherent 
affront to totalitarian Stalinist logic, she nevertheless did not seem to have a theory of 
influence that would explain how the empire of poets would impact the masses, which is 
somewhat ironic considering that Akhmatova was a celebrity with a wide audience, who 
willingly sought out and participated in mechanisms of maintaining her celebrity status, 
particularly at the end of her life.25 Lotman, on the other hand, did have a theory of 
influence of ideas, which was similar to Pomerants’ conceptualization of late Soviet 
intelligentsia, in which notions of culturedness would radiate at the top and percolate 
down to the urbanized masses, and thus slowly but surely—and most importantly 
bloodlessly, without unnecessary disturbances!—establish the ground conditions for 
overcoming the Soviet repressive state, which would basically whither in the face of 
everyone’s triumphant ‘inner freedom.’26 But Lotman was not a celebrity with a public 
audience in the way of Akhmatova in the 60s-70s, and he did not attempt to produce 
writings at this time that would appeal to a mass audience. “The Decembrist in Everyday 
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Life” was an academic text, designed for circulation among other academics (it was 
published in an academic collection, by an academic publisher, with an academic print-
run),27 and though a generalized liberal belief in the salvific role of culturedness is quite 
evident in it, this message is not designed for mass consumption, even though it is 
expected to reach the masses eventually, through the power of semiotic magic. Thus, 
Akhmatova’s and Lotman’s approaches to the past differ as a result of their differences as 
social actors. Akhmatova the poet believed in the past of poets; Lotman the educator 
believed in the past of educators. 
In the present section, we will examine the case of Natan Eidel’man, who is in 
some ways a synthesis of Akhmatova’s and Lotman’s social positions, but in another way 
is cardinally different from either of them. Eidel’man was similar to Akhmatova in the 
sense that he was a little bit of an intelligentsia celebrity, and he was similar to Lotman in 
that he was also a historian of the nineteenth century. Crucially, however, Eidel’man was 
a popular historian, which made his intelligentsia status quite different from that of 
Akhmatova, and his scholarly status quite different from that of Lotman. Eidel’man did 
not want to claim something like an empire of poets for his self-legitimation—he wanted 
mass public demand. Similarly, he did not (and could not) claim to be an elitist initiator 
into culturedness and citizenship like Lotman—he wanted the status of a public 
intellectual and thus a public civic educator. For all of these reasons, Eidel’man’s use of 
the past was different from that of Akhmatova and Lotman. Eidel’man could not simply 
assume that his audience would believe the past to be relevant, he had to make it 
relevant—and he did so by making it both aesthetically and discursively appealing. With 
that in mind, let us now turn to Eidel’man’s earliest major monographic work with a 
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sizeable print run—his 1970 long-form piece of historical nonfiction on the life and times 
of the Decembrist Mikhail Lunin, published through the Lives of Extraordinary People 
publishing line at Molodaia Gvardiia.28 
Aesthetically, Lunin strives to make the past feel palpable and vibrant by 
providing extensive, full-length citations of free-wheeling letters from all involved and 
peripherally involved parties in the Decembrist’s biography. These letters are full of 
nicknames and references to seemingly irrelevant everyday-life events, such as news of 
travels of relatives, births of cousins, and so forth. Eidel’man injects clarifying footnotes 
to translate the French, or explain some antiquated diction, or to point out the historical 
context, but he almost never paraphrases his sources or abridges them, as one might 
expect in a scholarly article. This is because Eidel’man’s goal is to produce as much 
‘local color’ as possible, to make his popular text appealing to consume. As is well 
known, the 1960s was a time of burgeoning fashion for the pre-Soviet past among Soviet 
urban masses.29 I will speak about the matter much more further on, but for the moment 
let me just say that this fashion needs to be understood in the context of the growth of 
Soviet consumer society, in which, just as in the West, existing fantasy images could get 
repackaged and resold to consumers, satisfying and generating consumer demands. The 
difference between the consumerism of late Soviet urban professional classes and those 
of the consumer capitalist West described by Jean Baudrillard was only one of scale. In 
short, in the 1960s the past was acquiring consumerist desirability and the aesthetics of 
Eidel’man’s popular history speak to that desire. 
But Eidel’man’s Lunin is hardly all just a bunch of fancy names and pretty tidbits 
from a time long gone. It is rather a text whose popular accessibility depends on the 
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direct applicability of its cultural models and scripts to the present late Soviet moment. 
As scholars and eyewitnesses have pointed out, such a dynamic was unavoidable, 
because there was pressure from the state ideological apparatus in the 1970s to generate 
historical fiction that would both reinforce ossified official ideological narratives and 
garner a mass audience.30 The two goals quite obviously had the potential to run at odds 
with each other. Moreover, combined with elements of a de facto liberal social structure, 
the potential for political ambiguity and negotiation compounded. Thus, Gary Hamburg 
has observed how Eidel’man’s Lunin abounds with easy parallels between the 
Decembrists and present-day Brezhnevite political repressions and show-trials. Why were 
such obvious subtexts allowed into press, Hamburg wonders, and suggests an answer by 
pointing to a curious bit of Eidel’man’s diary, which discusses the clearing of Lunin past 
the censorship of Militsa Nechkina, the long-standing doyenne of Soviet orthodox 
Decembrist scholarship, in charge of the industry since the High Stalinist 1930s: 
Eidel´man's account of Lunin's judicial process was so transparently applicable to 
the Soviet system that Nechkina [...] felt obliged to ask Eidel´man to cut the 
discussion of Lunin's trial from his book. Remarkably, Eidel´man rejected her 
request, telling her that he had accurately reported the facts of the case […] 
Nechkina yielded to Eidel´man's judgment—an outcome that caused him to 
remark: “Militsa loved me, she loved me; otherwise, one word from her and she 
could have destroyed my book, but she chose not to.”31  
 
Eidel’man’s ability to maneuver his Aesopian reading past an establishment figure like 
Nechkina would not have been possible in earlier, more totalitarian times. The culture 
industry in the late Soviet period was enabled by a social dynamic in which the guardians 
of permissible speech were diffuse and subject to all sorts of pressures, including, in 
Eidel’man’s case, a combination of insistence on historical accuracy before a highly 
qualified (albeit orthodox) historian, and the deployment of personal charm. 
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Steering between the relatively flexible censorship of a de facto liberalized late 
Soviet social structure, ossified official ideological requirements, and consumer demands 
for contemporary relevance, Eidel’man had quite a bit of leeway to say what he wished to 
say, and he used that leeway to tell the story of a Decembrist who does not, as it were, 
“come out to the square at the appointed hour,”32 nor does he even support the idea of the 
revolt because he believes that “an untimely rebellion reinforces despotism.”33 Lunin is 
nevertheless apprehended, but then continues to shine with incredible moral resolve in 
the face of Nicholas’ investigative commission’s proceedings, and then, while in Siberian 
exile remains fearlessly committed to the cause of providing opposition to autocratic 
power.  Moreover, it quickly becomes clear to the reader of Eidel’man’s work that he 
admires Lunin not only for his exemplary humanity, or for his culturedness (as Lotman 
might have), but for his actual liberal political platform. Eidel’man argues that all of 
Lunin’s political activity is rooted in his personal liberal-humanist ideal of “Man” 
standing above all.34 And Eidel’man clearly admires Lunin’s political activity, especially 
his legalist dissident tactics. Hence, while under interrogation 
Lunin essentially declares the creator of the secret society to be none other than… 
Tsar Alexander I, and directly points to his speech at the Polish Sejm, where he 
had spoken of the gradual preparation of Russia for lawful liberal institutions. 
Even this very term is from the tsar’s speech. It had included the words 
“institutions libérales.” […] In his forthcoming answers Lunin will not stop citing 
the dead tsar: “lawful liberal… lawful liberal…” […] He is playing a dangerous 
game with power, as if testing it to see if he will be judged for actions that are not 
formally criminal? As if he doesn’t know—though of course he knows very 
well—one of the essential principles of authoritarianism [samovlast’e], later 
formulated by Shchedrin: “I tell him reason, and he tells me—hooey!..”35 
 
It is hard to read these words without thinking of someone like Alexander Esenin-Vol’pin, 
the 1960s legalist dissident, who coined the basic premise of his resistance as ‘respect 
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your own constitution.’ Indeed, Eidel’man’s personal deference to that legalist dissident 
position becomes all the more clear in his earlier, 1966 writing on the 1860s radical 
publicist Serno-Soloviev, in which he points out that  
Of the 32 prisoners only Serno knows his rights and demands that he be given the 
record [of the criminal accusations against him- PK]. And they give it to him. The 
other prisoners, who have since their childhood been conditioned to think that the 
authorities are allowed to do anything while their subjects are allowed to do 
nothing, do not even suspect that they too are allowed to examine their files.36 
 
Between these characterizations of Eidel’man’s historical heroes, we can see a dynamic 
of appropriation of the past that is significantly different from Lotman’s. Whereas 
Lotman would approach the past from the standpoint of possibly inheriting some abstract 
ideas of conduct from it, Eidel’man is willing to import actual useful political scripts. In 
his popular history of Lunin, and also of Serno, Eidel’man essentially writes an 
encomium for liberal rights. The question of the legitimacy of such a direct marshaling of 
history doesn’t seem to occur to him. In any case, he has no choice about the matter, 
because this style of reasoning is inherent in the genre of popular history, which can only 
be popular if it feels relevant, and it can only feel relevant if it erases distance between 
past and present by making the former into a straightforward lesson for the latter.  
Before we move on to our next case, let us close our discussion of Eidel’man with 
a curious case of reception. In 1966, just a few months after “Serno” was published in the 
journal Znanie-sila, an abridged version of the story appeared in a one-off issue of a 
monthly periodical, called The Russian Word [Russkoe slovo], founded by a certain 
Ryleev Club. The Club was promptly shut down and the only issue of its only publication 
was quashed, but not before it made it out to the West, where it was published as part of 
the anti-Soviet émigré thick journal, Grani. It is unclear if Russian Word simply 
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reproduced a version of “Serno” without Eidel’man’s knowledge or permission, but 
either way, it is fascinating to see how unabashedly bluntly this journal takes up the 
whole disposition of obvious contemporary relevance that enables Eidel’man’s historical 
nonfiction.37 First off, there are Russian Word’s first words, printed on the inside of the 
front cover, in all capital letters, stating that “THIS ISSUE OF THE LITERARY AND 
PUBLIC JOURNAL RUSSIAN WORD IS NOW RELEASED AFTER A HUNDRED-
YEAR HIATUS.” Then comes a letter from the editorial board, extolling the need for a 
“CULTURAL REVOLUTION.” After that comes Eidel’man’s story, which, aside from 
extensive abridgements, also features a subtle, but telling addition to the Znania-sila 
original. Describing Serno’s imprisonment and interrogation, and the pressures on him to 
give up his friends, the text lauds Serno’s impressive grace under pressure with a one-
liner set apart as a separate paragraph: “What’s essential is to be and to remain a human 
being!!!”38  In the 1966 Znanie-Sila version, this line occurs as part of the preceding 
paragraph and has just one exclamation point. In the later 1980 version the line 
disappears entirely.39 The additional exclamation marks in Russian Word may be 
Eidel’man’s own, or they might be an injection on the part of Russian Word’s editors, but 
either way this sort of extremist inflection fits Russian Word’s agenda perfectly. After all, 
this is a publication by two nineteen-year-olds.40 They’re inspired, fairly naïve readers, 
and their placement of Eidel’man’s essay at the front of the journal speaks to the way in 
which they think his popular history actually provides a concrete program for present-day 
action. In their rendering, Eidel’man’s popular history becomes a counter-myth of 
glorious origins for contemporary late Soviet liberalism. The nineteenth century here 
becomes not just a site of inheritance of behaviors, but of actual liberal political practice 
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and discourse as well—so much so that the journal’s creators can happily (and entirely 
unironically!) claim that their publication originated a hundred years earlier. And 









































IV. Mass Market Soviet Cinema and The Imperial Era:  
Motyl’s Star and Riazanov’s Poor Hussar  
 
“For me, overall, it is the music, the French language, the feeling of an 
endless road, it is Trubetskaia and Tseidler, it is the Annenkovs—the son 
and the mother. And Pauline! It’s the sorrow, and the overall undeclared 
but palpable feeling of history, which reaches far beyond 1825-1828. Did 
I like the film? Yes. No. Three times a tear caught my eye…” 
 
Natan Eidel’man, “A Feeling of History”41 
 
 The past three sections have tracked an arc of appropriation of the past among 
Late Soviet liberal cultural producers. I have examined how in the case of Akhmatova’s 
empire of poets, the past is contemporaneous with the present because it has perennial 
relevance, and I have pointed out how this gesture reinforces the empire of poets as a 
structurally liberal social institution, while also considering the limitations of this kind of 
political imaginary by pointing out Akhmatova’s lack of interest in considering the way 
in which her empire should project its influence on greater popular culture (even though 
in practice Akhmatova attempts just that, especially in the 1950s-60s). In the case of 
Lotman, I have considered another elitist approach to the past, which underlines the 
mechanisms of its heritability and potential social efficacy—specifically, I have pointed 
out Lotman’s interest in certain notions of culturedness that had been generated by early 
nineteenth-century cultural elites, that had impressive influence in their time and may 
very well continue to have such impact in the present day. And with the case of 
Eidel’man, I have shown a more mass-culture approach to the past—one that, far more 
than Akhmatova’s and Lotman’s, relies on key late Soviet social developments—the 
exigencies of the ossified Soviet ideological apparatus, the growth of the urban educated 
consumer society (Solzhenitsyn’s ‘obrazovanshchina’), and the de facto liberalization of 
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structures of censorship and control—and uses all of these transformations to tell and to 
sell the story of a past that is directly discursively, politically relevant to the present. I 
will now continue our set vector towards more mass-market liberal deployments of the 
pre-Soviet past, by considering two works of mass entertainment with far greater reach 
than Eidel’man could have ever dreamed of: Vladimir Motyl’s slick Decembrist tear-
jerker feature film, The Captivating Star of Happiness (1975), and El’dar Riazanov’s 
made-for-TV ironic tragicomedy, Say a Word for the Poor Hussar (1980).42 I will 
examine the way in which both of these films are able to package the past as lyrical, 
desirable consumer objects, and the discursive effects of such a repackaging. With 
Motyl’s Star I will show how the past-as-lyric becomes almost a fully de-ideologized 
object of consumer exchange, which for that very reason already points beyond the limits 
of Soviet off-brand consumer modernity; With Riazanov’s Say a Word I will show a 
more complicated dynamic, in which the film both ironizes the Russian Golden Age’s 
status as a present-day consumer object, but also subtly critiques the viewer’s implicit 
ideology of emotional investment in the past’s mythical status. 
  
The case of Motyl’s Star  
 
 In her book on the representation of the “Decembrist Myth in Russian Culture,” 
Ludmilla Trigos is generally right to be dismissive of Motyl’s “Star of Captivating 
Happiness” (1975), a movie released to mark a 150-year anniversary of the Decembrist 
revolt, which happened to coincide with the peak of the Brezhnevite period of cultural 
censorship, later referred to as the epoch of Soviet decadence [epokha zastoia]. Official 
press for the anniversary capped off with a missive from Militsa Nechkina, the doyenne 
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of ossified Soviet historiography of the Decembrists’ place in the Revolutionary 
movement; Motyl’s film happily obliged. Trigos sees Star as the case of a “smash hit” 
director being commissioned by the Soviet state to celebrate the Decembrists and 
International Women’s Day together, thus “deflect[ing]” the Decembrists’ “subversive 
potentiality by valorizing the wives’ traditional feminine images.”43 In that regard, it is 
useful to compare Trigos’ recent appraisal of the movie to that of Eidel’man’s 
contemporary review, which partly criticized the film for its historical inaccuracies, but 
was generally positive about the “feeling of history” that it renders on screen. It should be 
obvious that Eidel’man’s sense of the film’s ‘truthiness’ is the flipside of the discursive 
banality rightly noted by Trigos. The film supplements its discursive lacuna with 
emotions and aesthetics. By investing so much weight into a lyrical rendering of the 
Decembrist story, it produces a “feeling of history” that Eidel’man enjoys. In what 
follows, I will briefly show exactly how Motyl’s film turns the Decembrist story into a 
lyric, as well as the cultural ideology that authorizes Motyl to make such an interpretation. 
The two-part biopic follows the famous story of the Decembrist uprising and its 
aftermath, focusing in particular on the travails of Maria Volkonskaia and Ekaterina 
Trubetskaia, the wives of the rebelling princes Sergei Volkonsky and Sergei Trubetskoi, 
as well as Pauline Gueble, the fiancée of the cavalry lieutenant [poruchik] Ivan Annenkov. 
Part One of the film’s chronology is anchored by the revolt in St. Petersburg on 
December 14, 1825 and the verdict on July 13, 1826, while Part Two begins after the 
verdict and concludes with the wedding of Pauline Gueble and Annenkov in Siberia, 
where the latter is still condemned to hard labor in the spring of 1828. Both parts abound 
with minor and moderate historical inaccuracies; Eidel’man surmises that “the director, 
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the screenwriter and the historical consultants all know very well” that none of these 
things happened, but that they made the changes because “the authors needed them” in 
order to represent “the brutality and inhumanity of power” and so forth.44 Eidel’man’s 
observation seems on point, but we should add the caveat that in at least one of his listed 
cases of inaccuracies—that of Alexander Bestuzhev’s interrogation—the film is so 
thoroughly unclear that it seems misplaced to judge it by any bar of historical accuracy 
whatsoever. As non-specialist viewers we have absolutely no idea who the character 
Eidel’man assumes to be Bestuzhev actually is. He is never referred to by name in the 
movie, he says only a few lines, in the last of which he calls Tsar Nicholas a pig, and 
after that we never hear from him again.45 This is because the film is fundamentally 
uninterested in history per se. Rather, it aims to present a “feeling of history,” by 
inundating viewers with a certain depth and richness of images that makes us believe in 
the story’s authenticity, without actually engaging with the events on a discursive level.  
Yet Star’s “feeling of history” plays second fiddle to the film’s main goal, namely 
unrestrained, pure “feeling” itself. The film’s central goal is to make the audience cry. 
And the film was apparently effective enough that even Eidel’man complied. Stylistically, 
Motyl’ pursues this tear-jerker effect by a combination of prodigious cutting and a 
luscious stylized Romantic classical music score by Isaak Shvarts. Shvarts’ score 
throughout Star is so omni-present and engrossing that at times the film feels like a music 
video. Along those same lines, Motyl’s montage is so aggressive as to make it very 
difficult to understand what is really being said about the politics of the revolt, as well as 
its timing. There are, depending how one counts, between 63 to 75 cuts going backwards 
and forwards in time in Part One alone, which is only 81 minutes long, and which 
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features at least 25 different settings, 10 of them from different, unidentified 
chronological points prior to December 1825. Motyl is also enamored of introducing new 
plotlines with a one-second flash of the forthcoming footage as the preceding scene is 
being tapered off—there are at least four prominent cases of this in Part One, and more in 
Part Two. Conversations often continue off-screen from the preceding scene, even as the 
picture moves on to the next, and vice versa. Speech is very often muted and supplanted 
by music—particularly in the early scenes of Part One, during Prince Volkonsky’s 
flashbacks to prior conversations with Pestel and other Decembrist leaders. Moreover, 
when speech is not muted, it often takes place in French, with only an occasional Russian 
voiceover. All of this has a disorienting effect vis-à-vis the scenes’ discursive content, but 
no disorientation is actually felt by the viewer of Star, because Motyl’s montage comes 
along with so much music that we interpret the juxtaposed images’ emotional plane, 
rather than the words spoken in them. And the fact that some exchanges are spoken in a 
romantically-coded, untranslated foreign language further emphasizes the lyrical effect. 
The other part of Star’s lyrical strategy pertains to its engagement with the 
Russian literary canon. Star assumes from its audience a secondary-school knowledge of 
Russian literary canon from or about the ‘Age of Pushkin.’ This much is apparent from 
the film’s title. But the film also makes some interesting unreflective deployments of 
canon, which betray its authors’ implicit ideological positions. We can observe this 
dynamic in the way the film deploys Nikolai Nekrasov’s Russian Women, a long-form 
two-part poem dedicated to the travails of Ekaterina Trubetskaia and Maria Volkonskaia, 
written in 1871.46 There is no point at which the film makes clear that Nekrasov is its 
main source text, which is why even a viewer as astute as Eidel’man does not understand 
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some of Star’s visual turns. For instance, there is a point where, while already in Siberia, 
Trubetskaia has a flashback to earlier happy times in Italy. “Why Italy? What is Italy for?” 
Eidel’man the viewer wonders, because Nekrasov’s poem is not on his mind. For the 
same reason Eidel’man thinks there is a brief quote of Pushkin in the film, showing 
Volkonskaia running away from a sea wave—he doesn’t realize that this moment too is 
plucked not from Pushkin, but from Nekrasov’s citation of Pushkin. We can tell that this 
is the case because Pushkin is actually there in the shot (see Figure 1, below).47 In this 
twelve-second segment, Pushkin doesn’t say anything, stands in the background, and 
hardly even looks like himself, but it’s certainly him, and we know it must be him 
because Nekrasov stages this exact scene in his poem: 
And Pushkin was here… I recognized him… 
He was our childhood friend […] 
Our whole family traveled to Crimea, 
And Pushkin came along with us. […] 
Leaving my family, I flew like an arrow 
After the curly-haired poet; […] 
I jumped and I played with the sea […] 
And Pushkin looked on… and laughed that I 
Got my shoes wet.48  
 
The fact that even a watcher as astute as Eidel’man doesn’t catch this ‘Easter egg’ makes 
one wonder—just exactly why is it there and who is it for? Star deeply believes in the 
existence and a priori power of the literary canon from which it draws its images. Motyl 
assumes that he can move us with the image of Volkonskaia running in and out of 
seawaves, whether or not we know this image’s literary source. He assumes this because 
he believes that ‘the greats’ have produced a timeless emotive vocabulary, that the works 
of great poets have some kind of ontic, transcendent power to move people. Motyl’s film 





Figure 1: Pushkin appears for a split second in Motyl’s film, behind Volkonskaia's parents, looking on. 
Which brings us to the final issue, the question of the timelessness of Star. As 
Trigos has argued, Star is ‘timeless’ partly in its choice of subject matter. The story of the 
Decembrists’ wives stands outside of history, because it is underpinned by patriarchal 
social mores that have mostly dominated Russian culture for at least the last 200 years. 
And though it is certainly possible to point out, with Lotman, that the dekabristki really 
did commit a political act by following their husbands to Siberia, we do not have to think 
like Lotman. We can simply tell the story of the dekabristki to confirm all of our existing 
chauvinist cultural fantasies about good loyal women, which is precisely what Motyl’s 
film does. But there is another level on which Star believes in ‘timelessness’—namely, it 
believes in the ‘timelessness’ of the emotional appeal of Russia’s Golden-Age past. And 
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nowhere is this particular ideology more obvious than in Star’s use of Okudzhava’s 
“Song of the Cavalier Guard” as the leitmotif for the Annenkov-Gueble love-story. In 
Eidel’man’s view, Okudzhava’s song is a “wonderful, sad, Decembrist, ‘truly our own 
[нашенский]’ romance.” How can that be so? How can a text by a famous 1970s singer-
songwriter (about whom we’ll speak at length shortly) be both “Decembrist” and “truly 
our own”? Okudzhava’s text is “Decembrist” because it is stylized according to 
nineteenth-century language, mentioning “cavalier-guardsmen,” “young maidens,” 
“swords” and so forth. Moreover, its deployment in the film interlaces with so much 
glittering, fairytale nineteenth century, full of untranslated French-language horseplay 
between the beautiful Pauline and Annenkov in his glistening white cavalier-guard 
uniform, that we are not left any room to doubt the song’s ‘authenticity.’ But what makes 
it “truly our own”? I think it is the assumption that this stylized, mass-market image of 
the nineteenth century is our own. It belongs to “us,” to the 1970s, having been created 
according to processes of consumer demand for de-ideologized rom-com fantasy. Which 
is to say that Motyl’s cautious Brezhnevite refusal to engage in any kind of discursive, 
politicized reckoning with the Decembrist narrative ultimately yields a product that is 
structurally anti-Soviet, precisely because it is motivated by the forces of liberal 
consumer modernity that are the same as the ones at play in twentieth-century Western 
capitalist entertainment industry. Motyl, together with Okudzhava produces timeless 
emotion, to satisfy late Soviet consumer demand. The past as de-historicized lyrical 
fantasy can be consumed by anyone. It acquires the status of widely exchangeable, 
fetishized currency, and so too do its lines from Pushkin and its visual quotes of 
Nekrasov.  In short, the past in Motyl’s Star becomes thoroughly aestheticized, 
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thoroughly mass culture. 
 
Riazanov’s Say a Word for the Poor Hussar 
 
 Many of the dynamics of Motyl’s Star appear in El’dar Riazanov’s Say a Word 
for the Poor Hussar (1980). However, this film’s satirical nature makes for a more 
complicated rendition of the consumerized image of the pre-Soviet past. Whereas Star 
produces a “feeling of history” as a slick formal component of its lyrical brew, Riazanov 
makes his “feeling of history” play a thematic role in his film. Say a Word quite 
consciously presents a stereotyped past for the viewers’ ironic enjoyment, but at the same 
time the film so skillfully manipulates that same image’s emotional impact that it 
becomes difficult to tell just where exactly the viewers stand with respect to it: outside, as 
knowing and wise (maybe even cynical and post-modern) consumers?—or inside, as the 
unwilling and unknowing actors in Riazanov’s multi-tiered game of satirical critique? 
 To start with, let us consider Say a Word for the Poor Hussar in light of 
Riazanov’s far older film, the 1962 operetta Hussar Ballad.49 The differences between 
the two films are, of course, vast. Hussar Ballad is a campy operetta, whose characters 
spontaneously burst into song, clank swords in even rhythm, and knock out bad guys with 
occasional help from a burly Russian peasant armed with a very large sofa. The 
operetta’s plot revolves around a 17-year-old tomboy noblewoman pretending to be a 
man in order to serve as a fearless hussar in the War of 1812 (supposedly, her character is 
based on Alexander Alexandrov / Nadezhda Durova, a cavalry officer in the Napoleonic 
wars, who was born anatomically female). In the process, she strikes up a homoerotic 
friendship with the equally valiant, but somewhat undomesticated hussar Lieutenant 
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[poruchik] Rzhevsky—a relationship which almost ends in a duel, but which the power of 
rhyming quatrains magically transforms into true love and a marriage proposal (with 
absolutely no room for discussion of the gender complexities involved in such a turn of 
events). Say a Word is a film of an entirely different tenor. This much is apparent already 
from the film’s opening shots—three minutes of extended bird’s eye flyovers of Russian 
nature, and Petrine and Catherinian palace grounds, with manicured French gardens and 
neoclassical facades (see Figure 2). Say a Word’s story is not the stuff of musical 
operettas—it is a comical but generally naturalist tale of the tragic end of a provincial 
theater actor Afanasii, as a result of an intrigue by a Tsarist political security agent, count 
Merzliaev, who had been sent to test the loyalties of a hussar regiment that is garrisoned 
there. And sadly, Merzliaev ultimately more or less succeeds in his mission—the film’s 
other protagonist, the valiant but hapless cavalryman Pletnev, ends up failing Merzliaev’s 
test and thus loses his rank and his regiment (though not his friends’ respect). The film 
has no swash-buckling scenes, no burly patriotic peasants, and no silent cardboard 
enemies. And yet Say a Word is undoubtedly related to Riazanov’s 1962 operetta, and the  
relationship is both explicit and implicit. Explicitly, Say a Word opens with one minute of 
credits that look exactly like those of Hussar Ballad—with words rolling over a stylized 
19th century military novel frontispiece background (See Figures 3, below). And 
implicitly, Say a Word’s cavalryman Pletnev is undoubtedly the offspring of Hussar 
Ballad’s Rzhevsky. It is not that the two are similar characters. It is rather that Pletnev is 
Rzhevsky—except he’s not the Rzhevsky of Riazanov’s original film, but the Rzhevsky 
of extremely popular late Soviet urban jokelore that evolved out of Riazanov’s film.  
As is well known, the late Soviet period saw a vibrant burgeoning of the urban 
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folkloric genre of the narrative joke (anekdot). The reasons for this growth are various, 
but the most important one for our purposes is the expansion of late Soviet mass media, 
which provided the stock characters for nearly all of the jokes.50 Skirting past the whole 
 
Figure 2: Extensive flyover sequences set in the palatial outskirts of St. Petersburg book-end Riazanov's film. 
		 	
Figure	3:	Compare	the	Napoleonic	era	stylized	background	for	Hussar	Ballad	(left)	and	Say	a	Word	(right)	
Lenin-Brezhnev oeuvre of late Soviet political humor, as well as Soviet ethnic jokes 
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(most of which are far too offensive for the pluralist American ear), we can use Russian 
Wikipedia’s hive mind to point to four other major late Soviet jokelore cycles based on 
USSR’s culture industry sources: 1) the adventures of Soviet master spy Stielritz from the 
highly popular 1970s miniseries, Seventeen Moments of Spring; 2) the adventures of the 
Civil War hero commander Chapaev and his sidekick Pet’ka, familiar from the Vasiliev 
brothers’ famous 1934 adaptation of Furmanov’s 1923 novel; 3) the antics of Sherlock 
Holmes and Doctor Watson, from the acclaimed 1978-1986 made-for-tv Soviet 
adaptations of Conan Doyle’s novels; and 4) the encounters of Poruchik Rzhevsky and 
Natasha Rostova, in which the former originated from Hussar Ballad and the latter from 
Sergei Bondarchuk’s adaptation of Tolstoy’s War and Peace.51 This list of stock jokelore 
characters confirms a key dynamic—that late Soviet urban culture was permeated by 
mass media stock images, that some version of a pre-Soviet past had already become one 
of those stock images, and that this development happened thanks to the burgeoning of 
film and television. To put it another way—Natasha Rostova did not make it into jokelore 
as a result of mass readership of Tolstoy’s famous novel (even though it did have mass 
readership); it was Bondarchuk’s film that did the job, and we know this partly because 
we can trace the joke to its origins in the late 1960s and partly because jokelore Natasha 
interacts with Rzhevsky, who is from another fictional universe, but one that is also from 
the movies, and also from the 1960s. Having said this, we should also add that jokelore 
Rzhevsky only distantly resembles Riazanov’s 1962 protagonist, and certainly does not in 
any way resemble his real nineteenth-century prototypes. Rzhevsky/Natasha jokes 
juxtapose the Tolstoyan heroine’s dainty aristocratic manner to Rzhevsky’s glorious 
uncouthness and libertinism. Aside from his freewheeling sexual exploits (which include 
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women, men, prostitutes, children and farm animals), jokelore Rzhevsky defines himself 
through a triumphant embrace of unculturedness [nekul’turnost’]—a combination of 
aesthetic and socio-moral ignorance. None of these traits define Riazanov’s 1962 
protagonist, whom we might characterize instead as a relatively valiant hussar with a bit 
of unwarranted braggadocio about military prowess and romantic success. But the power 
of modern urban folklore is such that this fairly tame personage, thanks to fifteen years of 
relentless efforts by Soviet schoolchildren, transformed in popular imagination into a 
blithely obnoxious permanent brothel-denizen and womanizer. And in Say a Word, 
Riazanov happily embraces this new version of his hussar, who returns to him as a 
prodigal son. The jokelore Rzhevsky, reincarnates into Say a Word’s Pletnev—who is a 
regular with the prostitutes, can’t behave himself in the theater, has never read a book, 
and spends most of his mental efforts in pursuit of Afanasii’s daughter Nastia (which 
sounds fairly tame, but Say a Word is a made-for-TV New Year’s special, after all). 
 Riazanov’s deployment of jokelore Rzhevsky to create Pletnev points to the 
film’s playful dynamic vis-à-vis its image of the past. With Rzhevsky, Say a Word winks 
at popular culture, indicating that it is aware of the existence of a ridiculous late Soviet 
stock-image of a pre-Soviet past. We know to laugh and we know that the film laughs 
with us, as we watch our pseudo-nineteenth-century hussar actually serve as the 
protagonist of this otherwise naturalist period piece. And the film also employs other 
techniques, to achieve a similar effect. For instance, as the film’s opening flyover shots of 
summery Peterhof and idyllic Russian natural settings transition into the telling of the 
plot (starting with showing Merzliaev on his way to the town of Gubernsk), we hear a 
storyteller’s playful off-screen narration which, combined with the images on screen, 
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conjures up a sort of Gestalt pop-culture image of pre-Revolutionary Russia. Unlike 
Motyl’s Star, however, Riazanov’s Say a Word wants us to approach this composite 
image ironically, as opposed to purely lyrically—Riazanov wants us both to enjoy his 
“feeling of history” and to laugh at it. And so the offscreen narration is suddenly 
interrupted by a quick image of a duel taking place outside count Merzliaev’s moving 
carriage. “What’s going on out there?” the narrator interrupts, while the camera pans 
Merzliaev’s briefly concerned face.  “Ah, a trifle”—and the narration continues (See 
Figure 4). And shortly thereafter, after the carriage comes to a stop, we see the 
excessively well-dressed count enjoy his scenic lunch for one: 
Merzliaev: How will you be treating me today, my dears? 
Egorych (his servant): Pardon me, your excellency, but it’s caviar again. 
Merzliaev: Again caviar? What a scandal. Well then. 
 
With just a few lines of this dialogue we begin to hate Merzliaev, but the film makes us  
reach this conclusion ironically, by comically exaggerating all Soviet clichés about 
ancien régime fatcat noblemen. So too with the duel outside Merzliaev’s window—it is 
us, the late Soviet audience who tend to think along the lines of ‘Tsarist-Russia-
Therefore-Duels,’ so of course we happen to ride past one of these “trifles.” A similar 
effect is also achieved with Merzliev’s incessant quotation of classic Russian poets 
during his cloying and disingenuous courtship of Nastia. Merzliav’s quotations, 
comprised entirely of first lines from famous poems by Pushkin, Lermontov and Tiutchev, 
are all famous to the point of triteness for us, the late Soviet audience. Merzliav’s 
effusive use of these texts expresses not only the historicist irony of a cynical gendarme 
citing the verses of anti-government sympathizers (sans Tiutchev), but also the irony of a 




Figure 4: Merzliaev casually observes a duel out of the window of his carriage. Within a few seconds, both men take 
shots and drop dead. "A trifle," Merzliaev concludes. 
 However, for all of Riazanov’s ironic deployment of a mediatized, mass-culture 
version of the pre-Soviet past, he also plays a far subtler game. For instance, the long 
scenic flyovers that frame the film are only sometimes paired with humorous text. Other 
times—and there are many other times—these long flyovers are coupled with highly 
lyrical performances of songs written in the nineteenth-century romance style, using 
nineteenth-century sources. The opening of Part Two is a three-minute flyover shot of the 
same gardens and neoclassical facades as in Part One, but now these are coupled with a 
moving minor-key musical rendering of Peter Viazemsky’s 1861 poem, “To Friends.” 





I drink to the health of the faraway,    
Faraway, yet wonderful friends,    
Friends who are lonely as I am  
Among those who are strange to their hearts.  
 
The lyrical performance of these verses alongside the flyover shots produces a feeling of 
nostalgia vis-à-vis Russia’s beautiful pre-Revolutionary past, full of “distant, but sweet 
friends.” On the one hand we can poke fun at the late Soviet Gestalt of it all, but on the 
other hand the film genuinely wants to move us with that same image, by making us feel 
like it is somehow, in some greater sense, really true and pertains to a “Russia that we 
have lost” (to borrow the title of Govorukhin’s Perestroika-era documentary, which will 
be discussed at length in Chapter Three). 
When watching Riazanov’s film, we end up in a curious position, which seems to 
hold no matter how well-informed we are. If we are very well informed, then we might 
happily take apart the film’s strategy of authenticity here and elsewhere, by noting the 
anachronism of accompanying action set in the 1840s with Viazemsky’s verse from the 
1860s. In that same vein, we can call out Nastia’s performance of a poem by Marina 
Tsvetaeva, about 1812, but written in 1913. But even if we know this, it still bothers us 
not at all. Even if we know that there is no distance in this film between Pushkin, 
Tiutchev, Viazemsky and Tsvetaeva, even if we know that 200 years of aesthetic culture 
(if we include the Petrine neoclassical settings) combine into a single image of a bygone 
era—even if we know all of this, and even if we are expected to laugh about the fact that 
this era is a construction of our time, it still for some reason feels good. It is still effective. 
We know it is a fantasy, and yet we still enjoy it. 
  But can we? Or should we? To what end? Maybe the self-awareness about the 
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Sovietism of Riazanov’s fairy-tale past, which we are expected to bring to his film, 
should help us find its contemporary Aesopian allegorical meanings? If that is really the 
case, then we are in luck—the film makes the drawing of allegories pretty easy. It is not 
very challenging to read Brezhnevism into lines like, “it was a time when the best minds 
were thinking, but kept quiet, because their mouths were being muzzled, while the worst 
minds spoke, even though, to be sure, they could have kept quiet.” It is also quite easy to 
read the whole Soviet political censorship apparatus into Merzliav, the image of a well-
educated but thoroughly disingenuous and cynical apparatchik. Indeed, if we were to look 
for Merzliaev’s real-life equivalent, we might consider Gosteleradio’s infamous 
gendarmist chief, Sergei Lapin, who happened to have made Riazanov’s work on the film 
particularly difficult.52 But on the other hand, Say a Word’s pre-Revolutionary setting is 
much more than just a stage for contemporary satirical caricatures. It is an emotionally 
appealing place in its own right, thanks to Riazanov’s cinematic techniques and Andrei 
Petrov’s stylized nineteenth-century military wind-ensemble film score. No matter how 
ironically we watch it, Golden Age Russia in Riazanov’s film always feels like more than 
just a game. Which brings us to the film’s central narrative trope, its fabula, as it were, 
which revolves around dramatic irony and the question of who is acting and who is not.  
The film’s plot revolves around a number of increasingly high-stakes cases of 
dramatic irony, all of which are initiated by Merzliaev. First, Merzliaev enlists the actor 
Afanasii to play a revolutionary ‘carobonari’ ringleader and arranges for the hussar 
regiment to execute the traitor. The firing squad will not know they are using blank 
bullets, and thus any hesitation on their part will reveal them as politically unreliable. The 
hussar regiment is appalled at their assignment, and so its commander, the Colonel, 
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hatches a scheme to spring Afanasii from jail by having Pletnev accompany him and then 
pretend to be ambushed by Afanasii’s revolutionary comrades. Afanasii realizes that his 
game is about to get some good people into trouble and so at the last moment tries to get 
Pletnev to understand that he is only acting, but Pletnev is too uneducated to catch the 
hint. However, Pletnev’s mock ambush ends up accidentally looking so convincing that 
even Merzliaev himself is somewhat confused. Afanasii actually tries to escape in order 
to help Pletnev, but Merzliaev catches him, and then, as a last ditch effort to protect 
Pletnev from a terrible fate Afanasii decides to tell Merzliaev that he really is a carbonari 
and that his revolutionary comrades really did try to spring him from prison. Merzliaev is 
unconvinced, but decides to call Afanasii’s bluff and has him believe that now he really 
will be shot. At the film’s emotional apex, we arrive to the execution grounds, where 
Afanasii tells the hussar firing squad that all the guns are blank (even though he thinks 
they are loaded). Merzliaev calls his bluff again and tells him to shoot himself “to save 
the soldiers from sin.” Afanasii hesitates, but ultimately takes the gun and shoots himself. 
As it turns out, the gun is also blank, but tragically Afanasii dies anyway, from a heart 
attack. All throughout this plot of fluctuation between play and reality, we also witness a 
series of running jokes that function according to the same dynamic, with Merzliaev 
asking various people around him to act like carbonari and to insult him with political 
outbursts. Predictably, even his most loyal underlings do this job so well that Merzliaev 
himself begins to suspect that they might really mean it.  
With the film’s explicit fabula in mind, it becomes clear that it is also reflected on 
the picture’s formal level. As consumers of the film’s fairytale nineteenth century, we 
sometimes stop being able to tell—or even worse, we sometimes willfully ignore—that 
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this setting’s emotional effect is constantly being constructed, that we are players in this 
mass media simulacrum. We might observe the main plot with an all-knowing ironic 
smirk, but we do not have such a luxury of smug knowledge about our own participation 
in the film’s double-dealing with the pre-Revolutionary past. Moreover, this film double-
deals not only to maintain a space of pleasant ironic ambiguity, but also to hoodwink us. 
The film, like Merzliaev, ultimately wants to win at its game of play versus reality. To 
that effect, there are points in the picture that feel like Riazanov’s private jokes, not 
meant for our discovery. The biggest such point takes place in the latter third of Part One, 
when we witness a morning in the hussar camp after a night at the brothel. As we shift 
through a series of coy images of cavalrymen dragging themselves suggestively out of 
rumpled hay (with no actual women being present—this is family television), we hear a 
playful song, with lyrics from Mikhail Svetlov’s 1928 poem, “The Great Road.” The film 
renders Svetlov’s poem in a light-hearted way, by using only the first half of it, which 
seems to extol the sexual exploits of dashing nineteenth-century military men. But such a 
reading does tremendous violence to Svetlov’s text, for two reasons. For one thing, the 
second half of the poem expresses serious skepticism about the ethic of reckless sexual 
violence that underpins the seemingly idyllic hussar lifestyle. And secondly, the second 
half of the poem is not about the nineteenth century at all, but about early Soviet 
revolutionary anxiety with respect to the dangerous possibility of willy-nilly inheriting 
Tsarist traditions and tainting the socialist dream. Svetlov’s poem’s final quatrain reads:  
 Forgive us, our wives! 
 Forgive us, our epoch, 
 Our hussar traditions’  




Svetlov’s poem is not a case of nostalgia for ‘the Russia that we have lost.’ It is rather a 
text of genuine social critique, a poem about the difficulty of overcoming a tradition of 
glorifying violence, from the perspective of a communist true believer. None of that 
context comes through in Riazanov’s rendering. 
 This little example of a well-covered ‘Easter egg’ is, in a way, the polar opposite 
of Motyl’s techniques. It reveals a very different ideology of canon. If for Motyl, 
Nekrasov’s lyrical images are believed to have a kind of a priori lyrical effect, whether or 
not their source is recognized, for Riazanov Svetlov’s images have this lyrical effect only 
when he does conscious violence to them and we the viewers do not recognize it. Motyl 
believes in canon’s demiurgic power; Riazanov believes in his own demiurgic power to 
manipulate canon. Motyl’s position is, at the end of the day, contiguous with the liberal 
cultural tradition; Riazanov’s position is aggressively post-modern. Perhaps his position 
corresponds to a further step in the evolution of late Soviet liberal discourse on the past. 
Or perhaps it is the harbinger of post-Soviet cynical pragmatics of manipulation of that 
past, dictated strictly by contemporary aesthetic and political exigencies. Motyl in 1975 
was still trying to produce a mass-market version of his liberal fantasy, in which he still 
believed, even though he seemingly accidentally turned it into a de-ideologized consumer 
product. Riazanov in 1980 knows that his audience still believes—and so he happily 
supplies a desirable simulacrum of a past, while knowing himself that this simulacrum 








V. Everyone Already Knows Everything: 
Bulat Okudzhava’s Gulp of Freedom  
 
“Let’s grab each other’s hands, friends!” 
 
Bulat Okudzhava, “An Old Student Song” (1967) 
 
 
 To conclude this chapter’s overview of the use of pre-Soviet past in late Soviet 
liberal cultural production, let us consider the case of Bulat Okudzhava, and in particular 
his 1971 historical fiction novel, A Gulp of Freedom. I turn to Okudzhava because of his 
social standing as a late Soviet liberal mass celebrity. Whereas Akhmatova’s celebrity 
status had been assured by her empire of poets, with little interest in the linkages between 
that elite coterie and the actual mass audience reading her work, Okudzhava consciously 
staked his celebrity strategy on a Soviet mass audience and the structural mechanisms 
that held it together—namely, mass media and the late Soviet urban lifestyle. Okudzhava 
used the mechanisms of late Soviet mass culture quite successfully. He appeared on 
television, he made records, and he placed his songs in extremely successful Soviet mass-
market film productions—the most prominent of these is probably Vladimir Motyl’s 
White Sun of the Desert (1970), a smash hit in its own time and a cult classic to this day, 
whose lead song by Okudzhava, “Your Excellency, Lady Luck” has been on the lips of 
millions of inebriated guitar-playing Russians for 45 years and counting (in passing, we 
might mention that the character singing that song is an old Tsarist has-been).54 As for 
late Soviet urban lifestyle—without delving too far into the matter, we should keep in 
mind perhaps the most impactful mass social development of the 1960s-1980s: the 
growth of private living space as a result of late Soviet urban residents moving into first 
Khrushchev’s gloriously ugly pre-fabricated concrete apartment boxes, and then 
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Brezhnev’s slightly less ugly ones. These apartments installed a notion of privacy as an 
inalienable attribute of late Soviet socialist off-brand modernity, which in turn enabled 
the growth of the late Soviet culture industry, especially television. Private 
accommodations also enabled the rise of other consumer electronics, leading to the 
growth of samizdat and magnitizdat. The latter in particular greatly aided the spread of 
recordings of late Soviet singer-songwriters—the so-called ‘bards,’ among whom 
Okudzhava was prominent.55 The late Soviet notion of privacy also directly impacted the 
thematics of Okudzhava’s self-presentation. His poetic self-image as a private intellectual, 
musing about his “little patria” of the historic central Moscow Arbat district, played to 
the fantasies of his urban middle class listeners.  
The issue of late Soviet privacy naturally leads us to Yurchak’s anthropology of 
svoi.56 Yurchak’s description of late Soviet urban society as a bunch of groups of svoi 
perfectly fits the social self-image of Okudzhava’s listeners, a kind of private, self-
organized in-group, encouraged by Okudhzava to “grab each other’s hands, friends!” and 
thus unite in mutual recognition (Yurchak himself uses the example of another bard, 
Vladimir Vysotsky). The svoi were adept at commandeering Soviet solipsistic and now 
fully “performatively shifted” (but still officially totalitarian) state discourse in order to 
thrive as de facto de-centralized social circles. However, this dynamic also made it very 
difficult for Yurchak’s supposedly de-politicized svoi to draw discursive boundaries 
around their communities. How would one really know who truly belongs in one’s circle? 
Where are the limits of each group of svoi? In other words, we are looking at the problem 
of forging a structurally liberal community under conditions of late Soviet repressions. 
On the one hand, I think it was an article of faith among liberal elites that such a 
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community existed—Okudzhava’s “Let’s grab each other’s hands, friends!” certainly 
expresses that ideology. Through a semiotics of semi-dissidence, which could include a 
great deal of behaviors enumerated by Yurchak, as well as through discursive moves like 
the ones we’ve already been discussing, especially Aesopian allegory, one was supposed 
to recognize who was in and who was out. But the larger a social circle becomes, the less 
clear the signals that one can afford to send, the more one has to assume everyone else’s 
belonging on faith. But if one is standing in the crowded hall of a Palace of Culture and 
Okudzhava asks the audience to “grab each other’s hands, friends!”, how does one know 
they are really friends? Is it just because they are at the same concert?  
Okudzhava’s semi-dissident liberal celebrity status presents a certain limit case of 
the liberalization of late Soviet society. On the one hand, he and other bards were semi-
dissidents as a result of Soviet ideological institutions that rewarded them for not passing 
into fully articulated dissenting positions and could also punish them if they did. On the 
other hand, the bards by their sheer existence expressed a kind of structural dissent. Their 
celebrity status was based on a de facto liberal social organization, which ran counter to 
albeit solipsistic and ineffective, but still official Soviet totalitarian ideology. This 
conundrum did not immediately become clear to the originally idealistic ‘people of the 
sixties,’ such as Okudzhava himself. In the early Thaw years, Okudzhava and his peers 
were inspired by the Party’s supposed promise of de-Stalinization, purification, and the 
rhetoric of a return to Leninist ideals. They all assumed that everyone was in this project 
together, that there was supposed to be no daylight between their civic position and that 
of the state. As the Thaw progressed and post-Soviet ideological mechanisms took on 
clearer shapes, it soon became obvious that the erstwhile idealists had been mistaken. The 
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final crushing of their hopes took place in Prague Spring, when the split between the 
liberally-minded ‘society’ and the state became too obvious to ignore (though in truth 
such a split had already been all but ensured ten years earlier, at the very advent of the 
state’s de-Stalinization policy). And significantly for our purposes, Prague Spring was 
also the point when the disillusioned ‘sixtier’ Okudzhava began to write historical fiction, 
starting with the account of the lowly provincial nobleman Ivan Avrosimov, who gets in 
way over his head when he begins to serve as a note-taker for the 1826 Imperial 
Commission’s investigation of the Decembrist ringleader Pavel Pestel. 
The thick-journal novel Poor Avrosimov (1969), which two years later was turned 
into Politizdat’s smash hit A Gulp of Freedom (A Taste of Freedom in the American 
translation),57 sits at the crossroads of many developments of which we have already been 
speaking. Just like Eidel’man’s Lunin, as well as Motyl’s and Riazanov’s films, 
Okudzhava’s historical fiction appears at a time when a pop-culture image of pre-Soviet, 
nineteenth-century Russia has already coalesced through film and television. Thus, the 
stylization of Okudzhava’s novel is designed to make its past feel authentic in exactly the 
same way as the off-screen narration in Riazanov’s Say a Word, or the ‘local color’ 
details in Eidel’man’s Lunin (moreover, it is my suspicion that Okudzhava’s racy 
decision to set much of his novel in a bordello is influenced by Rhzevsky jokelore). 
Additionally, just like Lunin, Okudzhava’s novel was being sponsored by a state push to 
retool its ossified ideology for a consumer audience. The story of the Decembrists stood 
at the beginning of the Leninist pre-history of the Russian Revolutionary movement (“the 
Decembrists woke up Herzen,” went the famous 1912 Lenin cliché58), аnd the period’s 
cultural ‘Age of Pushkin’ reigned supreme in Soviet canon, so Okudzhava’s manuscript 
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seemed to be a perfect fit for Politizdat’s lineup of safe, but exciting historical fiction. 
Politizdat’s mass-market pressure to make the text ‘relevant’ authorized Okudzhava, just 
like Eidel’man, to import lessons from nineteenth-century history into the present day. 
And the fact that late Soviet censorship was diffuse and subject to all sorts of pressures as 
a result of social liberalization allowed Okudzhava to get away with quite a bit of semi-
dissenting ambiguity in this text. However, the author’s social position as a celebrity also 
made the thematics of his novel different from those of Eidel’man’s Lunin. Eidel’man, as 
we recall, used the story of Lunin to show the relevance of nineteenth-century liberal 
humanist (and legalist) ideals for the present late Soviet moment;.Okudzhava, as a result 
of his own social position, decided to turn story of the fictional Avrosimov into a self-
critical parable about the futility of resistance against an adept authoritarian system.  
A Gulp of Freedom has one main trans-historical moral—that even though 
‘everyone’ in the informed social circles ‘already knows everything’ about the 
authoritarian state’s ideological dead end, the state is nevertheless perfectly capable of 
making most of its all-knowing elites continue to obey orders and rules, no matter how 
discredited they might be. Hence, we see the evolution of Avrosimov, who starts out in 
Petersburg as a freshly arrived provincial, who at first does not ‘already know everything,’ 
but then encounters Pestel during the interrogations and after hearing him very quickly 
loses his faith in the divine mandate of Nicholas’ rule. Along the way, however, 
Avrosimov also gets educated into the ways of Petersburg’s cynical beau monde. 
Petersburgers such as Avrosimov’s new friend, the guardsman Pavel Buturlin simply do 
what they have to do to get ahead, ideally without getting anyone else hurt, but also 
willing to bite the bullet on this matter, particularly when there is no other way out. 
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Hence Buturlin tells Avrosimov at the beginning of the novel that had he been given the 
order to strike down his own comrade-in-arms Bestuzhev on Senate Square on the day of 
the revolt, he would have done it: “I would have said to him, ‘forgive me, brother,’ and I 
would have struck him down. And he wouldn’t have taken pity on me either, 
obviously…”59 And such is the fabula of Okudzhava’s story—on the one hand 
Avrosimov naively continues to evolve in his discursive opposition to the regime, but on 
the other hand he rises higher and higher in Petersburgian society as a result of his 
successful service during the course of the interrogations. This duality comes to a head 
when on the exact same night that Avrosimov is planning to spring Pestel from jail he is 
also offered the Order of St. Vladimir by General Tatishchev for his excellent service. 
And here the farce ends. Within the space of a few pages, Avrosimov’s plans are revealed 
to Tatishchev by the former’s courtly love interest, Avrosimov is promptly thrown in jail, 
where he has a mental breakdown and then the very next day goes back to his village, 
never to return. Appropriately, the man sent to arrest him is his friend Buturlin, whose 
last words in the novel are,  “forgive me brother, but I have to arrest you…”60 
 The social dynamics in the story of Avrosimov clearly relate to Okudzhava’s own. 
The general principles of elite Petersburg society come down to Buturlin’s declaration 
that “everyone thinks only of himself,”61 but with the caveat that one also should avoid 
hurting others, so long as it is possible. Buturlin won’t volunteer to strike down his friend 
on Senate Square, for instance, while the novel also has us despise the character of 
Captain Maiboroda for volunteering to report on Pestel. This morality underscores the 
distinctness of the elite’s interests from the state—one should strive to maneuver between 
both forces, as opposed to deferring to one of them. In his early 1970s samizdat essay, 
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“Quadrillion,” Pomerants formulates the exact same principle with respect to late Soviet 
society with the pithy one-liner, that “decent people screw over their neighbors [gadiat 
blizhnemu] only out of necessity, without enjoyment.”62 We can draw a similar parallel 
between the corruption of Nicholas’ state and that of Okudzhava and his peers in the so-
called ‘creative intelligentsia.’ Avrosimov receives the Order of St. Vladimir for his 
services; Okudzhava receives a nice house in Peredelkino and plenty of trips abroad, 
especially to France. The late Soviet state was, as we know quite adept at operating a 
complex system of carrots and sticks, through which it could ensure compliance from 
entire strata of only nominally loyal servants. It was precisely this social contract that 
Solzhenitsyn decried in his polemic with Pomerants, when he argued that the Soviet 
‘semi-dissidents’ claiming to cultivate ‘inner freedom’ were all just a bunch of cowards, 
unwilling to stand up for fear of losing their bourgeois perks.63 And so we might interpret 
the story of Avrosimov as an expression of Okudzhava’s own despondence as a 
disillusioned ‘sixtier’ who has agreed to keep his mouth relatively shut in exchange for 
state-sponsored privileges. But A Gulp of Freedom is more than just an allegory of late 
Soviet semi-dissenting intelligentsia cynicism. I think a subtler reading of the text also 
reveals a level of self-critique of the very premise of the combination of ‘semi-dissent’ 
and liberal celebrity, and thus marks a point of recognition of the place where real 
intelligentsia politics might begin. Ultimately, Okudzhava actually crossed that point in 
1993, with tragic consequences for himself.  
To get at the point of the text’s self-critique, we will have to read more closely 
into Avrosimov’s foil, the despicable Captain Maiboroda, who on closer inspection has 
far more in common with Okudzhava the celebrity than might otherwise meet the eye. 
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The subplot concerning the Captain begins at Avrosimov’s uncle’s house, in which the 
protagonist encounters a charming Ukrainian man, whose “whole image […] called forth 
sympathy, and it was hard to say why: maybe it was his gypsy eyes, or maybe his sudden, 
dazzling smile, that was nevertheless somehow a little childish, or maybe it was 
something else.”64 After a few hours of day-drinking, Maiboroda and Avrosimov leave 
the uncle’s place and make their way to the brothel (the logic of jokelore about Rzhevsky 
informes Okudzhava’s text here, I think) and during the course of their scenic walk 
Maiboroda relates the cloak-and-dagger story of how he acquired Pestel’s confidence and 
then betrayed him to the authorities. As a result of the account, Avrosimov begins to have 
doubts about Maiboroda’s moral fiber, but he doesn’t say much about the matter at the 
time. The two then arrive at the brothel, and after a few rounds of drunken stupor we 
rejoin reality to find Maiboroda telling his story again, word for word, but this time to 
Avrosimov’s friends, which include Buturlin, among others. At this point, things get a bit 
confusing for Avrosimov. He seems to believe that his friends are enjoying the Captain’s 
narrative, so it takes him by surprise to see Buturlin’s “ashen face” when the latter asks 
him, “where did you find this guy?”65 Soon after this point, we catch a confusing 
exchange between the Captain and the brothel audience, in which nothing apparently 
unpleasant is said at all, until suddenly we see Buturlin slap Maiboroda across the face 
and say, “Dear sir, you have just insulted me by using an obscenity to refer to my 
lady…”66 Maiboroda does not understand what is going on, and does not defend himself, 
but slowly the whole brothel seems to catch on to the subtext of Buturlin’s action and the 
scene ends with Maiboroda getting shamefully kicked out of the premises. After this 
point we encounter Maiboroda a few more times and in each instant he looks more and 
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more cloyingly pathetic, until finally he disappears entirely, only to reappear as a byline 
in the epilogue, where we learn that he has shot himself, somewhere in Central Asia.  
What is it that transpires in the brothel that makes Maiboroda end up in such a bad 
way? Buturlin’s actions make clear that his insulting slap pertains not at all to some 
“lady,” but to Maiboroda’s cowardly betrayal of Pestel. But why does Maiboroda not 
understand this, and why doesn’t Avrosimov either, at first? Why does it seem the whole 
time like the audience is enjoying Maiboroda’s narration, only to turn on him so 
suddenly? Because Maiboroda is a bad storyteller. The problem is not that his story is 
badly told; it’s rather that Maiboroda misjudges the political sympathies of his audience. 
Consider how Buturlin and an attending Grenadier Lieutenant respond to the Captain’s 
claims about the treasonous intent of Pestel’s written constitution, Russian Truth/Justice 
[Russkaia Pravda], which the Captain had supposedly seen “with his own eyes”: 
“Why do you keep harping on this: with my own eyes, my own eyes,” the 
Grenadier Lieutenant growled. 
Meanwhile, the strangers in the half-shadows, the gentlemen unknown to 
our hero, continued to remain calm and motionless, and only their half-filled 
glasses, raised over the table, swayed in their hands.  
“Yes,” said Buturlin quickly, “it is a bit odd, isn’t it: he says one thing, 
and you say another. Why should I have any faith in you? 
“Gentlemen,” said Seriozhen’ka, “why not let Arkadii Ivanovich tell it. He 
recounts it so well, as if he’s reading a novel. What difference does it make to 
you? 
Then Arkadii Ivanovich laughed, flattered by Seriozhen’ka’s words. 
“Gentlemen, I am ready to recount it all. I feel even lighter, since I am 
among my own kind [svoi], among those who had the occasion to do justice… So, 
let us try, shall we.”67 
 
Here we can observe the whole crux of the Captain’s problem as a failing narrator. He 
thinks he is “among his own kind” (note the very Yurchakian use of “svoi” in the 
original), even though he has just met this group of people, and plus there are strangers in 
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the background, whom no one has ever met—they’re an anonymous attending public, 
whose positive disposition the Captain can only take on faith. He also thinks everyone 
present is on equal terms vis-à-vis their ideas about “justice,” and soon he pays dearly for 
this lack of social acumen. But how was he to know otherwise? It is not as if he can 
simply ask his audience to tell him of their pro-Decembrist sympathies, especially at this 
time, when Nicholas’ ruthless investigation is just heating up! The Captain simply should 
have known not to assume what he thinks is common knowledge, but there’s no one 
explicitly to tell him so. Maiboroda should have realized that his fellow brothel attendees 
are not ‘”svoi,” but he does not, and no one will let him in on this secret. 
 The Captain’s narrative failure is Okudzhava’s nightmare scenario, allegorically 
speaking. It expresses the potential of failure that is inherent to the social structure that 
supports a singer-songwriter like Okudzhava. Maiboroda, to put it bluntly, is a bad bard. 
He fails because he assumes that ‘everyone already knows everything,’ but then suddenly 
realizes that they do not. In the situation of semi-dissent, of maintaining unverbalized 
unity by “holding each other’s hands,” it is actually quite easy suddenly to become a bad 
bard. A social group of “svoi” might hold together through a complicated semiotic field 
of non-verbal or partially verbal signals, but at the end of the day those signals do not 
attain to the level of coherent discourse. Such is the limit of a partially liberalized social 
field in the conditions of authoritarianism. Without saying clearly who we are and what 
we want, we cannot tell if we really should be ‘holding each other’s hands,’ and neither 
can the bard who is holding us together. Which brings us back to the main message of A 
Gulp of Freedom, as well as the question of the use of pre-Soviet past in late Soviet 
liberal cultural production. Before examining the case of Okudzhava, we assumed that 
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pre-Soviet past could simply and easily serve as allegory for present-day discourse, but 
with Okudzhava we learn two important caveats about that dynamic. One is that the 
liberal makers of this allegorical discourse, the late Soviet intellectuals themselves, are 
flawed vessels—so flawed, in fact, that perhaps we should not take their claims seriously. 
And two, the whole Aesopian gambit works only through the assumption of a shared 
view of the present, the assumption that ‘everyone already knows everything.’ But what 
if that assumption is wrong? It is one thing to use the past as allegory in conditions where 
it is possible to clarify what the other side of the allegory should be; it is quite another 
thing to try to access the past when there is no way to clarify the explicit terms on which 
it should intersect with the present. The conditions of late-Soviet censorship created 
precisely the latter, more dangerous situation. At the end of the day, the point of 
censorship was to preclude actual politics, to keep celebrities like Okudzhava at the 
threshold of politics but not let him cross it. The point of Brezhnev’s infamous “little deal” 
with the intelligentsia was to create two risks for verbalized, public disobedience—the 
risk of losing one’s livelihood, of course, but also the risk of losing one’s comfortable 
group of “svoi.” Okudzhava as Avrosimov is keenly aware of his cowardice in the face of 
the first risk; Okudzhava as Maiboroda balks in the face of the second one.  
*** 
 
As a denouement to this story and this chapter let me just say briefly that 
Okudzhava took the risk of crossing into overt politics towards the very end of his life, in 
1993, as a result of which he tragically ended up in a bind reminiscent of Maiboroda’s. In 
the heady days of October of that year, when newly post-Soviet Russia looked to be on 
the brink of civil war between the supporters of Yeltsin and those of the Russian 
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Federation’s Communist Party, Okudzhava added his name to the now infamous “Letter 
of the 42”—a newspaper missive to Yeltsin, declaring the undersigned liberal 
intelligentsia members’ unequivocal support of his cause.68 From its first lines, the letter 
feels like a typical late Soviet liberal production:  “There is neither the will nor the 
necessity to comment in detail on what took place in Moscow on the 3rd of October. What 
happened could have been avoided, if it weren’t for our irresponsibility and stupidity—
the fascists resorted to their guns in an attempt to take power.” Notice the insistence on 
the principle of ‘everyone already knowing everything,’ as well as the ease of labeling 
Yeltsin’s enemies “fascists” (we might recall here the Thaw-era liberal binary 
cosmogony of society as the good guys, the intelligentsia, versus the bad guys, the 
philistines/Stalinists). The letter goes on in a similar vein for a few more paragraphs and 
concludes with the declaration that “History has once again given us a chance to make a 
great stride towards democracy and civilization. Let us not miss this chance again, as we 
have already done on more than one occasion!”69 The insistence on “History” as a mythic 
framework for action, the self-flagellating declarations concerning “our responsibility and 
stupidity”—all of these elements suggest precisely the kind of pathologically vague 
formulation of the liberal wing as an “us,” without actually clarifying who “we” are and 
what “we” stand for, beyond the obvious “against fascism.” And in the end it turned out 
that there wasn’t such a clear “us” as the letter’s signatories assumed. Yeltsin’s brutal 
usurpation of legislative power in 1993 split the liberal wing of Russian society. Most of 
these people weren’t particularly sad to see the Communists lose power, but quite a few 
civic leaders were dismayed at their peers’ readiness to endorse Yeltsin’s budding 
authoritarian tactics. Among those people were many of Okudzhava’s erstwhile fans, and 
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Dmitry Bykov’s account of Okudzhava’s life begins with the tragedy of Okudzhava’s 
signing of the letter, which led to a feeling of alienation that, in Bykov’s view, ended up 
cutting Okudzhava’s life short.70 Meanwhile, in today’s Russia, the “Letter of the 42” 
tends to earn retrospective ignominy from contemporary liberal intellectuals, who see 
their predecessors’ decision to support the authoritarian actions of Yeltsin’s nominal 
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 Chapter Two 
Patriotic for Their Time: 
Conservative Destalinization and the Pre-Soviet Past 
    
     
 Nikolai Mitrokhin opens his study of the late Soviet nationalist “Russian Party” 
with the post-War Stalin years, a time when a vast new cohort of apparatchiks had been 
recruited against the background of Stalin’s anti-Semitic campaign against “rootless 
cosmopolitans.” This cohort was predominantly ethnically Russian, it was specifically 
selected for chauvinist sensibilities, and it also never went through a purge. The rising 
power cadre at the advent of the Thaw had a less tainted Stalinist experience than the 
previous 1930s generation and was particularly inclined to understand the Soviet project 
in terms of a zero-sum struggle between a neo-imperial Russia and its Western enemies, 
both within and without. When Khrushchev charted a course for destalinization, this 
cohort and also many of their elder superiors were strongly inclined to view the de-
montage of the ‘cult of personality’ as a threat to themselves and ipso facto the state.1 It 
was easy for the members of the Soviet apparatus to believe that the destalinizing liberals 
were either unconsciously or consciously doing the bidding of anti-Soviet Western 
enemies; at the same time, it would take considerable inventiveness to re-interpret the 
new post-Stalin era in a way that could contest the liberal hegemony over this period’s 
social meaning. Official Soviet ideology would be of little help because its totalitarian 
premise entirely elided the possibility of even acknowledging, much less contesting the 
dynamics of the new cultural hegemony. Instead, the state apparatus went looking for 
people in the cultural milieu with whom they could forge an alliance of sorts. This 
relationship would be premised not on the diktats of ossified Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, 
	 88 
but rather on tactical common ground with various cultural producers who for their own 
various reasons began to view some of their destalinizing peers with suspicion. Scholarly 
accounts regarding this period usually point to the rise of Village Prose, as well as the 
aftermath of Khrushchev’s memorable 1962 visit to the Manége exhibition of neo-avant-
garde art as watershed moments for conservative differentiation. But it is possible to 
reach slightly earlier, and discover much stranger allies in the new era of anti-liberal 
struggles. I begin Chapter Two with such a case, examining the role of Vasilii Shulgin 
(1878-1976), a monarchist and member of the Imperial Duma, then a White Army 
ideologist, then a prominent émigré figure, then a quiet Serbian resident, then, a Soviet 
political prisoner, and then finally a Vladimir region retiree after his 1956 amnesty. 
Given his storied biography, Shulgin was a rather surprising, but nevertheless quite 
symptomatic conservative ally of the post-Stalin state. I will argue that in his positioning 
vis-à-vis the Thaw-era Chekist apparatus it is possible to perceive the origins of the 
symbolic groundwork on which the Russian pre-Revolutionary legacy would later be 










I. The Chekist Thaw and Vasilii Shulgin  
“History has a memory, but it doesn’t bear a grudge.” 
 
Old Bolshevik Fedor Petrov, Before the Judgment of History (1967)2 
 
 
The case of Shulgin is a harbinger for the kind of dynamic that the pre-Soviet past 
would undergo during the course of the late Soviet years, because through him we can 
examine how the Soviet security apparatus, in search of allies, could establish certain 
trans-ideological tactical relationships with individuals and with historical narratives that 
from the perspective of official orthodoxy were inimical to the Soviet project. In the 
process of this reinterpretation, pre-Soviet conservative and sometimes outright 
monarchist symbols, narratives and values could be salvaged and renovated for the 
purposes of ideological struggle against late Soviet liberals. 
Throughout the second half of his exceptionally long life, starting with his 
emigration from Crimea in 1920 along with the White forces stationed there, Shulgin was 
always at the very least curious and sometimes even partly laudatory vis-a-vis Soviet 
power and its achievements. Towards the end of his life, Shulgin mystically captured this 
ambivalence bordering on partial admiration in a diary entry describing his dream about 
Lenin, sometime in the 1950s: 
I saw some kind of theater, entirely empty of an audience, with a court on the 
stage. To the left of the judge, a prosecutor, to the right, an empty place for a 
defender. […] Then Lenin enters. I ask him, ‘have you got a defender?’ No, he 
says. I say, ‘that’s no good, to go to trial without a defender. If you like, shall I 
defend you?’ He says, ‘Defend me!’ The scales of judgment hang in the air. The 
prosecutor speaks: ‘Lenin created the ChK […] How much blood it spilled. […] 
Then they killed the tsar, the tsaritsa, the whole family, the dynasty… they killed 
everyone who didn’t manage to get away abroad.’ The cup of the accuser is 
overflowing with blood. […] The prosecutor fell silent. The chairman says, ‘the 
defense has the word.’ My speech consisted of only two words, ‘Brest. NEP.’ 
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‘Look, prosecutor, look, judges, the cups of good and evil have balanced. […] Is 
Lenin guilty? He is guilty. Is he innocent? He is innocent. Has he been acquitted? 
Not acquitted. But also not convicted. He shall face God’s judgment, and only 
God, who knows of good and evil, will sentence him.3 
 
This dream was part and parcel of Shulgin’s attempt to find a way of conversing with 
Soviet power in the wake of his amnesty. Though he ultimately did not feel comfortable 
with the KGB’s solicitation of his pro-Soviet Letters to Russian Emigrants (1961), 
Shulgin nevertheless did feel like he had valuable political advice to share with his state 
handlers. 4 For their part, the Soviet “guardians of the [nuclear] genie’s bottle” could 
expect collegiality from the old monarchist because of his strongly held “conviction” that 
“even the worst regime is better than anarchy,” and also that “in the second half of the 
twentieth century, the Party does many things correctly.”5 
 Even more interesting, however, is the attitude of the various KGB operatives 
who worked Shulgin’s case during the Thaw, and who were not only fascinated with their 
mark, but were also convinced that as a result of the new era in which they ended up, 
Shulgin was now a political ‘friend’ of sorts, irrespective of his avowed monarchism. 
This positioning comes through in KGB agent V. Shevchenko’s account of traveling the 
country with Shulgin in preparation for the penning of the Letters. In his memoiristic 
piece, written at the apex of Perestroika in January 1991, Shevchenko recalls that the 
“unifying origin” that formed the basis of his “alliance” with Shulgin was “the newness 
of the days of that epoch”: 
Shulgin back then had caught and understood the beginning of great changes, 
whose reverberations we feel today. We didn’t speak with him then about the past 
that divided us, a past that in my view did not conform to his understandings, a 
past from which Shulgin couldn’t abdicate. We also didn’t start to speak about a 
dividing future, which we imagined differently. We spoke with him about the 
present. About that present, in which we had ended up— people from different 
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epochs, from different generations.6 
 
Shevchenko’s focus on the present as standing apart from the “divisive” past reveals what 
the scholar of Anglo-American conservatism, Corey Robin would call an ‘activist 
conservative’ attitude driven by the political exigencies of the Thaw, which our KGB 
operative retrospectively rhymes with the ensuing chaos of 1991.7 With the state under 
threat from liberalization proceeding in possible cahoots with the West, Shulgin’s past in 
some ways no longer counts— Shevchenko’s communist moral judgment of Shulgin’s 
monarchist and White Army activity is rendered inactive. As a result, Shevchenko can 
observe that Shulgin had always been “a true patriot of Russia.” Indeed, even Shulgin’s 
participation in the White movement cannot be morally judged as outright evil 
anymore— it was “fate” that made him do it, Shevchenko observes: 
It was fate’s will that Shulgin should receive the abdication of Emperor Nicholas 
II. That is why, due to his views, Shulgin did not accept the October Revolution, 
just as it was not accepted by the Cossacks, who rebelled virtually en masse, as 
well as a part of the officers whose epaulettes were taken, and a part of the 
intelligentsia, which refused to countenance the shame of the Brest peace 
agreement.8 
 
Shevchenko here doesn’t quite clear the White movement as such of moral turpitude, but 
he certainly presents an encomium according to which the White “rebellion” can be 
understood not in terms of class interests, as Marxism-Leninism would have it, but in 
terms of patriotic indignation in the face of capitulation to the Germans. Shulgin and his 
peers took arms against Soviet power out of a worthy sentiment, however misplaced it 
might have been.  
In a word, the adamant anti-Communist right-winger had been “patriotic for his 
time,” to paraphrase the old Stalinist formula for reinterpreting Russian Imperial 
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history— though with one important difference.9 Shevchenko’s rhetorical move does not 
actually exonerate Shulgin vis-à-vis the Soviet official master narrative of History. 
Rather, the move suspends the moral status of those who are still viewed as outright 
enemies of Soviet power, quite like Shulgin himself in his dream suspends his own moral 
judgment of Lenin. This gesture of suspension is made possible by Thaw-era temporal 
magic, according to which the present moment is in an essential way disconnected from 
the past. To clarify further how this dynamic works, let us now consider what was 
Shulgin’s one and only major gambit to acquire a mass Soviet audience— the staged 
documentary Before the Judgment of History [Pered sudom istorii] (1965-67). 
 
Shulgin Before the Judgment of History 
Directed by Fridrikh Ermler, himself a committed Soviet Communist and former 
Chekist partner-turned-filmmaker, Before the Judgment of History had a surprisingly 
complicated production and release history. A staged, pre-scripted documentary 
comprised of conversations between Shulgin and an unnamed ‘Historian,’ the film on the 
one hand seems like an officially calibrated and properly censored Thaw-era cultural 
product. On the other hand, memoiristic recollections from Ermler himself, as well as 
from Shulgin’s friends, all point to a great deal of conflict between the monarchist and 
the filmmakers. Shulgin made very few ideological concessions and refused all lines in 
the script that he himself didn’t write. Ermler, for his part, was absolutely fascinated by 
the charming “grandpa,” but despite his own staunchly pro-Soviet convictions was either 
too ill or too scared to play the part of Shulgin’s opponent, handing the role to an actor.10 
As a result, the few producers and viewers who saw Judgment came away with the 
	 93 
impression that Shulgin carried himself much more convincingly than the Historian. In 
short, “the judgment of History had failed”— and presumably it is for this reason that the 
film was quashed a few days after going to screen and would have to wait until the late 
1980s to resurface again.11 Leaving aside the question of who ‘really won’ the 
contestation, Before the Judgment of History is valuable because it clarifies the late 
Soviet conservative discursive frameworks through which Shulgin could be rehabilitated 
as a peculiar ‘friend’ of contemporary Soviet society. The film manages to do so by a 
temporal intervention— the new post-Stalin era posits an insurmountable distance 
between Shulgin’s monarchism and Khrushchevan modernity. Thanks to this radical 
distancing, elements of Shulgin’s pre-Soviet past are divested of their dangerous anti-
Soviet context and are instead allowed to float freely and even assume a new, vaguely 
friendly relationship vis-à-vis what the film cheerfully renders as a harmoniously 
destalinized and therefore unquestionably ‘historically victorious’ late Soviet state. 
Before the Judgment of History is a thoroughly presentist film. Its investment in 
its own present era isn’t merely the stuff of typical historical documentaries with 
retrospective eyewitnesses. Rather, the contemporary mid-1960s moment constantly 
recurs in the film in an inexplicable, fetishistic fashion. This film about the life and times 
of a monarchist politician in the 1910s and 1920s opens with the shot of a commercial jet 
landing on the Leningrad tarmac (see Figure 5, below) and proceeds onwards with 
gratuitously interspersed shots of Yuri Gagarin, the 1964 Monument to the Conquerors of 
Space, the Kremlin-based Khrushchevan international-modern-style Palace of the 
Congresses, and then finally the XXII Party Congress (that Shulgin in real life had 




Old Bolshevik Petrov speaking with Shulgin in the halls of the Congress. The Bolshevik 
recalls how even back when he had been a young student in the early 1900s he had 
already been a Marxist, “and if we were to judge by the results, we studied pretty well.” 
The “results,” of course, are intimated by Petrov’s gesture to the windows overlooking 
Moscow, followed by the splicing of a reel of Gagarin walking to the Soviet Airmen’s 
March.12 All of these fetishistic deployments of Khrushchevan modernity are designed to 
depict the present as so magnificent, so manifestly correct, that the past— in this specific 
case Shulgin’s own pre-Revolutionary past— is rendered somehow morally irrelevant. 
Now that Shulgin apparently supports the incontrovertible achievements of Soviet power, 
Petrov can say to him that “history has a memory, but it doesn’t bear a grudge.” The 
film’s musical score further amplifies Petrov’s concluding statement— the agitated, 
percussive leitmotif of history’s judgment, associated with Shulgin, is finally overcome 
by the radiant, major-key leitmotif associated with Khrushchev’s modernity, culminating 
with a choir ecstatically singing “Veni!” as the camera focuses on a profile portrait of 
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Lenin hanging behind Petrov’s podium at the XXII Congress (see Figure 6, below).13  
The ‘suspended grudge’ allows viewers to approach Shulgin with a generally 
congenial attitude. Throughout the film, Shulgin is given ample opportunity to present 
himself as a jolly old man, a kind of living relic. Judgment’s ‘promise of the premise’ 
involves Shulgin wandering the streets, squares and palaces of Imperial Petersburg, and 
also visiting a perfectly staged train car in which he had received Nicholas II’s 
resignation. All of these scenes are supplemented with various ghostly audiovisual effects 
to recall the bygone times (see Figure 7, below). Everywhere he goes, the monarchist 
wears a 1910s-style suit, with an upturned white collar and black tie. At one point 
Shulgin even gets to show off his refined ancien régime manners and French language 
skills to a group of attractive high school girls (see Figure 8, below). It is precisely this 
congenial image of Shulgin that wins out over the film’s substantive presentation of the 
monarchist as an implacable ideological foe. This is the case because even when direct 
engagement with Shulgin’s anti-communist views and activities does take place, it is 
always cognitively hampered by the Historian’s inability to speak clearly about early 
Bolshevik atrocities and the decades of Stalinist rule.  
After several sniping exchanges about Civil War culpability, in which Shulgin is 
in fact perfectly able to defend himself and his side, the film moves on to its most 
devastating engagement. Shulgin claims that the White idea had never been ideologically 
or morally defeated, without being given a chance to explain exactly what it was. At this 
point, the Historian grows visibly apoplectic, accompanies Shulgin to a screening room 
and plays fascist Italian and German documentary reels, complete with Mussolini, Hitler, 










devastation, including the Leningrad Blockade. As we watch the ‘documentary 
evidence,’ we are being convinced that the “White Idea,” whatever it is, is guilty by 
association. However, this condemnation is non-narrative, non-rational, and takes place at 
a considerable distance from the person of Shulgin. Even if his avowed sympathies for 
Mussolini mark him as hopelessly misguided, he is not actually directly tarred by World 
War II’s atrocities. In any case, Shulgin takes the opportunity to say that only a small 
minority of the White émigré community joined Vlasov’s troops and that they are 
anathema to the authentic White movement. Shulgin then ends the heated discussion by 
saying that today he no longer considers himself an emigrant, now that “the white dove of 
peace has started to circle over Russia.” With that, the Historian suddenly puts on a 
cheerful smile and says,  
I’m happy, I am very happy, Vasilii Vladimirovich! I just want to say that this 
idea had appeared in Russia long before you recognized it. It had been spoken in 
Lenin’s decree on peace on the day after the October revolution. That is, in those 
days when a new, Soviet Russia was born—  the Soviet Union, the union of 
laborers bringing to life the great ideas of Lenin, and the ideas of the XX 
Congress of Lenin’s Party, and the ideas of the XXII Congress, where you were a 
guest.14 
 
The Historian’s palpable elision of the Stalinist decades between Lenin’s peaceful 
program and its Khrushchevan reincarnation makes a coherent “judgment” of History 
over Shulgin impossible. On that note, we might conclude our reading of this film with a 
story told by Shulgin’s friend, N. N. Lisovoi, who recalls how the old monarchist once 
suggested to the filmmakers that the film end not with the Old Bolshevik Petrov, but with 
another former émigré, Alexander Kazem-Bek, who in the 1920s and 1930s had been an 
ideologist of a ‘red-brown-white’ amalgamation of fascism, socialism, and then 
eventually returned to the USSR in 1957: 
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“I’ll say, ‘Kazem-Bek! You’re a genius! A while ago you came up with a slogan, 
‘The Tsar and the Soviets’- and Stalin immediately made your slogan a reality.’ 
After these words the authors of the film for some reason immediately decided 
against the idea of a meeting with Kazem-Bek.”15 
 
Operation: Trust 
 With the case of Shulgin, we can see how the post-Stalinist erasure of ‘historical 
grudges’ untangles the old enemy from wholesale moral opprobrium. It’s not that any of 
the specific official Soviet narratives about him and the White cause have been explicitly 
invalidated, but rather that those grand narratives have lost their judgmental power. 
Meanwhile, Shulgin’s interaction with his KGB handlers and filmmakers displays the 
potential for realigning his social value in the post-Stalin era along the lines of patriotism, 
in light of which the amnestied émigré monarchist manages to come off as good, in a 
word. A similar dynamic appears in Operation: Trust [Operatsiia: Trest] (dir. Sergei 
Kolosov, 1967), a successful, well-known four-part television miniseries that actually 
featured Shulgin’s footage from Before the Judgment of History and was thus, as far as I 
know, the only widely available cultural product through which the late Soviet masses 
could have become familiar with the old monarchist (the fact that some of them did 
become familiar with Shulgin through Trust is confirmed by a witness account of Soviet 
school children singing the film’s White Army theme song as Shulgin was being escorted 
past them at a Leningrad court-house in 1969).16 
 Scholars have contextualized Trust in terms of a whole trend of late-1960s Soviet 
filmic depictions of the Civil War, in which the White side no longer comes off like a 
bunch of cartoon villains.17 I would add that Trust is also interesting because the Red side 
in it is no longer quite as Red. On the surface, the film seems like the stuff of doctrinaire 
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Soviet propaganda— brave early Chekists work to prevent White émigré terrorists from 
carrying out their evil designs. Beyond this veneer, however, the film poses an interesting 
engagement with the question of why one should support and fight for Soviet power and 
what makes one into an admirable protagonist— and Marxist-Leninist convictions are 
hardly the answer to either point.  
Based on Lev Nikulin’s 1965 documentary novel The Swell of the Sea [Mertvaia 
zyb’], which was itself based on authentic classified Chekist documentary evidence, Trust 
tells the almost completely true story of Alexander Yakushev (1876-1937). A former 
member of the service nobility, Yakushev (Igor Gorbachev) works for the transportation 
ministry in the early Soviet state, under the aegis of Felix Dzerzhinsky, while being 
involved in a secretive monarchist revanchist organization. As a result of a Chekist 
intervention, Yakushev decides to turn on his erstwhile activities and instead to help the 
Soviet state in the task of combatting anti-Soviet plots. To do so, Yakushev and а Chekist 
cell led by Artur Artuzov (Armen Dzhigarkhanian) create an underground political 
association called the Trust [Trest]. Yakushev then uses his official Soviet credentials to 
travel around the world and raise the Trust’s prestige among the émigré communities. As 
a result, the Trust for years manages to intercept and delay possible anti-Soviet plots 
originating from by General Kutepov in France and Baron von Wrangel in Yugoslavia. 
After a series of harrowing encounters and close calls, the miniseries concludes with a 
dramatic shootout- the film’s main villain, Kutepov’s alleged niece Maria Zakharchenko-
Shul’ts (Liudmila Kasatkina), finds out about Yakushev’s betrayal, plots an unsuccessful 
bombing of the Chekist headquarters at Lubianka, gets chased to the Finish border and is 
shot down by Artuzov himself just as she is about to get away.  
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To emphasize the truth value of its story, Trust employs a number of both on- and 
off-screen means. For one thing, the whole miniseries is framed by a narrator, an aging 
“Professor” Leonid Makar’ev, (1892-1975, a professor of theater acting in real life, 
though the film never specifies his field of study). Makar’ev not only interjects with 
historically important tidbits, but actively contributes his own memories about the period 
under discussion, which include personal memories of Artuzov. The film also includes a 
television-style microphone-in-hand interview with Toive Viakhe, an ethnic Finnish 
Soviet border guard who had been secretly involved by the Chekists in the Trust and then 
spent four decades living under an assumed identity (see, Figure 9, below). Meanwhile,  
off-screen the filmmakers went through considerable efforts to gather authentic facts 
about the Trust and the people involved in it. Kolosov received wide-ranging help from 
old Chekist consultants who had personally known Artuzov and also worked undercover 
in the émigré communities. Moreover, Kolosov and Kasatkina tracked down Shulgin, 
who in 1925 had secretly traveled to USSR with the Trust’s help and thus personally 
knew nearly everyone involved. Kasatkina credits the old monarchist for giving her a 
genuine sense of the “heroic nature” of Maria Zakharchenko.18 As a result, scholars, 
filmmakers and the mass viewers of Trust have all noted the refreshing authenticity of 
Maria’s character. The potential for moral confusion on this point was such that at the 
bequest of the KGB censors, the filmmakers actually were forced to delete Maria’s final 
line (pulled by Kolosov from her casefile): “behold how Russian people die for Faith, 
Tsar, Fatherland and Russia!”19  
There is a measure of typical Thaw-era irony about the Chekists’ overall energetic 




involved in the Trust had been executed by the Chekists in the 1930s (aside from Viakhe, 
who survived solely thanks to his cover identity). The film, of course, is never allowed to 
point this out explicitly, but its poetic concluding shots clearly make a statement on the 
matter— Yakushev walks across a forest being mowed down for construction wood, and 
then joins Artuzov at a riverbank. The two exchange heavy, silent gazes, while the 
camera cuts to a flyover shot of them sitting in an enormous expanse of knocked-down, 
bundled trees (see Figure 10, below) In short, we are presented with a visual pun, 
illustrating one of two possible Russian sayings— ‘they’ve sure chopped a lot of 
firewood,’ or ‘when they chop down a forest, the chips fly’ (i.e., ‘they’ve sure made a 
mess of things,’ or ‘you can’t make an omelet without braking eggs’).20 Quite 
appropriately, then, this shot seamlessly transitions into a flyover shot above a modern 
1960s city. The film’s final image is the 1964 Monument to the Conquerors of Space. In 
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this way, Trust ends with the same Soviet post-traumatic ritual of fetishistic invocation of 
contemporary magnificent modernity that we have already observed in Before the 
Judgment of History.  
	
Figure	10:	The	final	shots	of	Operation:		Trust.	'They've	sure	chopped	a	lot	of	firewood,'	as	the	Russian	saying	goes. 
But there is yet another, subtler irony involved in Trust, which has to do with the 
specific kind of image of the protagonists that this film depicts. On the Chekist end, 
Artuzov and his underlings come off in Trust as highly educated, well-spoken, erudite 
types. From Kolosov’s memoirs, we know that this was not at all a foregone 
conclusion— it required an explicit alteration of Nikulin’s source text by Kolosov’s 
Chekist consultants:  
Our people didn’t roll their own ciggies out of shag and newspaper strips. […] So 
where did the shag come from? From standard literary depictions of the Chekists 
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of that era. Shag is typical of Civil War films, with their dugouts and bearded 
front-liners. […] Artur Khristianovich [Artuzov] studied music with his mother 
from childhood, he was an excellent pianist as an adult, and he sang very well, he 
had a beautiful voice… He also painted well, and was a sculptor, and knew 
French, English and German perfectly, and was also an excellent sportsman— a 
skier, a figure-skater, an equestrian… [….] Artuzov wasn’t some factory worker, 
he was a metallurgical engineer with a Petersburg education. He wasn’t some 
underground man, he joined the Party only in 1917, he never talked like this. This 
language might crawl from the book to the film, and then we’ll have a lie instead 
of History.21 
 
Artuzov the Chekist spymaster, in other words, is an intelligent quite like his asset, the 
nobleman Yakushev, and the two of them are in this way no different from their White 
foes. Which is to say that in the 1960s, after putting in two decades of considerable effort 
to obliterate the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, the Chekists decided that they 
themselves now wanted to be intelligenti. According to their idea of a destalinized 
capital-H “History,” the Soviet Chekist image would now conform not to standard 
depictions of the good guys solely defined by humble class origins, but rather claim a 
Thaw-era image of hegemonic anti-Stalinist intelligentsia values. The effect of this 
disposition on the film’s character development is similar to that of Shevchenko’s 
transformative relationship to Shulgin— these illustrious men of high pre-Revolutionary 
origins, with all of their palpable intelligentsia ethos, are no longer simply consigned to 
oblivion as a result of their class nature and concomitantly incorrigible anti-communist 
ideologies. Their life-world and even their misguided opinions are now again in some 
sense valuable; the dividing line between good and evil now lies elsewhere.  
Like Shulgin, Yakushev and other protagonists of Trust all ultimately make their 
choice to support Soviet power not because they’ve suddenly become Marxists-Leninists, 
but rather because they are nationalist patriotic allies– in contradistinction to Kutepov 
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and Wrangel, who in this film wish to sew chaos in Soviet Russia with foreign assistance. 
Indeed, the Trust handlers’ sense of patriotic duty may be so thoroughly decoupled from 
any interest in the official ideology of the Soviet cause that even half-way into the film, 
despite having already co-masterminded the Chekist deception for several years, the ex-
nobleman Yakushev still isn’t quite sure whether or not he is a monarchist: “what, are 
you trying to explain to me what Monarchists are like? What, I’ve never seen 
monarchists? I’m myself a monarchist… well, a former one.”22 Meanwhile, from the 
archetypes of Trust’s Chekist intelligenti one can see a straight line to Max Otto von 
Stierlitz (Seventeen Moments of Spring, dir. Tatiana Lioznova, 1973)— by far the most 
famous fictional late Soviet spy, who comfortably acts the debonair Nazi German 
nobleman, and who is played in real life by a Soviet actor (Viacheslav Tikhonov) made 













II.  Glazunov, Soloukhin and the late Soviet conservative discourse on art 
…it is somehow hard to believe that [Vasnetsov’s] ‘A Knight at the 
Crossroads’ didn’t exist before 1882 […]. It is as if it has always existed, 
like the steppe, like Kiev, like the Volga, like Russia… 
 
Vladimir Soloukhin, Letters from the Russian Museum23 
 
 
 Section One presented several cases of how the Thaw-era security apparatus was 
able to establish and make explicit a certain kind of alliance with pre-Revolutionary 
conservative persons, narratives and values. As we have noted, this alliance was fraught 
with difficulties— in the case of Shulgin, the Chekists, sensing a more cautious 
Brezhnevite change in the winds, ultimately decided to cease and desist in their 
promotion of the octogenarian monarchist. In the case of Trust too, a certain measure of 
censorship, particularly vis-à-vis the character of Maria Zakharchenko, proved necessary 
so as to adhere to the official bounds of orthodox negative characterization of the White 
cause. We should also mention that at about the same time, the conservative wing of the 
Russian dissident movement was for its part also starting to examine the possibilities of 
an alliance with the national security state along revamped nationalist ideological 
grounds. In the process, some conservative intellectuals were writing political agenda 
letters to the Politburo,24 while others were re-discovering the origins of “National-
Bolshevism”— the syncretic practice of Bolshevik statecraft, thanks to which former 
Tsarist conservatives and other nationalists joined early Soviet leaders to defeat the 
Whites and win the Civil War.25 However, I will now switch my attention to another area 
of culture and examine how two prominent official late Soviet conservatives working in 
the field of late Soviet aesthetics articulated a discourse that would contest liberal cultural 
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hegemony and in the process recuperate pre-Soviet aesthetic forms and cultural values. 
 As is well known, in the wake of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, the Soviet state 
apparatus was quite skeptical about the course for cultural liberalization and was looking 
for openings through which the trend could be counteracted. One such opening took place 
in the wake of Khrushchev’s infamous tour of a small display of non-realist art at a 1962 
young artists’ exhibition at the Manege. The aesthetics of Thaw-era neo-avant-gardists 
did not intrinsically demand that they be tarred with an enemy brush— after all, these 
painters and sculptors were claiming to be resuscitating early Soviet Revolutionary 
artistic traditions. The problem was that a great deal of members of the state hierarchy 
wanted to turn the tide of Thaw-era liberal cultural hegemony, and the arena of art 
appeared to be good a place to drive a wedge, in large part thanks to Khrushchev’s 
personal repulsion vis-à-vis non-figurative art. Thus, in December of 1962, in the wake of 
Khrushchev’s visit to the Manége, the Ideological Commission of the Communist Party 
organized a series of meetings with the ‘creative intelligentsia,’ which weren’t simply 
about clarifying the boundaries of allowable artistic and cultural production in the USSR, 
but also contributed to the marking out of a new zone of ‘liberal’ versus ‘conservative’ 
contestation of late Soviet cultural discourse.  
 Il’inskii, the chairman in charge of the meetings, inadvertently put his finger on 
the problem in his opening speech, noting that  
The party sees the positive results of your work. Of course, this did not come 
about on its own. It’s a result of remarkable transformations in our life, it is a 
clear expression of the productive course of our party. And maybe the most 
important feature of young art is its active support of the Leninist party course in 
the battle with the old and in the affirmation of new, truly communist, Leninist 
principles of our life.26 
 
	 107 
Note how the course for destalinization has already been normalized and universalized 
under the aegis of the “true newness” of the epoch— to be an adherent to the vaguely-
defined, vaguely Stalinist “old” seems patently ridiculous here. And yet in the same 
speech, Il’inskii affirms the new site of struggle: the “peaceful,” but therefore all the 
more “ideological” battle between communist Russia and the Western bourgeois world 
now defines the poles along which one should argue about good and bad art. On the side 
of the good, Il’inskii unsurprisingly proposes Socialist Realism, which he defines in very 
normative, supposedly self-explanatory terms as the art of “healthy common sense”; 
meanwhile, on the side of the bad is “formalism and abstractionism,” which  
is not the empty dalliance of fools, but an explicit fallback from socialist realism 
and simply a fallback from healthy common sense, precisely from those principles 
on the basis of which our art has grown and continues to flower. Formalism and 
abstractionism are not a searching for new forms, but a capitulation to bourgeois 
ideology, a ceding of our ideological positions.27 
 
Il’inskii, conforming to Corey Robin’s observations about conservatism’s rhetorical 
predilections, proposes a vitalist, agonistic framework for parsing cultural production— 
Soviet versus Western art is understood in terms of “health” versus “rottenness,” 
common sense versus “negligent ugliness,” and the battle is zero-sum, with the enemies 
of common sense really desiring to make “abstractionism and formalism into a leading 
and only direction in art.”28 At the same time, Il’inskii’s insistence on “healthy common 
sense” makes for a rather open-ended aesthetic criterion, and it is precisely on this point 
that Ilya Glazunov intervenes with his proposal to ground contemporary art in pre-





 At the time of his participation in the 1962 Ideological Commission meetings, 
Ilya Glazunov was living in a strange gray zone of semi-favor vis-à-vis the Soviet state 
bureaucracy. The young painter had already won international competitions and had a 
solo exhibit in 1957; however, his art was deemed ideologically dubious by the high 
Soviet art establishment, which then decided to reprimand Glazunov by giving him a bad 
final grade for his studies and consigning him to the deep provinces, to teach drawing. 
Glazunov very quickly returned to the capital despite his official banishment and lack of 
propiska (Moscow residency documents), and built up a reputation as a good portraitist 
among an elite international clientele. In this era of “peaceful competition,” the Soviet 
state saw good money in letting Glazunov travel and paint foreign leaders, while 
Glazunov for his part made friends with some powerful people, like the eminent Soviet 
poet, Secretary of the Writers’ Union and closeted monarchist nobleman Sergei 
Mikhalkov, as well as the ‘Pavlov group’ at the Komsomol, in charge of the “Young 
Guard” [“Molodaia gvardiia”] publishing house.29 Leveraging all of these connections, 
Glazunov managed to stay and successfully work in Moscow without actually having 
been admitted into the Artists’ Union, and it is likely thanks to those connections that he 
was invited to attend and speak at the Ideological Commission’s gathering. 
 Positioning himself as an independent voice in the Soviet art establishment, 
Glazunov managed to make a discursive innovation at the 1962 gathering that the official 
ideologist Il’inskii was unable to make, but that actually put the young conservative 
painter well in line with the efforts to invent a conservative version of destalinization. 
Namely, Glazunov proposed that Stalinism and contemporary neo-avant-gardism, as well 
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as its historic modernist forebears, were all in essence one and the same: “both the ‘left’ 
and the ‘right’ characteristically have one thing in common: the eclipse of interest in the 
internal world of man, which is directly contrary to the foundational ideas of Russian art, 
which has already existed for millennia.”30 The notion of ‘healthy common sense’ that 
Il’inskii had such trouble defining thus transforms in Glazunov’s speech into a notion of 
nationalist authenticity as the proper benchmark for artistic production. Meanwhile, a 
taste for authentic Russian art can only be developed through rigorous patriotic 
educational engagement with the entire history of Russian culture: 
It is impossible to love what you do not know. That is why after the tiring 
demagogy, after all the painted chocolate candy illustrations, after all the lying 
about life, the youth inevitably searches for the new— because they are 
disconnected from their roots and cannot, like Antаeus, draw strength from their 
native mother land. That is why these sickly and unhealthy events and tendencies 
take place in our art. That’s all I wanted to say. These facts are, unfortunately, 
endless. We could fresco all the walls, just as there had once been names of 
soldiers who died for their fatherland on the walls of the destroyed Cathedral of 
Christ the Savior.31 
 
Zubok has interpreted Glazunov’s final line as a call for the reconstruction of the 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior, which would eventually be rebuilt at breakneck speed in 
the 1990s, a subject I will discuss at length in Chapter Three. For the moment, I would 
like to stress specifically the ‘reconstruction’ aspect of Glazunov’s call. By framing his 
idea of the need for patriotic aesthetic education in terms his vociferous support of the 
nascent cultural preservationist movements of the 1960s (most prominently VOOPIK and 
the “Rodina” club), Glazunov emphasizes a reconstructionist, reinventionist approach as 
the only path that can properly challenge the nefarious, nihilistic anti-Russian cultural 
forces. By associating Stalinism within a greater anti-Russian ‘left-right conspiracy,’ 
Glazunov offers a way of interpreting neo-nationalist cultural values as an alternate path 
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forward in the state project of destalinization. Glazunov’s suggested path for Soviet 
society would surely involve a lot of difficult ideological renovation, as well as expensive 
physical renovation vis-à-vis the historic monuments left in disrepair or rubble, but in a 
typical activist conservative fashion, such a path would protect the most essential thing— 
the existing state order—from the liberal barbarians at the gate.  
 Several years after participating in the Ideological Commission meetings, 
Glazunov would be given a chance by his friends at the “Young Guard” to present a long-
form exposition of his aesthetic and political views—in 1965 and 1966 the painter 
published his 200-page essay, The Road to You in four issues of Molodaia gvardiia. 
Glazunov’s long tractate is too scattershot and meandering to read as a fully structurally 
coherent piece of writing—it is part memoir, part patriotic travel guide, part aesthetic 
education. Biographically, it starts from Glazunov’s birth in Leningrad and ends with 
his’s arrival in Moscow—the Leningrad blockade, life in the countryside and travels to 
historic Russian cities on the Volga and Siberia are spliced in the middle. Thematically, 
each of the four issues of Road has its own hue and stand-alone feel. Part I is driven by 
memory of the War and its total destruction, juxtaposed to images of authentic Russia, 
from Petersburg to Ulgich. Part II highlights Glazunov’s coming of age as an aesthetic 
thinker and painter. Part III is a paean to the late nineteenth century as an ideal time in 
Russian national aesthetic development. This part also involves meeting some living 
relics from the pre-Revolutionary era, including Prince Leonid Obolensky, whom 
Glazunov finds in Siberian exile, and who teaches the artist how to look at icons. Part IV 
is mostly an exposition of Glazunov’s conservationist agenda regarding Russian national 
cultural monuments, culminating with a lament about the sad state of disrepair at the 
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World of Art movement’s village of Talashkino. Across all of these parts, Glazunov’s 
text consistently expounds the principles of Glazunov’s aesthetics, the political divisions 
that those aesthetics expose and amplify, and those aesthetics’ conservative re-
constructionist utopian potential. 
 On both a formal and a thematic level, Glazunov is enamored of sharp 
Manicheanism. Throughout the text, Glazunov constantly juxtaposes a vitalist image of 
art as a bulwark against the nihilist forces of violence and destruction. This juxtaposition 
takes various stark visual shapes throughout the essay— in Part I, the painter studies 
ancient Greek and Egyptian art in the midst of bombed out Leningrad in the immediate 
wake of the blockade.32 In Part II, Glazunov recounts the legend of the city of Kitezh, 
which for him is an expression of authentic Russian aesthetic folk sensibilities, “the most 
beautiful of all historic Russian folk legends” in which a beautiful holy city waits to 
reemerge once evil is gone from the world.33 In Part III, Glazunov juxtaposes the wanton 
Soviet state-sanctioned destruction of Russian icons and churches to the “miraculous” 
work of icon restoration.34 Part IV concludes with Glazunov’s ultimate image of 
destruction of art— the destitute state of Nikolai Roerich’s World of Art ‘temple’ in 
Talashkino.35 Throughout the text, Glazunov also explicitly theorizes his aesthetic 
principles, focusing in particular on the notions of narodnost (the discourse on nationality 
in art) and realism. Nationality in art, for Glazunov, is a supreme aesthetic value, which 
takes shape in counter-position to the nihilistic cosmopolitan sensibilities of modernity-
obsessed avant-gardists past and present. And realism too, is interpreted as a perennial 
Manichean aesthetic doctrine— Glazunov, following Dostoevsky, claims that all high art 
must depict a pitched battle between good and evil, and that realism should be understood 
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in an “eternal” sense, as the perennial call to express “the grand movement of time, with 
its eternal, fierce battle of good and evil, in which the battlefield is the heart of man.”36 
 Glazunov’s theory of art, his historiosophical understandings, his politics and his 
aesthetic practice all turn on the fulcrum of the late nineteenth century— the fifty or so 
years preceding the revolution, beginning with the work of Viktor Vasnetsov and ending 
with the World of Art movement, especially Nikolai Roerich. What appeals to Glazunov 
most about this time period is its nationalist renaissance disposition, with a special 
emphasis on the prefix. The examples of Vasnetsov and the World of Art exemplify how 
Russian nationalist forms of art could be invented under the sign of reclamation of pre-
Petrine aesthetic values. With their interest in Russian icons and churches, legends, tales 
and folk craft, the members of the World of Art claimed that they were restoring 
authentic traditions and breaking out of the mold of the bland post-Petrine Western 
knock-off modernity surrounding them. Such an artistic disposition allegorically aligns 
with Glazunov’s own stance vis-à-vis Soviet modernity. 
Glazunov, unlike the Chekists in charge of Judgment and Trust, is aesthetically 
appalled with the Khrushchevan international modern style, he draws no inspiration 
whatsoever from the Conquerors of Space monument or any other visual symbol of 
triumphant post-Stalinist ‘modernity.’ For him, all of these symbolic mainstays are 
aesthetically boring and politically evil— they represent the nihilistic, cosmopolitan, anti-
Russian forces of destruction, and Glazunov tends to sum up all of them in the demonic 
image of Tatlin’s Tower, which recurs throughout his paintings. These ideas come 
through starkly in most of Glazunov’s “monumental” paintings, such as, for instance, 
“The Prodigal Son” (1977) and “Kitezh” (1986), “Eternal Russia” (1988) and “The 
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Mysterium of the Twentieth Century” (1977).37  In “The Prodigal Son,” shirtless teenager 
wearing Western jeans returns to the beautiful light of his native Russian culture after a 
long, bloody red debauch. He begs forgiveness from an iconographic Russian saint, with 
the luminaries of a thousand years of Russian culture in a ghostly cloud overlooking the 
saint’s shoulder. In “Kitezh,” a glittering fairytale Russian holy city stands submerged 
under a lake, while above the surface stands a faceless international-modern business 
district, with tiny black-clad faceless crowds waving red flags along the riverbank. 
“Eternal Russia” and “Mysterium” amplify Glazunov’s insistence on maximal depiction 
of the forces of good and evil to a paranoid extreme: both works are encyclopedic 
amalgamations of just about everything and everyone that comes to Glazunov’s mind in 
the context of the paintings’ telling names. Comic-book-like color distributions and 
arrangements on the canvas make short work of having to interpret just what and who 
Glazunov thinks is good and evil. 
 Glazunov likes to think of his art as an expression of true realism, according to 
which “an artist must understand and express most of all his own era, with its 
arrangement of forces, with its understanding of good and evil.”38 That is, the painter 
thinks it is incumbent upon him to reveal the underlying spiritual Manichean struggle 
behind the everyday reality. Except, with his attempt to put out such self-explanatory 
iconic “thought images,”39 Glazunov forecloses on the possibility of really making sense 
of Russian history. All narratives pertaining to Russia’s complicated past are collapsed 
into emotionally charged icons, but they do not actually explain anything. Glazunov’s art 
performs a kind of placebo of politics, it renders an emotionally compelling picture of 
friends and enemies, but stops short of engaging in a realist critique of its own premises. 
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As a result, Glazunov’s aesthetic ideals end up yielding themselves rather easily to 
cynical instrumentalization by the post-Soviet Russian state. Perhaps the best example of 
this turn of events has to do with the theme of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.  
In 1962, in his speech at the Ideological Commission, Glazunov had likened the 
creation of a new Cathedral of Christ the Savior to a commemorative practice that would 
recall all of the monuments of Russian culture destroyed by the ‘Stalinist’ state. In 1977, 
the painter inserted a small image of the toppling Cathedral on the left-most side his 
“Mysterium” (just next to the satanic theater curtains). In 1988’s “Eternal Russia” the 
Cathedral would also recur submerged in a pool of blood underneath Tatlin’s demonic 
tower, while in 1990 it would stand in the idyllic pastoral turn-of-the-century upper 
corner of “The Grand Experiment,” awaiting its imminent destruction along with the 
Romanov family. In 1999, just as Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s men were putting the 
finishing touches on the reconstructed Cathedral, Glazunov would paint a second part to 
his “Mysterium,” placing the rebuilt Christ the Savior at the far right edge, underneath a 
heroic embodiment of “Holy Rus.” So it seems that all is well that ends well? Except in 
the same year, Glazunov paints another enormous canvas, titling it “The Market of Our 
Democracy.” This work continues Glazunov’s method of sweeping accrual of all symbols 
of ‘everything wrong in Russia today.’ And the rebuilt Cathedral of Christ the Savior is 
positioned in the center, at the top of the canvas, standing just behind a poster of Mickey 
Mouse, next to a risqué advertisement for Canadian Snow-Scooters and a detail from 
Zurab Tsereteli’s widely-despised 1990s monument of Peter the Great. The Cathedral 
thus appears as just another element in “the market of our democracy.” Moreover, the 
area in the top left corner that Christ the Savior used to occupy in “The Grand 
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Experiment” has now been replaced by a giant Masonic pyramid from the US $1 bill, 
made up of international flags. This symbol has an Israeli flag below it, but the whole 
thing is anyway a stand-in for the Star of David, because in the Russian nationalist 
imagination Jews and Masons (and the ‘West’) are always a part of the same nefarious 
cosmopolitan collaborative collective. Meanwhile, on the left half of the painting, 
towards the bottom, stands the beautiful Russian fairytale maiden from “The Prodigal 
Son,” except now she is wearing stripper clothes and selling a “Russia” cake. 
 In short, by the late 1990s, Glazunov seems to have recognized the hollow 
cooptation of his late Soviet reconstructionist fantasies by a despicable post-Soviet state, 
but there is not much he can do in the way of imagining something different. The forces 
of evil, never really analyzed beyond their arrangement in a paranoid fashion along the 
Manichean spectrum, have triumphed here completely. As a result, the painter just ends 
up repeating himself— that same year Glazunov paints yet another “monumental” 
canvas, “The Sacking of the Temple on Easter Night.” But here everything is 
comfortably clear and familiar— it’s a story from the 1920s or 1930s, with the same old 
friends and enemies, the godless, possibly Jewish Communists/Stalinists with a Trotsky 
look-alike at the head, coming to plunder religion from the pious, humble Russian folk. 
Ten years later, yet another enormous canvas appears, this time called “Dekulakization” 
(2010) and again it depicts the same old politics. Neither of these paintings even attempt 
to speak about “today” anymore— which is to say that in the post-Soviet era, Glazunov’s 
whole allegorical mechanism finally seems to have failed him. His hopeful late-Soviet 
reconstructionist utopian ideals that had inspired him not only to paint his paintings, but 
also to become a prominent semi-political figure in cultural preservationist movements, 
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have failed to deliver, and all the painter can do now is endlessly return to the familiar old 
scene of the crime, with its self-explanatory and banal heroes and villains. 
 
Vladimir Soloukhin 
As Glazunov finished off the publication of his Road to You in Molodaia gvardia 
in 1966, Vladimir Soloukhin immediately began publishing his Letters from the Russian 
Museum in the same journal, releasing them in two parts that same year. Just a few years 
earlier, according to Zubok, the young Soloukhin had arrived to the Writers Union 
restaurant and was deciding where to sit. In Zubok’s telling, Soloukhin joined the ‘anti-
Thaw’ crowd out of a vague feeling of ethno-national belonging, because the ‘other side’ 
had been comprised of quite a few Jews.40 By 1966, however, Soloukhin had a much 
clearer idea of his own ideological predilections, thanks in great part to his friendship 
with Glazunov. The closeness of thinking regarding politics and aesthetics between 
Glazunov and Soloukhin is palpable. Throughout the Letters, Soloukhin, like Glazunov, 
extolls Russian iconography and frescoes, laments the destruction of pre-Revolutionary 
historic buildings, especially churches (including the Cathedral of Christ the Savior), and 
waxes poetic about the late nineteenth century. The difference between the two is less on 
the level of expressed convictions and more on the level of argumentation. Glazunov’s 
Road is ungainly and multivaried; Soloukhin’s Letters are tight, conceptually coherent. 
As a result, while it is difficult to whittle Glazunov’s text down to a single take-away 
message, Soloukhin’s Letters happily oblige in this matter.  
Published in two parts, Letters tell a story of ‘Stalinist’ (read: Communist) 
usurpation of Russia’s nationalist legacy, set against a populist revenge fantasy in which 
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the Russian narod shall rise up, reject both the dull Soviet and liberal cosmopolitan 
modernity, and pledge allegiance to Russia’s nationalist Sonderweg. Meanwhile, the art 
hanging in the Russian Museum will guide the people in their quest for national renewal, 
thanks to its mid-brow common-sense traditionalist appeal. Within this general narrative 
arc, Soloukhin on the one hand clarifies Glazunov’s ideas to the point of vulgarization 
(Glazunov is a subtler thinker regarding the question of narodnost and aesthetic ‘common 
sense’), but on the other hand also pins down in a more clarified and popularly accessible 
format a late Soviet conservative myth of the late nineteenth century as a time of 
aesthetic harmony. Piggy-backing on Glazunov, Soloukhin renders an aesthetic ideology 
of late Soviet reactionary utopianism, in which the pre-Revolutionary past becomes a site 
of splendorous, vibrant order, where social hierarchies are acknowledged, while the 
possibility of social conflict goes entirely ignored. Moreover, Soloukhin’s vision 
solidifies the myth of 1917 as an absolute aesthetic watershed, and in this way reinforces 
the stark divide between a vision of traditional, Russian popular authenticity versus a 
monolithic enemy Communist-Stalinist-liberal vision of anti-populist modernization. 
Soloukhin puts his anti-modern sensibilities on the table from the very beginning 
of his Letters— taking as his model Radishchev’s classic anti-Catherinian travelogue, A 
Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow, Soloukhin starts the first part of his Letters with 
a lamentation of the destruction of Moscow’s unique nationalist likeness, both in the 
1930’s and more recently, and marks out Leningrad/Petersburg as a place of refuge— a 
city that is still spiritually intact thanks to its peripheral status vis-à-vis the new Soviet 
capital. The theme of refuge from evil further amplifies in Leningrad— the Russian 
Museum is presently overshadowed by a wildly successful, lavishly funded exhibition of 
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anti-humanist, foreign, offensive American architecture. Meanwhile, the icons in the 
Russian Museum are for the most part held in the reserves, where, like medieval Russian 
kenotic martyr saints, hiding out from evil desolation:  
The beauty that had been thinly distributed throughout the whole of Russian land 
is now scratched off like gold plating, and gathered into piles. A pile in the 
Tretiakov storage… A pile here… a pile perhaps, in the Yaroslav museum… A 
pile in the Vologda museum. […] As for the land where it had been scratched of 
and peeled off, or even simply washed off, there remained just piles of rubble, 
weeds, maybe dead and headless brick buildings, where they keep kerosene, oats, 
feed for pigs, sheep and cow hides.41 
 
Worse yet, even at the Russian Museum things aren’t so safe— a special fresco exhibit 
may be under pressure to close down because of some “sharp” (read: anti-Semitic) 
formulations in the exhibit’s book of audience comments.42 The pathos of Part I comes to 
a head at the end of its final, eighth letter— after a long, emotional discussion of the 
Russian Museum’s underfunded program of icon salvage and restoration, Soloukhin 
zeroes in on the famous medieval icon of St. George trampling a serpent: 
A white horse, a flaming background, a vanquished serpent, and a spear of 
retribution along the diagonal. […] I love this symbol very much […] Retribution 
is one of the most understandable and inspiring feelings for human beings. The 
monster is all-powerful, hundred-headed, ravenous and hateful. Every day it eats 
a beautiful maiden, it ruins a pure human soul. And it seems like there’s no respite 
from it, there’s no redemption, but a youth rides in with a fluttering red coat on a 
blindingly white horse and raises his spear, which cannot be repulsed. 
Retribution! What can be more righteous than this feeling!43 
 
The direct quotation from Radishchev emphasized above crystallizes Soloukhin’s point. 
For Radishchev, the hundred-headed beast had been the repressive, anti-Russian 
Catherinian state; for Soloukhin it is all of anti-human, anti-Russian, evil modernity, 
whether Stalinist, or early Soviet, or Khrushchevan, or American— they are all parts of 
the same monster, and the hour of Russian national vengeance is well nigh. 
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 If Part I’s overall aim is to designate a problem, Part II offers a solution, of sorts. 
After briefly walking through the halls of boring eighteenth and early nineteenth-century 
classicist Russian art, Soloukhin picks up with the work of Venetsianov, who quits the 
academy, goes to his countryside estate and paints his serfs: “And are they slaves? 
Maidservants? Maidservants with the poise and gaze of Tsaritsas!”44 The Russian 
Emperor Alexander I, for his part, does his patriotic duty and buys Venetsianov’s 
paintings: “He decided to organize at the Hermitage a gallery of paintings from the 
Russian school of art. […] Thus for the first time under a single glittering roof with the 
Venuses, the Heracles, the Flemish and Spanish masters, there appeared the peasants 
from the little village of Tronikha in the Tverskaia region.”45 Soloukhin admires 
Venetsianov, in other words, because he sees this painter as the first one to participate in 
a kind of splendorous, harmonious national social system, in which there is no aesthetic 
difference between serfs and queens, in which the good king likes to look at beautiful 
paintings of his “Olympian” peasant subjects.46 For Soloukhin, such a view of the 
nineteenth century stands in sharp contrast to the “official” Soviet history of pre-
Revolutionary art with its emphasis on the socially-minded realists of the period, 
especially the Peredvizhniki group. Soloukhin derisively regards the Peredvizhniki’s 
project of social critique as “genre painting” and “feuilleton art,” in which “if there’s a 
wedding, then it’s got to be either a witch at a village feast or an unequal marriage. It’s as 
if there were no successful weddings and equal marriages at all. We were no longer able 
to speak of anything with each other without aiming to pinch somehow.”47 
 After Venetsianov and an interlude with Fedotov and Nesterov, Soloukhin finally 
gets to Vasnetsov’s paintings of Russia’s fairy-tale past. Following Glazunov, Soloukhin 
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views Vasnetsov as a spiritual father of the World of Art group, whose members re-
discovered, re-birthed an authentic Russian nationalist aesthetic. In this age of “invented 
traditions,”48 Russia’s nationalist-minded artists invented their style by peering beyond 
the Petrine divide into Russian medieval iconography, as well as by looking for 
authenticity in peasant fairytales, folk legends, crafts and so forth. As a result, Soloukhin 
claims that painters like Vasnetsov managed to create an image that, despite its origin in a 
particular moment in history, feels eternal:  
‘A Knight at the Crossroads’ is at the Russian Museum. Maybe this steppe is as 
dear to us as a dream, as if we are children and flying again, or maybe the 
fairytale is tied up here so tightly with the real history of a people— but either 
way, it is somehow hard to believe that ‘A Knight at the Crossroads’ didn’t exist 
before 1882 and that the entire preceding generation of Russian people, of 
children at least, did not grow up with the image of Vasntetsov’s “Knight” in their 
minds. It is as if it has always existed, like the steppe, like Kiev, like the Volga, 
like Russia, like the legends and the fairytales about it.49 
 
Soloukhin has a similar take on Surikov. And most importantly, both of these painters, as 
well as Nesterov and Fedotov, all depict the vibrancy of a Russia that emphatically ended 
with the Revolution: 
Russia, shortly before the cataclysm, had been multifaceted and varied in images. 
There was the Russia of servitors… the Russia of mutineers… The Russia of 
explorers… The Russia of science… the Russia of art: hundreds of names. There 
was a student Russia and an officer Russia, a navy and a taiga Russia, a dancing 
and drinking Russia, a tilling and a wandering Russia. But there was also a 
praying Russia.50 
 
Indeed, Soloukhin concludes the Letters on a similar sentiment, quoting Nesterov’s 
description of the Russian Museum, written already after the Revoluion: “There are the 
famous Smolianki, the best Rokotov, and everything tells us of the past of the people, the 
mores of the life that has disappeared.”51 
 With his poetic descriptions of a “Russia shortly before the cataclysm,” and also 
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of Russian archetypal images depicted by Vasnetsov, Soloukhin forms a myth of a 
symphonic pre-Revolutionary lifeworld in which the people, the intellectuals, the 
alcoholics, the mutineers all played their harmonious role. It’s a vision of a vibrant past 
order in which intensity of color is emotionally designed to cut off and outright deride the 
possibility of critical social analysis as a viable way of connecting with this past. And the 
coherence of this image of a pre-Revolutionary “Eternal Russia” holds together thanks to 
the radical divide of the Soviet new time that is assumed to have eradicated it. In this 
framework, the Soviet regime is assumed to have appeared out of thin air as some kind of 
parasitic usurper. Hence, Soloukhin notes that “Vasnetsov’s nationalist activities were so 
varied and wide that, for example, military helmets, called at first Bogatyrki, and later 
Budenovki, had been prepared for the Tsar’s army according to Viktor Mikhailovich’s 
sketches, and we have inherited them from the Tsar’s military warehouses.”52 Except the 
truth is a little stranger than this bit of fiction. Namely, Vasnetsov really did design the 
Red Army’s military hats, but he didn’t do it for the Tsar— he did it specifically for the 
Red Army, on the orders of none other than Trotsky, himself a major protagonist of 
Mikhail Agursky’s study of “National-Bolshevism.”53 For that matter, Nesterov too 
didn’t stop painting in 1917— he continued to make art well into the Stalin era, and the 
post-Soviet aesthetic philosopher Victor Arslanov, following his teacher Mikhail Lifshitz, 
has argued that it is precisely Nesterov’s 1930s portraits of creative intellectuals that 
reveal the painter in his prime.54  
Whatever we think of Arslanov’s aesthetic judgment, what is obvious is that 
Soloukhin’s myth of a radical break of 1917 operates by playing down the continuities 
that survived past the “cataclysm,” and by ignoring the complicated social narratives that 
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brought about the Revolution in the first place. And with his anti-political, anti-rational 
image of an always righteous, always right-thinking Russian narod squaring off against 
the faceless forces of cosmopolitan modernity, Soloukhin and other conservative 
intelligentsia figures end up failing the political tests of the late 1980s, when, as Yitshak 
Brudny points out, the ‘Russian Party’ proved quite incompetent at representational 
politics.55 But in one sense they were successful: like Glazunov, Soloukhin contributed to 
turning late-nineteenth-century Russia “before the cataclysm” into an aesthetic image 
with an easily instrumentalizable symbolic value. Just as the cynical post-Soviet state 
happily rebuilt the Cathedral of Christ the Savior so beloved by Glazunov, the state also 
happily coopted Soloukhin’s love of St. George, returning him (or, to be precise, his 
look-alike) to Russian state insignia. The post-Perestroika Yeltsin state did all of this not 
because they thought deeply about the symbolic meaning of these objects, and neither 
was the state interested in bringing the conservatives who had created these symbols to 
actual political power (after all, many of the conservatives had aligned themselves with 
the anti-Yeltsin putschists in 1991 and then again with the anti-Yeltsin Parliament in 
1993—see Chapter Three). Rather, a reconstruction and reclamation of these fetishized 
symbols promised to burnish the new state’s legitimacy at no political cost. At a time 
when any political legitimacy was in very short supply, the late Soviet conservative 
aesthetic legacy proved to be as good a site to poach as any. And so, to borrow their own 
mythic language, we might say that Soloukhin’s and Glazunov’s conservative 
reconstructionist ethos ultimately never managed to slay the hateful hundred-headed 
beast— indeed, they might have given it a new lease on life. 
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III. The Neo-Slavophile Critique of Political Action: 
Or, How Oblomov Became a Late Soviet Conservative 
 
His demands, directed to the future, are the most minimal ones: let 
everything calm down, settle down. […] It is true that some things 
need to be updated in this settlement, but just the tiniest bit. 
 
Iurii Loshchits, about Ilya Oblomov56 
 
 
 All of the cases of conservatives discussed above have touched on the question of 
political agency. The late Soviet liberal view of political agency might be summed up in 
the following shorthand— maintain cultural hegemony, attract a mass following (though 
some segments of the masses would ‘count’ more than others), and demand a liberal 
democratic political overhaul through the public sphere. With the conservatives, the 
question of political agency was more problematic. After all, in the conservative politics 
of alliance, it wasn’t quite so much state power that was to be contested, analyzed or 
critiqued, but rather the liberal long-standing strategy of cultural hegemony. How long 
have the liberals been in charge? “since, depending on who’s counting, the French 
Revolution or the Reformation,” Corey Robin jokes, speaking about Anglo-American 
conservatives.57  Late Soviet conservatives have a similar sort of maximalist 
historiosophical tendency. Thinkers and political practitioners like Glazunov, Soloukhin, 
Shulgin, and the KGB proposed to interpret the post-Stalin era as a new time, which 
would offer an opportunity to exact a cultural revanche against an anti-Russian 
‘modernist-Stalinist-liberal conspiracy’ that has been in charge for decades, if not 
centuries, possibly including the entire post-Petrine era. The point of this imaginary 
wasn’t so much to peddle grand historical paranoia (though there was plenty of such 
paranoia, particularly of the anti-Semitic kind), but rather to dispute the value of 
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transformative social action tout court, be it understood as enlightenment, or 
modernization, or progressivism, or liberalism. All variants of these future-oriented 
activities are always viewed as a threat; the affirmation of a vision of a nationalist 
‘special path’—the Sonderweg in which future-oriented agency is unnecessary is the 
conservative antidote.  
Belief in the ‘special path’ entails a de-coupling of one’s participation in the 
social sphere from the future-oriented, emancipatory imperative. To be a Sonderweg-
minded conservative subject, one should somehow strive harmoniously to participate in 
culture without engaging in such destabilizing activities. It is partly the search for this 
form of harmonious nationalist practice that brought Glazunov and Soloukhin to admire 
the World of Art movement, which they viewed in opposition to the politically engaged 
“feuilleton art” of the Peredvizhniki group. A similar disposition also brought some 
conservatives of the 1960s to reexamine the post-Decembrist era and the nineteenth-
century Slavophile heritage. 
 
Vadim Kozhinov 
 In 1968, the Russian scholarly journal, Issues in Literature [Voprosy literatury] 
published an article by the prominent conservative critic Vadim Kozhinov, entitled 
“Towards a Methodology of History of Russian Literature (On the Realism of the 
1830s).” Though the paper focused on the period between 1825 and 1842, it launched a 
heated discussion of the 1840s Slavophile current in Russian nineteenth-century cultural 
thought, to the point that official ideologists had to step in and set the record straight. In 
his first paper, Kozhinov argued that Soviet scholars of the nineteenth century have been 
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unfair in describing the epoch following the failed Decembrist revolt of 1825 as a time of 
cultural decline, just because the regime of Nicholas I’s was repressive. As a 
counterargument to this (strawman) position, Kozhinov focused on the examples of Petr 
Chaadaev’s Philosophical Letters and Gogol’s Dead Souls, both of which were penned 
and circulated in this period.  
According to Kozhinov, the 1830s were a “remarkable time of outward slavery 
and inner freedom” an epoch that allowed Chaadaev to formulate the need for a 
Sonderweg [samobytnost] as a central Russian Idea. For Kozhinov, such a thought 
marked the beginning of Russia’s cultural “world significance.”58 Gogol, meanwhile, 
delivered on Chaadaev’s challenge by writing The Dead Souls, which “is not satire, it is 
an art close to art of the ‘renaissance’ type,” because it “reveals Rus in its indivisible 
wholeness.”59 Getting more ecstatic with every page, Kozhinov would finally conclude 
his article with the bombastic summary claim that “The common understanding of the 
1830s as a time of ‘decline’ is getting in the way of objective research of what is in my 
opinion one of the greatest literary epochs.”60 Kozhinov’s article was followed by a 
number of others, including refutations of his claims by orthodox literary historians, a set 
of articles on the Slavophiles of the 1840s and 1850s, and finally Kozhinov’s own 
response, published in October 1969, entitled “About the Most Important in Slavophile 
Criticism.” Following up on his earlier piece, the critic continued to emphasize the idea 
of the Sonderweg (samobytnost) as the crucial value and ultimate measure for Russian 
cultural production. Tactically defending it from accusations of being a politically 
“reactionary” concept (the word being understood here in the narrow official Marxist-
Leninist ideological sense), Kozhinov claimed that Russia’s special path was actually 
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responsible for bringing about the Russian Revolution, in which the nation rose up 
against the encroachments of Western capitalism. Whatever we make of this (Stalinist) 
claim, the “Most Important” part of Kozhinov’s article for our purposes occurs when it 
explains the Slavophile special path’s relationship to ‘modernity’:  
The Slavophiles [weren’t] interested in some kind of resurrection of ancient 
‘foundations’ or much less ancient everyday life or mores. In no way did the 
Slavophiles wish somehow to ‘archaize’ modern life and culture; they strove only 
to make sure that life and culture would more fully, more thoroughly be 
permeated by that nationally unique [samobytnyi] content, which, in their view, 
had been much more strongly expressed in the life of pre-Petrine and especially 
pre-Mongolian Rus. The ‘Europeanization’ of Russia forced this content inward, 
into the depths of folk life. But the Slavophiles felt that this content is fully 
capable of living within modern (sovremennye) forms of existence and 
consciousness, that it can be combined with railroads and with the newest science 
and philosophy.61 
 
In Kozhinov’s rendering, Russia’s special path clearly has trouble with “modernity.” On 
the one hand, there seems to be some modernity that the Sonderweg can countenance— 
be it in the realm of technology, science, philosophy or everyday habits. On the other 
hand, there is the rest of modernity, which Kozhinov understands as an anti-Russian, 
“Europeanizing,” homogenizing force. Elsewhere in the text, Kozhinov also uses the term 
“nihilism” to describe it. Altogether, this force is actually worse than outright political 
repression—hence the critic’s ire at the “Western-oriented nihilists of the 1860s, “who in 
their desire to dethrone Pushkin from his supreme cultural status sinned worse than 
Nicholas’s state that had merely censured the poet during his lifetime.”62 I think this issue 
of “nihilism” points to a resistance of political modernity in Claude Lefort’s sense— that 
is, the kind of modernity that negates the notion of a trans-rationally, traditionally 
grounded order of the social world and thereby opens the door for that social world’s 
rationalizing, “nihilistic” obliteration.  
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The idea of the Russian Sonderweg, therefore, is an idea of a conservative cultural 
activity that contests modernity’s imperative to engage in transformative socio-political 
actions on the grounds of such actions being anti-Russian. And this is precisely why 
Kozhinov emphasizes the period of the 1830s for his reflections. By highlighting the 
decade and a half after the failed Decembrist revolt as the “greatest era” for Russian art, 
Kozhinov wishes to dispute the official Soviet account, inherited from pre-Revolutionary 
liberal thought of the 1840s “Westernizers,” according to which art acquires value only 
insofar as it serves a project of political liberation. For Kozhinov, art becomes truly 
‘grand’ only insofar as it does not attempt to act politically at all. Great “art of the 
renaissance type” has to express the nationalist Sonderweg in some paradoxically 
inactive sense. This is an inherently contradictory formulation, because it claims that 
properly conservative “renaissance” art somehow has to both renovate and resist 
renovation. Whether or not such a view of aesthetics makes sense, what is undeniable is 
that it tracks well with the late Soviet conservative political stance of critique of the very 
notion of political agency, which they closely associate with liberalism and 
modernization. To understand better how this stance works, let us examine the case of 
classic Russian writer Ivan Goncharov’s character of Ilya Oblomov, who in the late 
Soviet era was very provocatively transformed into a kind of conservative political hero. 
 
Iurii Loshchits’s Oblomov 
In 1977, the conservative writer and critic Iurii Loshchits released a monograph 
biography of the Russian novelist Ivan Goncharov (1812-1891) via the “Lives of 
Extraodinary People” book series at the “Molodaia gvardiia” publishing house, which 
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was by then run by junior members of the “Pavlov group.”63 Brudny views Loshchits’s 
biography as part of a trend at “Lives,” which at this time also published the biographies 
of other classic authors, like Alexander Ostrovsky and Nikolai Gogol. All three of these, 
as Brudny notes, “criticized the nineteenth-century radical intelligentsia’s interpretation 
of the works of these writers,” ipso facto challenging the Marxist-Leninist canonical 
interpretations of this period and its politics. Moreover, the challenge didn’t go 
unnoticed— in 1979, official ideologists at the journal Communist went after Loshchits, 
accusing him of misinterpreting the nineteenth century.64 Loshchits’s (mild) trouble with 
the state is hardly an exception— because of its ideologically activist nature, Soviet 
conservatism always had the potential to worry its handlers in the state bureaucracy. Even 
so, Loshchits’s interpretation of Goncharov’s life, oeuvre and most famous novel, 
Oblomov (1849-1859) is emphatically anti-liberal. Goncharov explicitly critiques the 
very idea of a moral imperative to engage in the ubiquitous process of Western 
modernization. Such a critique denies the validity of all liberal political action as such, 
and presents in its stead a peculiar form of Sonderweg-minded, anti-political Russian 
conservative subjectivization. 
Loshchits’s biography of Goncahrov is structured around several key moments in 
which the writer realizes fully the threat that Russia faces from modernity. Stylized 
nineteenth-century language is particularly heavy in the book’s early parts, describing 
Goncharov’s idyllic upbringing in Simbirsk and likening it to that of his most famous 
protagonist, Oblomov. Goncharov then attends Moscow University, where he watches 
Alexander Pushkin argue against a “haughty” Russian medievalist professor trying to 
disprove the authenticity of the Igor Tale.65 A short while later, Goncharov fails to write 
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a first novel, because, according to Loshchits the writer realizes that a romantic 
Rousseauian plot would no longer be appropriate for the epochal challenges of the “iron 
nineteenth century.”66   
Goncharov’s modernity skepticism then takes a mature form as a result of his 
almost-around-the-world sea voyage on the frigate Pallada (1852-1855). During the 
journey, Goncharov watches the installation of the first steam engines on British ships 
and observes the sprawling capitalist network of the British Empire, which imposes 
foreign rule, erases national particularities and constitutes a direct threat to Russia, 
culminating with the Crimean War, which cuts Goncharov’s voyage short. This historical 
turning-point crystalizes the grand confrontation between Russia and Western modernity: 
The mid-century commenced in 1855 in Russia- the year of Nicholas’s death, the 
year of the fall of Sevastopol, the year when hundreds of villages cried over the 
dead and hoped for soon-to-come land and liberty… A little land and a little 
liberty. Meanwhile the werewolf steam train puffs in the snowy corridor of 
forests, whistles riotously, and keeps an eye on the trees: it’s no problem that I’m 
little, I will eat all of you soon, I will turn you into black, hot dust… In the mid-
century Russia suddenly ‘grew up.’ Capitalism finally arrived to its limitless, 
tantalizingly rich expanses— through the power of English rifles, through the hot 
power of steamships and steam trains, through the beguiling and sweet power of 
comforts (still available only to the select).67 
 
As a critic, Loshchits argues that Goncharov’s oeuvre aims to address this epochal 
confrontation, on both a formal and a substantive level. Formally, Goncharov has to 
invent a “mythological realism” and a “pure novel” form in order to answer the challenge 
of the times.68 Hence, Loshchits emphasizes the many Biblical motifs peppering 
Goncharov’s works, and also constantly highlights his texts’ “polyphony,” such that its 
conflicting parties get to speak their minds honestly: “the author himself […] does not 
attempt to pass a final word on the side of either ‘truth.’”69 In Loshchits’s treatment, both 
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of these aspects reach their apex by the end of Goncharov’s career, when the writer 
assumes a God-like presence in his last novel, The Precipice (1869): 
He ‘knows’ ahead of time that the course of the events is irrevocable […] But he 
cannot limit the inhabitants of [the novel’s setting, the country estate of 
Malinovka] in their freedom of actions. […] He is sick with the catastrophes, 
pains and ‘sins’ of his future heroes. But he also knows that the temptations 
cannot but come in their time. In the end he can only hope that all sicknesses and 
woes will not conquer them, that the human heart will not split from pain, that it 
will survive the pressure of evil…”70 
 
Loshchits emphasizes the ambivalence and the mythological charge of Goncharov’s texts 
not only to render Goncharov into a ‘deep’ Russian thinker, but also to suggest a kind of 
model for conservative intellectual engagement with the ever-threatening modernizing 
world.  
Instead of taking up a forward-looking, coherent political platform, so 
characteristic of mid-nineteenth century Russian publicists and authors like Alexander 
Herzen and Nikolai Chernyshevsky, the model conservative author strives to avoid any 
such resolute gestures and instead renders the contradictions of his age in a kind of 
harmonious, even-handed fashion. The disjointed, complicated world passes through the 
“pure” novel form, where it acquires a kind of aesthetic balance. In the conservative 
novel, social contradictions aren’t resolved, but rather coexist within a unifying text. We 
should note that we have already seen a similar gesture take place in Soloukhin’s 
depiction of the nineteenth century. But Loshchits goes a bit further than Soloukhin. In 
his reading of Goncharov’s oeuvre, the gesture of conservative aesthetic unification of 
contradictions comes along with a moral injunction against action. In the epochal 
confrontation between Russia and modernity, with modernity posing the quintessential 
Chernyshevskian question, ‘what is to be done?,’ Loshchits has Goncharov respond by 
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saying ‘nothing.’ This attitude comes through in the critic’s reading of Oblomov, which 
forms the centerpiece of the biography.  
For Loshchits, Oblomov formulates a Russian Sonderweg response to encroaching 
modernity’s totalizing injunction to “do.” Ilya Oblomov “[does] not wish to do. […] [He] 
quit[s] your grandiose game of noble doing,”71 and the critic insists that this refusal is 
morally valuable. Loshchits reads Oblomov as a kenotic amalgamation of Eastern 
Buddhist and Russian saintliness, in which the saint aims to save himself from evil 
through a kind of righteous inaction: 
Ilya Ilyich’s ‘old’ truth cannot withstand the rush of civilization. It can only hide 
in the chrysalis of nonresistance. It is impossible to stand in the way of evil. But 
there is hope that one can somehow suffer through it, to quietly come out on the 
other side. There’s no strength to go directly against it. But it is possible— at least 
in thought— to refuse the evil’s right to reality.72  
 
Conversely, Oblomov’s enemy in his difficult, doomed task of principled anti-
modern inaction is his best friend, Andrei Stolz. The critic’s reads Stolz in a resolutely 
negative fashion, downplaying the ambivalences with which the novel presents him. For 
Loshchits, Stolz is none other than the devil, in a Faustian and a Western Capitalist sense. 
The critic likens Stolz’s constant restlessness to that of Goethe’s Mephistopheles.73 
Moreover, Stolz also apparently deploys a Mephistophelean tactic to beguile Oblomov 
into his service by recruiting the help of a beautiful maid, Olga, who for her part doesn’t 
necessarily realize that she is a weapon of evil. Olga, the “new woman,” is being 
manipulated to do the devil’s work through the cardinal sin of pride— “she likes very 
much to think of herself as [an enlightener]: after all, she, a woman, leads a man behind 
herself! What strength she has been given [by Stolz], what force?! How can she not be 
proud of herself, how can her glorious head not spin!”74 Lastly, and most damningly, 
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Loshchits observes Stolz’s colonizing, Western capitalist plans vis-à-vis the idyll of 
Oblomovka. Reading Oblomov alongside the Frigate Pallada travelogue, Loschits argues 
that Stolz is quite like the European colonists who seek to conquer all of the world’s 
defenseless Oblomovkas:  
As long as the ‘sleeping kingdom’ exists, Stolz somehow feels out of sorts, even 
in Paris he tosses and turns at night. He is tormented by the thought that the 
Oblomovka peasants have been sewing their bit of land since time immemorial 
and have been collecting rich harvests without reading any agronomic brochures. 
And that the excess bread just stays around among them, without getting sold off 
by rail— to Paris, for example. […] Thanks to Stolz’s will, the ‘sleeping 
kingdom’ will turn into… a railroad station, and the Oblomovka peasants will go 
‘work the embankments.’ So there they collide at full speed, [the Russian fairy-
tale fool’s] cumbersome brick-oven and the hot steam train, the fairy-tale and 
reality, the ancient myth and the sober reality of the mid-19th century.75 
 
In the face of such wanton, violent, totalizing evil embodied by Oblomov’s best friend, 
all the protagonist is left to do is pursue a kind of quintessentially conservative political 
non-practice. Oblomov, for Loshchits, turns into a peculiar, “purely Russian” kind of Don 
Quixote. For Oblomov, just as for Don Quixote, “his fanatical faith in the absolute reality 
of his dreams is contrasted against the practicalities of his human surroundings.” 
However, whereas Don Quixote would engage in “militant frenzy” on behalf of his faith, 
Oblomov “prefers the goal of conservatism [okhranitelstvo] to the goal of propaganda, a 
defense, rather than an attack.”76 This “philosopher of ‘absolute rest’” 
…may be considered the shiest and most unassuming of all utopians ever known 
to man. His demands, directed to the future, are the most minimal ones: let 
everything calm down, settle down. Oblomov’s ‘plan’ includes only the village 
settlement, dissolved in surrounding nature. It is true that some things need to be 
updated in this settlement, but just the tiniest bit.77 
 
Using the Russian calque for “conservatism,” Loshchits rather explicitly articulates his 
political ideals.  
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The love of a gloriously passive utopia in which “some things need to be updated 
[…], but just the tiniest bit” encapsulates the late Soviet conservative ethos of resistance 
to the modernizing “action” that is doomed to occur anyway, but that can at the very least 
be denied its “spiritual reality.” If one is to become a conservative political subject along 
these lines, all one can do is insist on one’s own spiritual special path, to cultivate a kind 
of “inner freedom”78 in the face of a liberal modernity that will, substantively speaking, 
always be in charge, but whose moral hegemony can at least be denied. Perhaps, thanks 
to principled moral resistance some local, specific instances of modernization can be 
stalled or repealed. Or, perhaps through a conservative resistance on the symbolic plane 
of national values, some essential attributes and relationships of the existing order can be 
strengthened and renovated, so as not to be entirely crushed by the liberalizing tide. 
Regarding this last point, we should note that the post-Soviet afterlife of critics like 
Kozhinov and Loshchits and their Party backers turned out relatively alright. Despite the 
late Soviet liberal party’s ideological triumph in the Perestroika, the members of the 
Pavlov group and its descendants either maintained or improved on their old niches in the 
new order, quite like the many late Soviet power elites that used to curate them.  
 
Nikita Mikhalkov’s Oblomov 
 To conclude my examination of the late Soviet conservative interpretation of 
Oblomov, I would like to turn now to Nikita Mikhalkov’s 1979 film, “A Few Days from 
the Life of Oblomov,” which builds on Loshchits’s conservative reading, but also 
appends it with a powerful neo-Chekhovian twist.79 Coming from the family of 
aforementioned Sergei Mikhaklov, Nikita was closely connected to the late Soviet 
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conservative creative intelligentsia circles. In the 1990s, the filmmaker would make his 
monarchist predilections clear, while at one point even signaling his eligibility for the 
Russian throne.80 Meanwhile, as a filmmaker Mikhalkov has spent a lifetime cultivating a 
mastery of Chekhovian melodramatic cinema, in which both protagonists and antagonists 
are enmeshed in a world in which clear action or an uncompromised moral compass are 
impossible. In her study of the “Imperial trace” in late- and post-Soviet Russian cinema, 
Nancy Condee has pointed out parallels between Mikhalkov’s melodrama and his 
politics, highlighting in particular his “melodramatic” triad of “impossibility, 
irrevocability, inevitability” as a counterpoint to the Western nationalist emancipatory 
triad of “liberty, equality, brotherhood.”81 For Condee, Mikhalkov’s characters inhabit a 
private subjective existence that negates the very possibility of effective political 
subjectivizaton. Through the exquisitely dead-locked incoherence of their lives, 
Mikhalkov’s heroes render incomprehensible and pointless the various political 
ideologies in which they are embedded and that they might espouse. Mikhalkov’s 
preferred chronology for his stories further amplifies this dynamic— nearly all of his 
films are set in the waning years of the Russian Empire or the early Soviet years just prior 
to Stalin’s purges. The inhabitants of this complicated historical period live a private 
existence that is too complex for ideology— like Mitia from Burnt by the Sun (1994), 
they “stand in for too many contradictory ideological positions simultaneously.”82 
Moreover, on this “buckle of history,” “things” like the Chekhovian-Mikhalkovan noble 
summer country house, “outlive people.”83 The continuity of this favored setting 
underlines the frailty of its human inhabitants. 
Clearly, Mikhalkov’s thoroughgoing melodramatic emphasis on the always already 
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doomed private existence within Russia’s tumultuous history matches Loshchits’s 
sensibilities. Indeed, Mikhalkov’s Oblomov incorporates and builds on Loshchits’s 
reading. Most importantly, Mikhalkov accepts the critic’s claim of a staunch moral 
dichotomy between Oblomov and Stolz. Just as in Loshchits’s reading, Mikhalkov’s film 
marks out Andrei Stolz as the antagonist, a cold-hearted betrayer of his kind-hearted, 
naïve friend. The antagonism is revealed, however, in typical Chekhovian realist 
theatrical style, via an emotional ‘secondary plane’ that belies Stolz’s innocent words and 
expressed intentions. We first glimpse a sense of Stolz’s antagonistic nature about two 
thirds into the first part of the film, when the two attend a bathhouse. To make a point 
about his steely willpower Stolz runs out of the bathhouse and rubs himself in snow, and 
then tries to force a handful of snow onto Ilya’s body, while repeating, “now or never.” 
After several repetitions, the intonation passes from joking to threatening, while naked 
Andrei’s grasp of naked Ilya turns violent. With a final whimper from Ilya, the scene 
takes on an unmistakable tenor of rape (see Figure 11, below).84 This violent grasp 
rhymes with a flashback scene ten minutes later, in which Stolz’s father lovingly, but 
violently shakes a stoic, silent Stolz as the latter departs the house of his youth forever, 
riding off on horseback and looking quite like a medieval German knight (see Figure 12, 
below).85 Then, finally, at the end of the film, Stolz’s violent nature comes full circle. 
After having initially introduced Ilya to Olga, Andrei returns after several months of 
absence and, despite having noticed the love that has developed between his two friends, 
he is now interested in Olga and will betray Ilay to have his way. This scene (and the 
whole film) culminates with a confrontation in which, first, Stolz calmly tells Oblomov 







private symbols of their affection: “I know everything […] About the lessons, and about 
the strolls, and about the bush. And about the letter, and about the cup, and about the 
lobster.” In shock, Oblomov responds, “My God, but how...“ The whole conversation 
takes place extradiagetically and the striking absence of the characters in the shot 
amplifies Stolz’s cold-blooded revelation about his intentions. This point is then 
immediately followed by one last expression of borderline physical violence, in which 
Stolz tries to get his friend to ride a brand new prototype bicycle along with him and 
Olga. With the camera placed behind Ilya, all we see is Stolz’s face as the latter says, 
rather incongruently with his angry expression, “do it for me Ilya, I will help you. It is so 




The scene of Stolz’s betrayal of Ilya epitomizes the melodramatic transformation 
that Oblomov has undergone in Mikhalkov’s hands. No such scene ever takes place in 
Goncharov’s original. There, Ilya and Olga’s relationship blossoms, plateaus and sours 
on its own, driven by a narrative engine in which dialectical, forward-moving 
confrontations of characters constantly transform their relationships until all characters 
manage to express their inner truth. In Mikhalkov’s Oblomov, this forward movement is 
tampered down. Character development in this film happens not through reinterpretation, 
but more through understatement and under-interpretation. Mikhalkov’s characters never 
know what they are really saying and doing, even in such moments as the poignant 
encounters between Oblomov and Stolz described above. Thus, even after the two 
friends’ last, culminating confrontation, they run off and enjoy themselves, taking turns 
on the bicycle along with Olga, as a voiceover explains the events of the following years. 
For a whole two minutes, the off-screen narrator tells us that Olga will soon break up 
with Ilya and marry Stolz, while Ilya will move to a small countryside house outside 
Petersburg, marry his housemaid, have a child and die soon afterwards.87 In other words, 
what happens in the novel gradually, over hundreds of pages of dialogue between, first, 
Olga and Ilya, and then Olga and Stolz, is entirely skipped. Mikhalkov’s film is not at all 
interested in tracking and resolving his characters’ travails in such a forward-moving 
dynamic. Quite the contrary, the filmmaker renders precisely those “Few Days From the 
Life of Oblomov” when neither Ilya, nor Stolz nor Olga realize what will happen to them, 
when none of them know that all of their hopes and relationships are already doomed. 
And then, to highlight Stolz’s and Olga’s ultimate doom, Mikhalkov adds one last scene. 
Just after the voiceover narration, Mikhalkov’s story picks up a few years after 
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Goncharov himself had ended it. By now, Stolz and Olga are living in a particularly 
splendid summer house and we see them calmly discussing Stolz’s successful bourgeois 
social life while sitting in different rooms. Olga, however, is quite nonplused, takes 
various neurasthenia medications, and finally breaks down sobbing because she cannot 
tolerate life with her ever-calm, subtly violent German bourgeois husband. Meanwhile, 
Oblomov’s son Andrei, whom Olga and Stolz have adopted, runs out excitedly across a 
long, rolling green field to meet his birth mother. The film then concludes with three 
minutes of very long, steady shots of Andrei running across the gorgeous countryside, 
shouting “mommy has arrived,” along with an extradiegetic choral performance of the 




By projecting Goncharov’s story forward a decade, Mikhalkov blends his 
Chekhovian treatment of Oblomov with Loshchits’s conservative nationalist one. Stolz 
and Olga’s relationship is ruined (as was to be expected in a Mikhalkov film). 
Meanwhile, Little Andrei Oblomov’s repeated call for his peasant “mommy” rhymes 
with the film’s beginning, in which Ilya Oblomov had recalled in his dreams how he as a 
little boy ran to greet his beloved mother in Oblomovka. The somber tone of 
Rachmaninoff’s Song of Simeon now reads like a dirge for an Oblomovka that is 
gone, forever conquered by Stolz’s insufferable German modernity. But on the other 
hand, the actual words of the Song of Simeon (“Now Thou dost dismiss Thy servant, O 
Lord, according to Thy word in peace; Because my eyes have seen Thy salvation”), 
which come through clearly in Church Slavonic, suggest that Oblomovka has been 
resurrected within little Andrei. Indeed, such an interpretation is quite in line with Ilya 
Oblomov’s musings earlier in the film. In the bathhouse, Ilya had spoken about thousand-
year-old trees, which grow new leaves every spring, and “a part of each leaf exists in the 
forthcoming years, and it was also there in years past. So then us too, whoever we are, if 
we’re alive, then there’s some kind of purpose.”89 The film’s conclusion, then, seems to 
suggest both that the saintly Russian Oblomovka has on the one hand been defeated by 
encroaching Stolzian evil, but on the other hand that “a part of it” somehow continues to 
exist and to redeem. The running child is both a symbol of a foreclosed future for this 
particular past, but he is also a symbol of that past’s enduring and salvific power.  
Mikhalkov’s pre-Soviet, late Imperial Russia, both in this film and in others, 
always comes off as historically doomed, but at the same time in Oblomov it promises to 
return anew, again and again. The only thing is, the return will not come about through 
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any form of activity at all, not even of the kenotic sort advocated by Loshchits. This is an 
essential, albeit nuanced difference between Loshchits’s perspective and that of 
Mikhalkov. Loshchits’s Oblomov, as a Russian saint, with his “quixotic,” principled 
refusal “to participate in your noble game of doing,” is still someone we might think of as 
an individual subject. He may be out of options vis-à-vis the evil that he combats, but his 
kenoticism is at least a self-aware act. In Mikhalkov’s treatment of this character, 
however, this form of active self-awareness is entirely absent. Oblomov here is far more 
like the “leaf,” than the saint, and Stolz too, for that matter, is far more a deluded 
Chekhovian bourgeois than the grandiose Mephistophelean Subject of modernity. When 
Goncharov’s characters undergo the Mikhalkovan-Chekhovian treatment, they lose their 
self-awareness. Their truth-seeking realist subjectivity is replaced by an opaque, stagnant, 
melodramatic non-subjectivity. Mikhalkov’s Oblomov and Stolz (and also Olga) are not 
aware, they misrecognize the truth about their relationship with each other, as well as 
regarding their function in epochal confrontation of Obolomovka and modernity.  
I interpret the move from Loshchits’s reading of Oblomov to that of Mikhalkov as 
a passing from the perspective of an elite late Soviet conservative to the condition of the 
late Soviet de-politicized masses. Loshchits’s Oblomov, as I have already shown, is an 
allegory for a form of conservative subjectivity that takes up an always already doomed, 
but nevertheless principled “quixotic” defense against the liberal onslaught. Mikhalkov’s 
Oblomov, on the other hand, is an allegory for a private, regular late Soviet individual, 
who has no access to political subjectivization at all because he is entirely disconnected 
and foreclosed from all possibilities of viable social action. Read this way, Mikhalkov’s 
late Soviet conservatism comes full circle with Condee’s observation of the function of 
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the silent, “demotic idenity” of the folk (narod) in the Russian cultural imaginary going 
back all the way to the Imperial era.90 Condee points out that the elites in charge of 
Russian symbolic production have always spoken for the narod, even as they have 
constantly articulated their inherent distinction from it, thereby “annulling” the creation 
of “autonomous, horizontal ties” with the masses.91 Moreover, speaking about the 
depiction of the late Imperial narod in Mikhalkov’s post-Soviet Barber of Siberia (1998), 
Condee has pointed out how in this film, set in the 1870s, the masses celebrating 
Shrovetide come off as a “staged […] demotic kabuki” of “the Russian folk” and in this 
display bears no resemblance to Western notions of “nationalism with the usual 
associations of newly empowered egalitarian agency, liberationist collective expression, 
or the independent civic life of nationhood.”92 I would like to suggest that two decades 
prior to The Barber, Mikhalkov was already allegorically staging a similar non-
egalitarian, non-liberationist enactment of narodnost— indeed, he was doing so 
throughout his neo-Chekhovian oeuvre. It is just that in Mikhalkov’s films the idea of the 
narod had been updated to conform to late Soviet realities.  
In Chapter One, I discussed the argument between Pomerants and Solzhenitsyn as 
to whether or not the narod exists in the wake of Soviet Russia’s forced industrialization. 
Pomerants had claimed that in late Soviet conditions old peasant identities have been 
destroyed and the new narod is the urbanized, educated consumer class. Speaking from 
his position as a liberal intellectual, Pomerants had suggested that these masses, officially 
dubbed the “technical intelligentsia,” would be the ideal junior partners of the liberal 
elites in the task of maintaining cultural hegemony and enacting political change. 
Solzhenitsyn, as we recall, refused Pomerants’s terms. Mikhalkov, I think, accepted 
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them, because as a writer, director, actor and producer of late Soviet melodramatic 
tearjerkers, he must have understood perfectly well that his mass audience identified far 
more with Chekhov’s melodramatic high society, than with the mythical peasant folk. 
The new late Soviet “folk,” the engineers, the masses of mid-level professionals and 
managers living in their private Khrushchevan high-rises and spending summers in their 
dilapidated summer country houses felt themselves more at home in The Cherry Orchard 
than in the Village Prose writers’ peasant huts. At the same time, all of these masses 
could go in either direction with respect to the question of enfranchisement and political 
subjectivization. Hence, Nancy Ries, in her anthropological study of “Russian talk” 
during the Perestrokia, observed how some of her Muscovite informants could identify 
themselves with the narod, thereby drawing a distinction between themselves and those 
with real political power, while other Muscovites, from basically the same social circles, 
could denigrate the narod as an ignorant pack of sheep (the proverbial bydlo) and thereby 
declare their belonging to the liberal “intelligentsia”— the class partaking of political 
subjectivization.93 
Mikhalkov, too, works within the conceptual framework outlined above by 
treating his audience as a mass reincarnation of Chekhov’s ineffective intelligentsia. In 
other words, to put it bluntly, he is making films for people who like to think of 
themselves as elites, but who also suspect that they are a pack of sheep. His melodramatic 
cinema panders to his audience’s ideal ego— Condee points out that the audience can 
easily self-identify with Mikhalkov’s neo-Chekhovian pre-Soviet and early-Soviet upper 
classes.94 But at the same time, Mikhalkov also invites his audience to identify with the 
absolutely dead-ended powerlessness of those elites. Even when they think of themselves 
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as the new rulers of the world, like Oblomov’s Stolz, they are merely pawns in fate’s 
game. Or, to refer to another key Mikhalkov film, these supposed elites have the same 
level of agency as players of the Mechanical Piano, which really plays on its own and no 
human action has any bearing on it. In this way the late Soviet conservative use of the 
pre-Soviet past comes full circle. Deployed by some during the Thaw to counter the 
liberal cultural hegemony’s quest for the enfranchisement of the creative elites and their 
junior partners from the urbanized educated masses, in Mikhalkov’s films the pre-Soviet 
past pulls off the seemingly impossible— it becomes a way of projecting those educated 
masses in an appealing way as powerless, private, apolitical, elite non-subjects, while any 
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Chapter Three 
The Russia That We Have Lost: 
Post-Soviet Liberal-Conservatism and Consensus on the Imperial Era 
 
 
In the spring of 1989, widely published and officially promoted Soviet nationalist 
writers found out that almost no one liked them. They thought that ‘the people’ had been 
with them. They did not realize that their print runs had no correlation to the size of their 
readership—incidentally, this was one of many typical Soviet supply-demand problems 
that Gorbachev’s Perestroika policies were designed to fix. Scholars like Yitzhak Brudny 
and Nikolai Mitrokhin, and to some extent Stephen Kotkin have all shown how the 
processes unleashed by Perestroika demystified the source of Soviet nationalists’ 
apparent cultural influence. To put it briefly, their high positions in the Soviet cultural 
establishment were secured as a result of an alliance forged between themselves and the 
Soviet nomenklatura class, and Gorbachev’s reforms—especially his appointment of 
Alexander Yakovlev as the lead curator of the Soviet public sphere—ended up 
torpedoing this arrangement.1 However, for every late Soviet cultural conservative figure 
and obtuse political hardliner failing at the polls and eventually hitching his hopes to a 
harebrained 1991 military coup (the August Putsch attempted by the GKChP, or the State 
Emergency Committee), there were many more others who stayed in power, by learning 
to ‘speak in Anti-Soviet tongues.’ How did they make such a transition? And why did the 
democracy movement that appeared in Russia in the late 1980s allow so many of the 
power elites into their leading ranks? How did Perestroika’s political discourse allow 
Party-men like Boris Yeltsin and Yuri Luzhkov to become the faces of post-Soviet 
Russia? And what role did the pre-Soviet past play in this discourse? These are some of 
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the main questions motivating the present chapter, which tracks how the discourse on the 
pre-Soviet past was deployed by the post-Soviet state and the statist conservatives aligned 
with it, since the late 1980s until today. 
As I have outlined in Chapters One and Two, late Soviet liberal and conservative 
discourses on the past were both born in the wake of Stalin’s death. As a result of 
processes launched by cultural institutions like Novy Mir in late 1953 and then eventually 
backed by Khrushchev in 1956, as well as transnational developments like urbanization 
and the growth of mass media, the liberal intelligentsia took charge of destalinization 
during the Thaw. The more conservative Soviet political class felt threatened by the 
creative projects and growing political involvement of the intelligentsia liberals. The 
power elites were wary of sharing power and possibly also destabilizing the state; 
however, they were now operating in a new political-discursive reality, defined by the 
course for destalinization, and they could not simply ignore it. And so, even as liberal 
discourse pressed to reveal the massive wounds inflicted on the Soviet body politic by 
Stalin’s regime, focusing in particular on the late-1930s purges of intellectuals, the Soviet 
nomenklatura came up with their own versions of destalinization.  
The more familiar version of nomenklatura-driven destalinization was associated 
with intense celebrations of Gagarin and baby Lenin, as well as slogans of world peace 
and peaceful economic competition between the capitalist and the socialist system, all of 
which dominated the Soviet public sphere throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The sheer 
zeal with which space flights, television sets, private apartments, and other 
socioeconomic achievements would be celebrated in official press and public gatherings 
between the 1950s and the mid-1980s would in it of itself communicate that a radical 
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break with the gloomy past has been achieved, that the party had reformed itself, and that 
now it would competently lead the whole Soviet bloc to the long-promised socialist 
utopia. This discourse would predominate in the Soviet public sphere, peaking around the 
time of the Kosygin reforms, but then continuing until well into Gorbachev’s tenure.2 
Meanwhile, a collaboration between the nomenklatura and key conservative 
intelligentsia figures was yielding another, more historically conscious, conservative-
revisionist discourse on destalinization. This narrative essentially argued that Stalin’s 
1937 purges were a rightful comeuppance for the hubris of the leftist modernization 
project, especially as it manifested itself during the Great Break, but also during the Civil 
War, the Russian Revolution and possibly going all the way back to the birth of Russian 
liberalism, sometime in the mid-nineteenth century. The basic point of this intervention, 
as I have discussed in Chapter Two, was to strike a defensive pose against late Soviet 
liberal hegemony by contesting the moral fiber, political motives, and visions of the 
future that were espoused by the liberal writers, poets and scientists who strove to lead 
the Soviet mass ‘technical intelligentsia’ class towards further political modernization.  
As we have seen in our discussions of Soloukhin, Glazunov, Kozhinov, Loshchits 
and Mikhalkov, these conservative figures’ narratives generated a historical imaginary of 
Russia that was defined by the dichotomy of ‘traditional versus modern,’ which would 
not always neatly line up with the historical watershed of 1917, but was certainly 
informed by it. For instance, late Soviet conservatives condemned the Soviet Leninist 
project as the brainchild of an age-old liberal drive for enlightenment, resulting in elitist 
violence against the Russian people, particularly the peasantry, culminating in Stalinist 
collectivization. Village Prose, the leading conservative literary movement in USSR, 
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reflected such ideological positions in its scathing critique of Soviet industrialization—
these ostensibly anti-Stalinist texts were ipso facto assaulting what Soviet conservatives 
saw as the liberal essence of the Soviet project.  Meanwhile, the Tsarist era would be 
treated as a lost epoch of national concord, of peaceful, harmonious and culturally 
autonomous (samobytnoe) Russian existence that was ruined by the nefarious 
Westernizing, modernizing liberals. 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, the ideology of late Soviet conservatism had an 
activist core to it—various exponents of the Russian Sonderweg, from insiders like 
Soloukhin and Glazunov, to occasionally dissenting writers like Valentin Pikul’, to out-
and-out dissidents like Solzhenitsyn and Agursky, were all trying to convince state 
servitors to jettison official Marxist-Leninist ideology in favor of a revamped and purified 
version of late Imperial Russian nationalism. The clearest example of this sort of rhetoric 
is, undoubtedly, Solzhenitsyn’s 1974 “Letter to Soviet Leaders.”3 The nomenklatura 
chiefs’ response to this activist conservative rhetoric was limited enthusiasm, sometimes 
boiling down to ‘thanks, but no thanks.’ Mitrokhin and Brudny have both shown how the 
state, with Suslov at the helm, would crack down on overly ambitious conservative 
rhetoric in the 1970s and early 1980s. A glorification of pre-Soviet ‘inactivity’ could get 
past canonized and ossified Marxist-Leninist ideology. For instance, as we have seen in 
Chapter Two, the premise of rehabilitating former Whites like Shulgin was that ‘they too 
loved Russia.’ What could not be openly extolled was Shulgin’s activist, counter-
Revolutionary alternative for Russian development—censorship simply would not allow 
it. Moreover, ideological functionaries like Suslov who patronized late Soviet 
conservative intellectuals conceived of themselves more as anti-liberal spoilers and 
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stallers, rather than as proactive creators of ideology, despite occasional failed attempts to 
do the latter.4 They felt almost as concerned about their ostensible allies’ activist 
conservative credo as they did about the liberalism of their intelligentsia opponents.  
Then came the Perestroika. In brief, economic stagnation, a geriatric power elite, 
near-universal cynicism with regards to Soviet official ideology, and a culturally and 
sociologically triumphant, but politically frustrated liberal intelligentsia, combined to 
push Gorbachev towards reforms. The new General Secretary decided to look to the 
cultural and political liberals as his allies, rather than the conservatives, and this did not 
have to be so.5 Nationalist discourse had permeated throughout the Party ranks and 
another leader could have chosen to adopt it and dress up the necessary structural reforms 
accordingly. Gorbachev, however, felt that his reforms required mass buy-in and 
participation, and the liberal intelligentsia had a much more convincing story about their 
relationship to the masses than the conservatives. While many (though not all) widely-
published Village Prose books collected dust on store shelves, the liberal figures 
mentioned in Chapter One, such as Riazanov and Okudzhava, among many others were 
making successful box-office hits, performing in packed houses, selling out copies of 
their novels, and recruiting the children of nomenklatura officials as their fans and 
followers.6 Moreover, Gorbachev was himself a true believer in the humanist rhetoric 
embedded in the orthodox Marxist-Leninist oeuvre. After all, as Vladislav Zubok and 
more recently Grigorii Revzin have argued, Gorbachev’s worldview was a product of the 
early Thaw—the last time that large numbers of Soviet citizens actually took Marxism-
Leninism seriously. Remarkably, the USSR’s last General Secretary had actually retained 
his faith in the USSR’s official discourse at a time when everyone else had lost it.7 
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As is well known, Gorbachev decided to support a new wave of Soviet 
modernization with the policy of glasnost’. He and others in the near-state technocratic 
circles believed that in order to solve the USSR’s ills, particularly in the economic 
domain, the boundaries of the public sphere would have to be opened up and various 
voices independent of the Party apparatus would then speak truth to power and thus allow 
the Soviet state to grasp the complex challenges facing the country. To put it in Claude 
Lefort’s political-philosophical terms, Gorbachev’s glasnost’ officially recognized the 
existence of discursive centers other than the state.8 The need to do this was evident to 
Gorbachev for at least two reasons: 1) because of the remarkable economic success of the 
post-War parliamentary-democratic West, and 2), again because of certain fundamental 
tenets of the 1960s Marxism-Leninist creed, which valorized Lenin’s NEP-era 
pronouncements that staked the success of the Soviet project on ‘culturedness’—that is, 
the growth of a culture of informed, politically conscious speech among the heretofore 
ignorant proletarian masses.9 
As glasnost’ intensified, Gorbachev made a move to what he thought would be a 
soft parliamentarianism, by creating the Congress of People’s Deputies (S’ezd narodnykh 
deputatov—SND) in 1989. For a while it was unclear what specific powers the SND 
would have, but clearly it did not bode well for late Soviet conservatives and their 
nomenklatura handlers. Most conservative intelligentsia figures and also most 
apparatchiks failed to win elected seats in the SND. Meanwhile, the liberals who got 
elected or who ended up in the SND by way of various Soviet corporate bodies very 
quickly started organizing against Gorbachev through initiatives like the Interregional 
Deputy Group (Mezhregional’naia deputatskaia gruppa—MDG), which would 
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eventually become the backbone of Yeltsinism.10 The losing conservatives got 
increasingly worried and eventually many of their most prominent figures came to 
support the failed anti-Gorbachev August Putsch. The Putsch’s failure, for complex 
political reasons, ended up destroying Gorbachev’s legitimacy and paved the way for the 
official fall of the USSR and Yeltsin’s takeover of the Kremlin that December. 
Altogether, the electoral failure of the late Soviet ‘patriotic party,’ coupled with 
the very public failure of the Putsch revealed the true basis of these individuals’ cultural 
prominence and political clout prior to the Perestroika, and also to some extent the true 
sociological state of the Soviet masses (or at least the masses that ‘counted’—namely, the 
Soviet citizens who were eager to participate in the political process). To return to the 
terms of Grigorii Pomerants and Alexander Solzhenitsyn (see Chapter One), both 
mainstream and also dissident Soviet conservatives had thought they were representing 
the will of the otherwise silent ‘people’ [narod] against the treacherous, westernizing, 
self-centered inzhenerno-tkhnologicheskii rabotnik (ITR) class of engineers, low-level 
scientists and managers, Meanwhile, liberal thinkers like Pomerants had surmised that 
after several decades of forced industrialization the ITR workers were the ‘new narod,’ in 
terms of both demography and political potential. In a sense, Perestroika proved 
Pomerants right. It was precisely the managers, engineers and other urbanized members 
of the Soviet ‘middle class’ who supported and grew the clout of the MDG parliamentary 
coalition. It was also them who turned out for the anti-Putsch barricades, who massed on 
Lubianka Square (the KGB headquarters) to demand the removal of the statue of 
Dzerzhinsky, the Soviet security services’ infamous founding father. And it was them 
who most consistently supplied Yeltsin with votes throughout the 1990s.  
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Meanwhile, the Perestroika revealed how the prominence of conservative 
nationalist discourse in the Soviet public sphere was in fact premised on a conversation 
with the Soviet power elites. The conservatives (particularly compliant ones) and the late 
Soviet nomenklatura had needed each other. On the one hand, this need was strategic—as 
Zubok and Brudny have argued, Suslov and his coterie were happy to use conservative 
discourse to drive a wedge within the relatively independent intelligentsia milieu. But on 
the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, this need was ideological—as Mitrokhin’s 
account has shown, the nomenklatura wanted to hear a plausible narrative of their own 
usefulness and legitimacy, at a time when almost no one in the country was able to 
believe in the official Soviet account on this matter. 
Once the nomenklatura-nationalist alliance was broken up by Yakovlev and 
Gorbachev, many mainstream late Soviet conservatives suddenly discovered that no 
alternative source of support was immediately forthcoming. Thus, Brudny concludes his 
study of the Late Soviet anti-liberal press with the massive electoral and cultural market 
failures of Soviet nationalists. However, many (if not most) of the actual members of the 
Soviet governing class managed to maneuver their way out of their Soviet positions and 
straight into post-Soviet ones. Sometimes, they managed to do so without even leaving 
their office, as happened between August and September of 1991, when the Soviet 
government class defected en masse to Yeltsin’s Russian administration, even as 
Gorbachev nominally remained President of the manifestly defunct USSR.11 Other 
former apparatchiks, like Yeltsin himself, or the 1990s mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, 
had to put in some effort to rebrand themselves. But rebrand themselves they did, by 
becoming exceptionally proficient at ‘pro-democracy’ and ‘anti-Soviet’ discourse. 
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The extent to which loud anti-Soviet speech easily re-legitimated scores of former 
apparatchiks might seem surprising. After all, in its original appearance on the political 
scene in the late 1980s, engagement in ‘anti-Soviet’ political activity seemed to mean a 
continued growth of ‘people power’ against the existing illegitimate ruling elites. The 
liberal-led turn of the Perestroika seemed to signal a broad commitment to thorough 
democratization and a complete replacement of the ruling elites with a new generation of 
leaders. However, already in the late 1980s it was clear that the ostensible ‘democrats’ 
espoused rather conservative ideas: they valorized the market and free enterprise, and 
most importantly, they were deathly scared of a return to early-twentieth-century mob 
rule and revolutionary violence. So, whereas a more democratically-committed version of 
anti-Soviet discourse left little room for existing power elites to rebrand, the ‘American 
libertarian,’ anti-populist version of anti-Soviet discourse made such a maneuver 
possible. And contrary to the hopes of a few Perestroika-era social democrats like Boris 
Kagarlitsky, it was the libertarian version of anti-Sovietism that won the day. 
Mark Lipovetsky has surmised that “the political agendas […] of U.S. 
Republicans” predominated in Russia due to the substantive content of the ITR group 
ideology. Since their inception within the Stalinist ‘priviligentsia,’ the growing Soviet 
urbanized technical intelligentsia masses collectively espoused a variety of scientific 
positivism with an “organic resistance to complexity,” which resulted in the valorization 
of the idea of a virile male individual as the prime mover behind all social existence, an 
uncritical acceptance of the notion of eternal social and cultural values, and an eschewing 
of self-critique as an intellectual value.12 Keeping this general understanding in mind, I 
would also highlight the specific political anxieties of the late 1980s, in which the ITR 
	 157 
masses found their political voice—namely, I would suggest that the people who brought 
Yeltsin to power were, over and above their proto-libertarian comportment, also rather 
ambivalent about continuing democratization, and that it was their ambivalence regarding 
the political process that they themselves had initiated that led them to forge common 
cause with former members of the nomenklatura. Interestingly, this foundational anti-
democratic anxiety was framed by a discourse on the pre-Soviet past. And to get a better 
sense of it we will now take a look at two cornerstone political-cultural documents of the 
very late Perestroika era—Stanislav Govorukhin’s well-known documentaries, Can’t 
















I. Govorukhin and the Pre-Revolutionary Style of Post-Soviet Conservatism 
 
Stolypin was hated equally by the left and the right. Such is 
human nature—those who are brave, who go against the 
wind, they are hated even more than cowards!” 
 
Stanislav Govorukhin, The Russia That We Have Lost14 
 
 
Cultural historians and eyewitnesses of the late 1980s often point to several films 
as important catalysts and symbols of Gorbachev’s deepening Perestroika. For example, 
Roy Medvedev has suggested that much of the culture of glasnost’ proceeded under the 
sign of Tengiz Abuladze’s Repentance (1984-1987)15—an allegorical film about 
Stalinism and its consequences, framed as a universalist moral statement thanks to its 
Antigone-esque plot device and its whimsical Italian Renaissance aesthetic. As such, 
Repentance was consistent with Courtney Doucette’s recent argument concerning the 
early Perestroika model of reformist discourse, that sought to put the Soviet project back 
on the right track by infusing it with a moral sensibility—that is, by engaging with 
collective historical trauma and honestly speaking about contemporary social ills.16 I 
would also add that Repentance’s appeal to antiquity spoke particularly well to ITR 
sensibilities, given the technical intelligentsia’s belief in eternal cultural values. By 1990, 
however, when Govorukhin released Can’t Live Like This, universalist moral stories were 
being superseded by real organized politics. The intelligentsia was in ascendancy, on the 
cusp of taking power by way of the MDG, and by now they had an increasingly clarified 
anti-Soviet platform in the offing. Can’t Live Like This (1990) and A Russia That We 
Have Lost (made in 1991, released in 1992) were as symbolic for this time as Repentance 
had been in 1987 because these two documentaries were attuned to the political 
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transformation that had taken place during the intervening years. Namely, both of 
Govorukhin’s films spoke for the class that was both leading the post-Soviet revolution 
and was also eager to foreclose the possibility of further revolutionizing.  
Can’t Live Like This is ostensibly a documentary about late Soviet crime and “the 
worldwide experience of combating crime.” As such, this film is part and parcel of the 
trend towards moral panic that characterized many public and private “laments” during 
the era of glasnost’.17 But Govorukhin’s documentary is not only a lament; it also has a 
clear political organizational trajectory. We can observe it in two related moves: 1) past 
crimes of the Soviet regime are supposed to explain the contemporary social malaise; and 
2) the film imagines its audience as a political class uniquely capable of transcending this 
malaise and ‘repenting in full’ by inheriting a pre-Soviet political order that had been 
destroyed by either foolish or evil leftists and the invariably evil “lumpen” masses.18 Both 
of these messages come through in the film’s hearth, when we see a montage of late 
Soviet alcoholics and various other subhumans, played over a background of Vladimir 
Vysotsky’s song, “What is This Silent House [Chto za dom pritikh].”19  
As Vysotsky intones lines like “show me a place where holy candles burn 
brightly!” as we see images of ruined churches (see Figure 15, below). We hear about 
dilapidated group “barrack” whose denizens have been “eating grass for ages” and 
turning “sour of soul” from having gotten “used to living in darkness.” Shortly after, we 
are shown disgusting, intoxicated village idiots as Govorukhin dwells on the mass crimes 
of the Soviet regime, singling out executions of high-profile aristocrats: the Tsar’s family, 
the extended Romanov clan, and the poet Nikolai Gumilev. What follows these grisly 
crimes, Govorukhin concludes, is the “degeneration of the nation [vyrozhdenie strany].” 
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Ostensibly, this argument is very close to the message of Abuladze’s Repentance—
“everything is so bad with us” (to quote a common lament recorded by Nancy Ries) 
because we have killed our tsar, lost our faith, our Russian national consciousness, and so 
forth.20 At the same time, Govorukhin’s use of eugenic rhetoric is striking: “the main task 
of society is to start recreating the human breed, which has suffered a tremendous loss. 
And one should remember that an incorrect genetic path of seventy years can’t be altered 
over the course of one five-year plan.”21  
How do ‘genetics’ so easily follow from ‘repentance’? The answer has to do with 
the self-conceptualization of Govorukhin’s audience. The filmmaker’s use of Vysotsky 
provides a hint in this regard. Vysotsky (who by now had been dead for a decade) 
appears in Govorukhin’s montage not as mere background music, but as a symbol of the 




anthropological subjects positioned themselves snobbishly as different from the masses 
of ‘regular Soviet people,’ who supposedly credulously bought into Soviet official 
discourse. At the same time, Yurchak’s informants distanced themselves from the 
dissidents, preferring to adopt an attitude of detached disdain vis-à-vis the Soviet state, 
rather than the dissidents’ attitude of engaged conflict. And of course, Yurchak 
specifically singles out Vysotsky as a favorite singer-songwriter of his informants.23 It is 
quite obvious that an elitist self-perception works at the core of this positioning between 
the odious but largely ineffective state on the one hand and the dumb Soviet masses on 
the other. A similar elitist perception comes through in the ITR masses’ penchant to 
describe themselves as a latter-day “intelligentsia.” Chapters One and Two have shown 
how during the late Soviet era, a whole lot of urbanized, relatively well-educated 
individuals started thinking of themselves as spiritual inheritors of pre-Soviet Russia’s 
aristocratic high culture and its political consciousness.  
Due to a combination of Soviet official cultural and industrial priorities, as well as 
the nature of the peculiar late Soviet censorship regime, literally millions of people 
started thinking of themselves as elites, and imagined their own existence as juxtaposed 
to the existence of a vaguely-defined, but hostile pro-Soviet narod. This ideation 
underlies Govorukhin’s late-Perestroika documentaries. His viewers listen to Vysotsky, 
they appreciate Gumilev’s poetry, and they want to repent for the crimes of the Soviet 
project by taking power from the Soviet state and its fiendish nomenklatura. In the 
meantime, they are also acutely aware of the stinking hordes. Hence, Can’t Live Like This 
repeatedly runs images of mobs of alcoholics in line to buy their daily allotment of liquor, 
or a mob hawking cheap wares. The concluding shot of the film’s main body is a flyover 
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of an enormous flea market in Odessa, with the statement that “the whole country has 
turned into an enormous flea market [tolkuchku]” (see Figure 16, below).24 Presumably, 
politically empowering this “degenerate” horde is futile. Govorukhin aims to condemn 
them as “genetically”—i.e. entirely, biologically beyond redemption, and to convince his 
audience to perceive itself as a “we” who are capable of leading the “regeneration” of the 
“nation” precisely in lieu of the wholly defective narod. This general message then 
intensifies in The Russia That We Have Lost. 
Released two years after Can’t Live Like This and filmed just after the failure of 
the 1991 August Putsch, The Russia That We Have Lost presents a highly idealized 
memory of pre-Soviet Russia as a fulcrum around which “we,” Govorukhin’s post-Soviet 
	
Figure	16:	"The	whole	country	has	become	an	enormous	flea	market." 
political subjects, should cohere. As such, this film draws on the same social ideology as 
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Can’t Live Like This. Explicit laments for the loss of aristocratic ideals are present in the 
first documentary, but only briefly. For example, Govorukhin inveighs that after the 
death and exile of aristocrats like Gumilev, “society lost and stopped valuing concepts 
like honor, nobility, worthiness. And when society stops treating these concepts with 
worship, that’s it. A fertile environment for the growth of crime is ready.”25 It is quite 
obvious in this lament that “values” like “honor, nobility, and worthiness” are not, in fact, 
“lost.” On the contrary, Govorukhin presents these values as eternal; he presumes that 
“we” should start practicing them today. Practicing such values is seen as authentically 
anti-Soviet, precisely because they are presented as aristocratic. Can’t Live Like This, 
following the typical Manichean logic of Anti-Soviet discourse, emphasizes fin-de-siècle 
aristocratic Russia as an imagined point of “loss,” as the last point in Russia’s historical 
record in which the fullness of aristocratic ideals may be found and reclaimed. The 
lament for the loss of aristocratic excellence, as well as the hope of its recovery, then 
goes on to comprise the core of the message of The Russia That We Have Lost. 
According to this film, “we” the post-Soviet Yeltsinist political subjects who have just 
rebuffed the 1991 coup, must now finalize the regime change by recognizing ourselves as 
inheritors of the Imperial aristocrats murdered by the Soviets. 
The basic premise of The Russia That We Have Lost is that “we” have “lost” it. 
The film opens with an off-screen monologue from Govorukhin, as we watch archival 
film footage and leaf through photos of everyday life of Russia before the Revolution: 
Russia—a mysterious, unknown country. It so happens that we know nothing 
about it. That’s why we live with so much difficulty and so stupidly. Where is the 
path to rebirth? People without a lineage [rod], without a tribe, without roots or 
parents, without history and historical experience, can never find this path. So, we 
must recall, who are we? Who are our parents? What is our mother, our land? 
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That’s what our film is about. Of course this is not objective research. The more 
you get to know this country, the more you fall in love with it, whether you will it 
or not.  […] What we will show is like the impressions of a man who has started 
to learn about his country already as a mature person. And everything I’ve found 
out while making this film has unsettled my soul—how did it happen? Why did 
God allow people to lose their minds? How was it possible to rob such a rich 
country? And why, why didn’t we know anything about it, about our motherland? 
The history of Russia that we learned in school was written by servile lackeys, 
who were in a rush to satisfy their masters, precisely those who trampled and 
robbed this country, its murderers. The history of Russia has been written by its 
murderers. So, that is how we should call our thankless genre—a casefile 
regarding the murder of Russia.26 
As we get into the film, the claim that we “do not know anything” about pre-
Revolutionary Russia because of Soviet “servile lackeys” takes on a clear post-1991 
political meaning. The very late Imperial past has literally been hidden from us under 
lock and key, in restricted archives [Spetskhran]. But after 1991, Spetskhran is open. 
Indeed, Govorukhin explicitly shows himself culling through these secretive archives, 
pulling up dossiers on the likes of Stolypin, Nicholas II, Lenin, and so forth, and 
examining them carefully (see Figure 17, below). At one point he states that “we are now 
in the Party, a,k.a. the Lenin archive. It’s winter, so as you can see this is taking place 
after August 1991, which released the secrets of the most secretive establishment of our 
country.”27 In other words, thanks to the heroic actions of pro-Yeltsin protestors during 
the Putsch, when formerly all-powerful Party citadels like the Central Committee 
headquarters, were stormed by the incensed and victorious public, we are now free to see 
everything that those institutions had been hiding from us—namely, the beautiful footage 





 “Falling in love” with pre-Soviet Russia is possible because it is no longer secret, 
thanks to “our” recent anti-Soviet political mobilization. The film burnishes the political 
imaginary in which “we” and pre-Revolutionary Russia are on the same side, by logic of 
having vanquished the “them” who hid the past from us. But who are these “them,” 
especially now, after 1991? Who are “our” political enemies now that “we” appear to 
have won? And how does memory of pre-Revolutionary Russia fit into the new post-
Soviet political imaginary? To clarify this problem, consider the way in which 
Govorukhin draws an analogy between the winter of 1992 and February of 1917. As we 
watch archival footage from the February Revolution, Govorukhin opines:  
Look at happy they are—Freedom! Meanwhile, Stolypin himself used to warn, I 
will give you freedom, but I will add that first we have to create citizens. […] A 
demonstration sign: ‘may the blood spilled by you be the last’—nooo! […] this is 
only the first trickle of blood. […] The lawful outcome of any revolution is 
poverty [razrukha] —no one works, the peasants don’t plow. […]The films being 
shown –they’re bacchanales of filth [poshlosti]. […] But it’s not necessary to 
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explain to us what this was like. We have poorly learned the lessons of the 
February Revolution, and so we have repeated it, entirely, down to the tiny 
details. […] It looks quite a bit like our tomorrow.28 
 
“The lessons of the February Revolution” in Govorukhin’s rhetoric, are that freedom is 
dangerous. The masses are not ready to act as “citizens,” they are a horde with vulgar 
tastes, and they are out to get us. Govorukhin uses the ‘no-longer-secret’ footage of 
raving anarchy and violence of 1917 to emphasize that today, in 1992, order must be had. 
And to show how order must be had, Govorukhin brings up the figure of Stolypin.  
Govorukhin’s account essentially paraphrases Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s 
encomium of Stolypin from the Soviet dissident author’s expanded and re-published 
August 1914.29 Listing Solzhenitsyn as a consultant in the credits, Govorukhin presents 
the tsarist Prime Minister as an all-powerful servitor who forcefully but prudently put a 
stop to the Revolution in 1905, and who then vigorously worked to re-establish order on 
new, re-legitimated, reformed, Western capitalist social foundations: “The ‘reactionary 
Stolypin,’ as he was depicted in schoolbooks, was actually a true revolutionary and 
reformer—everything he did, he did for one reason, to lift Russia up, to make it truly free. 
Free of penury, ignorance and lack of rights. […] Stolypin was hated equally by the left 
and the right. Such is human nature—those who are brave, who go against the wind, they 
are hated even more than cowards!”30  
Govorukhin valorizes Stolypin so that “we” today can emulate him. “We” have to 
recover a Stolypinist kind of sensibility, we have to recognize ourselves as elites like him, 
as activist conservative defenders and reformers of the state like him, as believers in anti-
communist, pro-capitalist modernizing values like him. We have to organize our politics 
not around some utopian notions of perpetually democratizing ‘people power,’ but 
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around those lost pre-Revolutionary Stolypinist ideals mentioned in Can’t Live Like 
This—“honor, nobility, worthiness,” which we imagine ourselves to be well-positioned to 
inherit. Govorukhin’s Stolypin, then, becomes a symbol of the ideal ‘liberal 
conservative’: he embodies righteous, effective, aristocratic, hierarchical—and for all 
those reasons also free-market capitalist—order.31  
It is quite evident that this Stolypinist myth of a “Russia That We Have Lost” is 
strikingly different from the myth of pre-Soviet Russia as a time of national concord, 
which had been officially celebrated by Late-Soviet Slavophiles. In Govorukhin’s image 
of the past, there is certainly no concord; on the contrary, Russia on the eve of the 
Revolution is a time of exciting, agonistic political struggle, in which the sides and the 
stakes are clear, and the conservatives are finally ready for a showdown. By 
mythologizing Stolypinist Russia and embodying Stolypin, “we” today can subjectivize 
ourselves as his rightful inheritors. To borrow Corey Robin’s formulation, Govorukhin’s 
fin-de-siècle Stolypinist “Russia that we have lost” appears as the ideal site of “the 
conservative’s […] good life,” a “reactionary utopia he hopes one day to bring into 
being,” in which “genuine excellence is revealed and rewarded, true nobility is 
secured.”32 Now that “we” are in charge, this is the kind of active and modern—rather 
than passive and feudal—order that we should seek to bring back into existence. In short, 
Russia on the eve of the Revolution appears as a particularly fitting allegory for Russia of 
today: it is a nation pursuing an activist conservative modernization project, it is an 
incredibly successful country that had been “shot down” by the Bolsheviks “like a bird 
just as it was taking flight.”33 And today, we can modernize once again, by picking up 
where Russia’s successful, but interrupted conservative modernity had left off. 
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II. Capitalism in Tsarist Dress-Up: Peresvet, Bank Imperial, Kommersant 
 
“This public was called the upper hundred thousand back then. 
That sounds like the print run of a newspaper—one hundred 
thousand copies. So it was, and so it has remained.” 
 





 Govorukhin’s documentaries present Russia’s late Imperial past as an appealing 
lost object to be recovered by a presumed post-Soviet activist, elitist, capitalist ruling 
group. We are no longer in the territory of Oblomov-like ambivalence about Western 
modernity; on the contrary, Russia on the eve of the Revolution now appears as an 
alternate, non-Soviet modernization project, with rejuvenated, capitalist homo faber 
aristocrats like Stolypin at the helm. This message was particularly appropriate for the 
early 1990s, when Yeltsinist intelligentsia figures tended to promote the libertarian 
capitalist “homo faber” as an ideal post-Soviet subject (to borrow Viktor Pelevin’s 
term).35 A similar conception of the very late Imperial era comes through in many 1990s 
advertisements of businesses, often financial ones, pitched to an implied audience of 
successful post-Soviet capitalist elites (whether or not such individuals actually existed). 
One of the most inventive and revelatory billboards in this regard was put up in central 
Moscow by the “trading firm” Peresvet, in 1993 (see Figure 18, below). 
Through a multifaceted symbolic play created by the juxtaposition of a 
preexisting Soviet propaganda mural and Peresvet’s billboard, the advertisement 
communicates the idea that post-Soviet Russian capitalism is an admirable, honest, 
authentic utopian endeavor that has come to replace the failed utopian project that 
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preceded it. The old Soviet mural, done in a stylized 1970s modernist idiom, states that 
“we are building communism.” Below it is Peresvet’s logo, in stylized old orthography,  
	
Figure	18:	The	billboard	advertisement	for	Peresvet	Trading	Firm. 
complete with the holy warrior saint Peresvet carrying a post-Soviet Russian flag, with 
the tagline, “and we are building a new Russia.” On one hand the violence of communist 
construction; on the other hand the redemptive violence of the early capitalist trading 
firm, struggling against the tyranny of the Soviet Red legacy weighing down on it. On the 
one hand, a grandiose statement of faith in an utterly discredited communist project; on 
the other hand, a statement of faith in a capitalist project, presented as equally grandiose. 
On the one hand a rigid, avant-gardist counter-aesthetic; on the other hand a script in 
pseudo-Slavonic style, itself a mass-appeal product of the late-nineteenth-century age of 
invented traditions. Indeed, the fact that the old orthography is misspelled (the banner 
correctly uses the ъ, but incorrectly puts a e instead of a ђ in ‘светъ') only proves the 
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point that the stylization is not about getting history right, but about eliciting vague 
feelings of nationalist authenticity. On the one hand a generic representation of the 
prototypical builders of communism, namely workers; on the other hand a generic 
representation of the prototypical post-Soviet capitalist business—a “trading firm.” 
Peresvet’s banner, in other words, elicits the simplistic early-1990s conceptualization of 
what capitalism is: it must be something having to do with ‘the market,’ ‘marketing,’ 
‘trading,’ et cetera. Firms that engage directly in these prototypically capitalist activities 
therefore take on a kind of patina of capitalist authenticity. And lastly, on the one hand a 
“we” spoken on behalf of the Soviet collective; and on the other hand a “we” spoken on 
behalf of “our” new post-Soviet totality. Peresvet’s holy capitalist work is precisely our 
own. We are united with Peresvet in our task of building Russia by participating in 
capitalism, by engaging in the market, by trading, using banks, falling for marketing 
campaigns and shuffling money.  
But of course, the advertisement is also not without irony. The response “…and 
we’re building a new Russia” is both serious and playful, it is at least partly a kind of 
stiob, an ironic appropriation of the old Soviet ideological grand style (“we’re building” 
is difficult to take seriously in the 1990s after all of the similar Soviet-era locutions).36 
Which might lead us to suspect that the post-Soviet capitalist project might itself be stiob, 
a playful, overwrought parody of our own imagination of capitalism. In other words, the 
unseriousness implicit in Peresvet’s banner suggests that we all know that its business is 
make-believe. We are expected to know that post-Soviet capitalism is a performance 
rather than a real social fact. At a time when Russian politics and business activities are 
overseen by an unholy union of Mafiosi, corrupt officials, and various men with guns, 
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“we” are asked to put our critique aside and play at capitalism, as if it is a game of fin-de-
siècle dress-up. Russian capitalism here is less a grand Project and more a fairy-tale. 
 
“World History, Bank Imperial” 
The message of playful suspension of disbelief with regards to post-Soviet 
capitalism also comes through in the extremely popular 1990s commercials for Bank 
Imperial.37 Here, however, the game is less about Russian Stolypinists, and a bit more 
cosmopolitan—Bank Imperial’s capitalism is the purview of eternally debonair 
noblemen, a trans-historical, international elite. Shot between 1992 and 1998 by Timur 
Bekmambetov, who a decade later would go on to create Post-Soviet Russia’s first 
international blockbuster (Nightwatch, 2004), the Bank Imperial commercials break 
down into two taglines: “world history, Bank Imperial” and “precision is the courtesy of 
kings.”38 The first category retells colorful tidbits, mostly gathered from Russian 
domestic and international historical canon.39 The second category, gives several 
examples of “precision” on the part of its illustrious characters—Julius Caesar arrives just 
in time to the Senate, Louis XIV pedantically corrects a restaurant bill, and Napoleon 
narrowly dodges death by cannonball. The message of Bekmambetov’s commercials is 
three-fold: first, we are expected to pat ourselves on the back for recognizing most of the 
characters in the commercials. As such, the commercials trade in mid-brow mass 
intelligentsia cultural capital. Then, we are expected to identify with Bekmambetov’s 
fantasies regarding the heroic aristocratic ethos throughout history. Bank Imperial 
positions itself as a kind of eternally illustrious institution, in which we belong by virtue 
of thinking of ourselves as elites. And last but not least, we are expected to enjoy the 
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medium itself—at a time when Russian cinema is massively losing out at the box office 
to slick Hollywood productions, Bekmambetov manages to demonstrate his Hollywood-
like mettle by shooting upbeat, humorous, and slickly edited commercials, and in that 
way making Bank Imperial feel like an authentic Western capitalist product.  
On the other hand, however, just as in the case of Peresvet, we are also expected 
to take Bank Imperial’s performance of Western competence with a grain of salt. The 
stories of Bank Imperial are overly grandiose and playful in a fairy-tale-like fashion. For 
instance, one of the most famous commercials involves Catherine the Great chiding her 
legendary general Suvorov for not eating. Suvorov responds that he’s fasting and won’t 
eat until the first star is out. “A star for Alexander Vasilievich,” Catherine commands, 
and in the next cut we see Suvorov dining with an enormous Imperial order on his chest 
(see Figure 19, below). Quite obviously, such a thing never actually happened, and I very 
much doubt any viewers thought otherwise. But the wittiness of the commercial depends 
precisely on our own playful suspension of disbelief, and I would suggest that 
Bekmambetov expects us to extend the same kind of attitude to Bank Imperial as an 
institution. At a time when prominent Russian banks are constantly being denounced in 
the news as Ponzi schemes, Bank Imperial essentially tells its audience, ‘yes, you and us 
both know that our supposed “Imperial” provenance is dubious and tomorrow we might 






  The culmination of the mode of use of Russia’s Imperial past in post-Soviet 
advertisements is without a doubt evident in the design and concept of Kommersant, post-
Soviet Russia’s first “business newspaper,” which in fact predated the fall of the Soviet 
Union by about two years. Like the ads, Kommersant also engages in an ironic, make-
believe aesthetic of Russian capitalism and it also participates in the myth of Stolypinist 
Russia as a historical model for the post-Soviet homo faber. But more importantly this 
newspaper, both on its pages and especially behind the scenes, constructs an image of 
political fusion between the post-Soviet state and its ‘new Russian’ stakeholders, in 
which the latter are expected to misrecognize the dubious nature of their collective 
identity as well as their political interests. 
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On the subject of eliciting vague feelings of historical authenticity, Kommersant 
outdoes both Peresvet and Bank Imperial. The hard sign not only is included at the end of 
the paper’s title, коммерсантъ, but figures as its very logo. Moreover, the newspaper 
makes an explicit play at inheritance by stating in the header of each issue that “between 
1917 and 1989 the newspaper was not published due to circumstances beyond the 
editors’ control.”40 In other words, just like in the case of Peresvet, Kommersant 
communicates its simplistic, Manichean version of Soviet historiography—before the 
Revolution, there was capitalism and today we are reconnecting to that legacy and thus 
skipping over the seventy years of the Soviet ‘historical detour.’ At the same time, just as 
in the case of Peresvet, Kommersant’s tag-line quite obviously comes with a wink and a 
nod. It expresses a make-believe stylization of continuity, rather than literal claims of 
inheritance. It is for this reason that Leonid Parfenov, the creator of a 2009 documentary 
about Kommersant, entitled With a Hard Sign on the End, catches the paper’s initiator 
Vladimir Yakovlev grinning at the camera while stating that, “funny as it might be, there 
was such a pre-Revolutionary newspaper, Kommersant, which was aimed at the 
businessmen of that era.”41 Yakovlev is grinning because it is absolutely obvious both to 
him and to everyone else that there could not be any institutional or personal connection 
between the original Kommersant and its modern-day ‘heir.’ Moreover, the use of 
‘kommersant’ to describe contemporary Russian businessmen is also a fairy-tale gesture. 
As Parfenov quips, there is only one man at Kommersant in the 1990s who actually (and 
somewhat bizarrely) has “the face of a pre-Revolutionary kommersant.” Parfenov is 
referring to Maksim Sokolov’s big, bushy, black beard—a typical look of pre-
Revolutionary kommersanty, many of whom belonged to Old Believer sects in which it 
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was forbidden to shave. Of course, 1990s businessmen didn’t look like that and they 
certainly had nothing culturally in common with the late Imperial merchant class.42  
For Kommersant, recalling the past is a limited matter—“inheritance” is never 
presented as real by this newspaper, it is always just stylization. Indeed, the designer of 
Kommersant’s logo makes precisely this point, saying that “I was categorically against 
having the Hard Sign simply be a part of the regular font. […] I wanted it to be a purely 
graphic end for the logotype, a purely drawn thing.”43 In other words, the Imperial past is 
first and foremost a logo rather than history. It is a marketing ploy, and it is to be 
consumed only half-seriously. Though to be sure, Kommersant’s signature ironic tone—
evidenced not only by the hard sign and the tagline, but also by its many humorous 1990s 
headlines and sometimes inappropriately silly pictures—is itself ideologically loaded. It 
is anti-Soviet precisely because it is playful.44 In the 1990s, to choose to fall into the post-
Soviet ironic mise en abyme was itself a political statement, reflecting one’s rejection of 
the clichéd blandness of Soviet official discourse.  
 All jokes aside, Kommersant was very much aware of its political organizing 
mission, and also of the thinness of the line separating this consummate pro-Yeltsin 
newspaper from the post-Soviet state (in recent years, this thin line has almost entirely 
disappeared).45 Parfenov’s informants insist that these were two sides of the same coin, 
and they show little ethical concern about it. Thus, during the 1991 Putsch the paper ran 
the pure anti-Soviet headline “Nightmare, Yazov Is On the Street” (a wordplay on the 
Russian title for Nightmare on Elm Street, the 1984 American horror film that circulated 
widely in Russia in the late 1980s-early 1990s). Yakovlev recalls that it was “extremely 
easy” for them to “self-identify with the reader” because “Nightmare, Yazov Is On the 
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Street was how the newsroom felt, how the journalists felt, and the readers felt exactly 
the same.”46 Yakovlev’s statement simply assumes that there could be no daylight 
between the newsroom, its audience, and the emergent anti-Soviet political elites. In 
essence, he claims that ‘every sane person must have felt the way we felt.’ Similarly, 
during 1998 financial default Kommersant ran a billboard with a white black words 
against a white background, simply saying, “We’ll get through.” Recalling the ad, 
Kommersant’s chief editor Andrei Vasiliev states, “these are people, our people, let’s say, 
they look and they think, oh! It’s for us, it’s about us, it’s me who says so!”47  
Parfenov describes Kommersant’s ad campaigns as “headlines for our own 
[svoi]”—they are always pitched as insider-speak for an audience that is expected to 
recognize itself as a group through newspaper’s tone, its attitudes, and its perspective on 
the state. What is the nature of this presumed group consciousness? The slogan “we’ll get 
through” provides something of an answer to this question. At that moment, when the 
economy was again in freefall and public opinion was shifting sharply against Yeltisn 
once more, while the Communist party, from whom the 1996 election had been stolen, 
was still an active force in the political opposition, the newspaper communicated in its 
billboard the only possible way that a ‘normal person’ could feel. “We” know that the 
defense of the post-Soviet, Anti-Communist project is the only acceptable political 
position. “We” know this because “we” the readers of Kommersant are the only group of 
people in Russia who think rationally, who understand Russia’s challenges, who know 
that what Russia really needs is more undiluted Western liberal capitalist reforms. At the 
same time “we” also feel like we are in the minority, and that a whole lot of ignorant 
lumpen masses are still out there, and ‘they’ will have our heads if ‘they’ ever get the 
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chance. In short, “we” are the collective homo faber, the thin, tight, thinking and acting 
rational political class—and ‘they’ are the narod. This is the post-Soviet, pro-status-quo 
ideological discursive subject-position that was born out of the sociological background 
of the ITR mass intelligentsia, whose members had an outsized role in shaping all post-
Soviet institutions, including Kommersant. And Parfenov’s documentary is remarkably 
well aware (but not especially critical) of this ideology of subjectivity. This is why the 
filmmaker opens and closes the film with an image of a 1901 poster (see Figure 20, 
below).48 Parfenov does not explain the poster's historical origin, or even give its original 
name. He simply describes it as a “famous caricature of tsarist society.” He goes on: “all 
of this public was distinguished from the rest of the people [narod] by the fact that it read 
newspapers. This public was called the upper hundred thousand back then. That sounds 
like the print run of a newspaper—one hundred thousand copies. So it was, and so it has 
remained.”49 Why does Parfenov claim that ‘nothing has changed’ in newspaper 
readership since 1901? At the end of the documentary, we find out the answer—because 
in 2009, at the time of the film’s release, Kommersant’s print run is about a hundred 
thousand copies.  But of course, the readers of Kommersant are also the only ones that 
count. As Demian Kudriavtsev, the general director of Kommersant from 2006 to 2012 
notes, “the print run has to do not with how many people live in a country, but how many 
well-to-do people, politically-involved people, business-involved people live in this 
country. Kommersant gets the entirety of those readers whom it manages to create, 
alongside the development of capitalism in Russia.”50 Shortly after Kudriavtsev’s 
statement, the film concludes with Parfenov’s monologue, stating that “the upper hundred 





can also empathize with them. How lonely they are. Good thing they’ve got a newspaper, 
to recognize each other.” And immediately after it, just before the credits, we see the 
1901 caricature again.  
The claim that Kommersant’s readership represents the totality of “well-to-do,” 
“politically-involved” true capitalists is, sociologically speaking, preposterous, but the 
point is not to get at a sociological truth. The point is, rather, to articulate the subject 
position of the audience to whom Kommersant is pitched. They should feel like they are 
the “upper hundred thousand,” staving off the hordes of anti-capitalist, possibly illiterate 
barbarians at the gate. This feeling of post-Soviet elitist cohesion, sustained by a pre-
Soviet political imaginary, and first articulated by the likes of Govorukhin, is the fulcrum 
that motivates Kommersant’s political meaning. “We”—those who opposed the Putsch, 
those who are ‘pro-capitalist,’ those who vote for Yeltsin, those who are businessmen, 
those who feel ourselves to be our nation’s elites—“we” are all in this together.  
The post-Soviet project is “our” project. But this myth of social cohesion is 
extremely problematic on two counts—it is both too narrow and too wide. On the one 
hand, it is manifestly anti-democratic. Insofar as the supposedly ‘democratic’ side’s 
discourse is staked on an elitist self-consciousness of those who are “politically 
involved,” trapped in an eternal battle with the silent, uncountable, malignant masses, it is 
difficult to see how such a discourse could result in anything but cover for 
authoritarianism.  But on the other hand, this “we”—whom does it really include and 
should we all really think of ourselves as being ‘on the same side’? In that regard, it is 
indicative that in the 1990s, Kommersant initiated two kinds of projects, which should 
have been seen as contradictory. On the one hand, the daily newspaper ran a series of 
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cartoons featuring a certain Petrovich—a humdrum everyman struggling to make sense 
of Russia’s new sociopolitical reality. Most of the jokes were about Petrovich learning to 
speak ‘post-Soviet,’ and many of the cartoons involved Petrovich in various states of 
frustration, shock, and physical pain. Thinking back on him, Yakovlev notes that “it’s 
hard to say why Petrovich was needed, it was a genius find, absolutely, […] it was the 
kind of irony and humor that made it possible to live.”51 Meanwhile, even as Petrovich’s 
daily painful travails graced the newspaper, Kommersant launched another project, 
Russia’s “first glossy journal,” Domovoi. Parfenov claims that the glam women’s 
monthly Domovoi first coined the phrase “new Russians” (written in English), and the 
filmmaker explains who such a person would be: he is “a shock worker of capitalist 
labor, so to speak. In general, the idea is that the husband, a new Russian, reads 
Kommersant, and his wife reads Domovoi. And constructs their way of life according to 
it.”52 So whose journal is it, then? Petrovich’s? Or the glamorous new Russian’s?  
To add more fuel to the fire, Parfenov also interviews Alisher Usmanov, the 
mega-billionaire Putinist oligarch and owner of Kommersant since 2008. Usmanov points 
out how happy he is to own this newspaper, because “I have always associated my self-
consciousness as a businessman with the Kommersant paper.” It is very hard to believe 
that Usmanov required Petrovich’s dark humor “to make it possible to live” in the 1990s. 
It is also very hard to believe that Petrovich had a desperate housewife who read 
Domovoi. Yet the whole premise of the newspaper is for us not to feel this contradiction. 
If anything, “we” are expected to subsume it under an “upper hundred thousand” kind of 
elitist group consciousness. And to help us do so, “we” have a pre-Revolutionary myth of 
the “upper hundred thousand.” “So it was, and so it has remained,” Parfenov insists. But 
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there is an enormous sleight of hand implicit in this historical imaginary. The “caricature 
of tsarist society” quoted by Parfenov wasn’t meant to be taken literally. It was a 
revolutionary polemic device, drawn up by a Socialist Revolutionary cartoonist. Yes, 
from his radical standpoint it seemed like all of the Russian educated public was in 
cahoots against the spat-upon and disempowered narod, but the point of that polemic was 
precisely to empower the masses. The flattening of elite disunity was certainly not meant 
to valorize the elites or to convince them to unite against the masses—in fact, the cartoon 
was not talking to the elites at all. It wanted to do away with the whole hierarchy. But 
when Parfenov reads this image, he does so precisely in a counter-revolutionary way. He 
takes the revolutionary articulation of the vampiric few versus the powerless many, 
accepts these fundamental terms as true, and simply reverses the moral polarities. And as 
a result, “the upper hundred thousand” actually appear as real, as a coherent entity, even 
though politically or sociologically speaking they were and are nothing of the sort. 
Parfenov’s historical imaginary sits at the core of the political discourse of the 
post-Soviet homo faber. But ironically, this historical imaginary remains entirely blind to 
the political tasks of a properly post-Soviet era. If “we” are indeed going to subjectivize 
ourselves as parliamentary democrats (rather than revolutionary bomb-throwers or 
counter-revolutionary authoritarians), then “we” are going to have to take political 
disagreement and class interests far more seriously. Petrovich and Usmanov cannot both 
be on the same side, just as the late Imperial reading public was not by any stretch of the 
imagination on the same side. To ignore divergent interests, to subsume discussions of 
meaningful social divisions in the interest of presenting a united front against a vague 
communist threat—to adopt Kommersant’s ideology, in short—is to blind one’s self 
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entirely from recognizing who is really in power and what it means for everyone else. 
And that ‘everyone’ includes not some imaginary illiterate and malevolent narod, but 









































III. A Normal Country:  
The Aesthetics of the Post-Soviet State 
 
“I want to live in a normal country.” 
 
Russian liberal intelligentsia lament 
 
 
 The imagined cohesion of ‘pro-capitalist’ society, generated by outlets like 
Kommersant and marketing campaigns of Peresvet and Bank Imperial, among many 
other venues, was quite obviously an important pillar of the Yeltsinist state. Meanwhile, 
the state itself was trying to meet the ‘capitalists’ half-way, by engaging in the discourse 
of ‘normalization’ of Russia. The state’s solution to the very common anti-Soviet lament, 
“I want to live in a normal country,” was ideally supposed to be two-pronged. On the one 
hand, it attempted to carry out various transitionist plans, all ostensibly aimed at the 
building of competent and lawful institutions that would stem the chaos of the 1990s. On 
the other hand, post-Soviet executives like Yeltsin and Moscow’s famous city mayor 
Yurii Luzhkov at least tried to create a feeling of normalcy. In the 1990s a lot of effort 
was expended on orchestrating a look and feel of Russia in general and Moscow in 
particular as ‘normal’—as opposed to Soviet—social entities. Yet what, exactly, was 
‘normal’ supposed to look like? Just as in the case of the banks and newspapers described 
above, the pre-Soviet aesthetic was central to this endeavor. 
 Russia’s 1990s, in the words of Stephen Kotkin, were a time of “democracy 
without liberalism,” which demonstrated  
…a number of what should have been self-evident truths. That civil society and a 
liberal state were not opposites but aspects of the same phenomenon. That 
government was not the enemy of liberty but its sine qua non. That private 
property without good government was not worth what it otherwise would have 
been. In short, that good government was the most precious thing a people could 
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have. Russia’s challenge was not cultural or economic but institutional, a problem 
of governability, especially of its governing institutions.53  
 
However, though ‘Yeltsin’s government’ was an oxymoron in an institutional sense, it 
was somewhat active in the realm of symbols. For instance, from its inception, Yeltsin 
and his supporters made sure to dress up their powerplay in an evocative Russian 
Imperial retro garb. It started with the return of the Imperial tri-color flag, which began 
appearing at MDG gatherings in the late 1980s. Then, during the 1991 coup someone in 
Yeltsin’s coterie made sure to unfurl the tri-color behind him as he posed defiantly on top 
of a loyal tank (See Figure 21, below).54 Similarly, in December of that year, when 
Yeltsin moved into Gorbachev’s office in the Kremlin and the USSR was declared no 
more, the tri-color replaced the hammer and sickle on the Kremlin spires that very night. 
By 1993, after another major political crisis, the set of state insignia was supposed to 
expand further, with the return of an Imperial double-headed eagle as the Russian 
Federation’s state seal, and also as the symbol of a newly revised Presidency. Meanwhile, 
a reconstructionist campaign began to take off in Moscow. Street and district names were 
returning to their pre-Soviet versions. Buildings that had been destroyed during the 
course of the Stalinist 1930s were now being rebuilt, “rising up from non-being,” to quote 
Luzhkov’s supernatural rhetoric.55 
There is an obvious and also not so obvious reason for why Yeltsin and Luzhkov 
devoted so much effort and resources to reconstructionist symbolism, at a time when the 
economy and basic social institutions were in dire straits. The simple answer would 
follow the lines of a “restorative nostalgia” argument articulated by Svetlana Boym.56 




find it. Chapters One and Two of my dissertation have shown the extent to which various 
liberal and conservative versions of Imperial restorative nostalgia were a major 
component of the sensibilities of the urbanized mass technical intelligentsia that had 
brought the likes of Yeltsin and Luzhkov to power.  However, there was also a deeper 
reason for investing so much into various reconstructionist projects, which had to do with 
the kind of solipsistic form of capitalism that took shape in Russia. As a result of 
cognitive distortions implicit in pro-Yeltsinist ‘democrat’ discourse, as well as systemic 
factors, post-Soviet capitalism was excessively consumerist and under-institutionalized. 
For this reason, those who called themselves capitalists were excessively fixated on 
simulating the image of themselves as capitalists. The very actions of buying, selling, 
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banking and marketing in Russia appeared as the sine qua non of the capitalist self-
image. However, such a level of solipsism was too unstable and caused many people in 
this decade to feel like their whole social world was a vast simulation, constantly 
threatening to disappear in a poof of smoke. The stories and novels of Viktor Pelevin 
from this decade put this feeling in writing, and that is why they—especially Generation 
P (1999)—became bestsellers, often to the dismay of mainstream liberal “opinion 
makers” like Parfenov.57 So, the feverish intensity of post-Soviet performance of 
capitalism also had to be mediated, and the pre-Soviet aesthetic deployed by the state 
played this role by trying to create a feeling of normalcy, within which consumer 
capitalism would be able to thrive. The only problem was that ‘normalcy’ also felt 
overdetermined. 
Within the analyses of Jean Baudrillard and also Claude Lefort, among others, the 
feeling of normalcy serves as the central mediator for the consumerist process. 
Baudrillard himself doesn’t use this term, but it permeates his theorization of 
“hyperreality” in consumer objects, including films, and it is also present in Claude 
Lefort’s theorization of post-War liberal democratic capitalist regimes. Thus, while 
speaking about the “retro” aesthetic of post-war historical cinema, Baudrillard quips that 
it is successful because today, “the historical stake” has been “chased from our lives by 
this sort of immense neutralization, which is dubbed peaceful coexistence on a global 
level, and pacified monotony on the quotidian level.”58 Meanwhile, writing at about the 
same time, Lefort describes the foundational political ideology of the postwar West, in 
which regimes continue to wield power over the masses by representing an image of 
group cohesion, in which we are expected to “exclude […] the question of the origin, the 
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legitimacy and rationality of the oppositions and hierarchies” and instead celebrate “the 
very experience of socialization here and now.”59 Lefort’s virtual space of maximal 
socialization is the flipside of Baudrillard’s hyperreality. They are both speaking about an 
ideal model of the Western postwar order, in which everything can be said and every 
symbol can be monetized, because words and symbols that formerly carried socially 
explosive potential no longer do so. After witnessing the dead ends of German Fascism 
and Russian Communism, everyone in the ‘free world’ has accepted the pact of living 
‘normally’ and not engaging in social revolutions. As a reward for this acquiescence, 
formerly socially disruptive symbols get repackaged into retro aesthetics, for all to enjoy. 
Potentially, the very fabric of historical memory can undergo this treatment, such that old 
social conflicts would no longer have any relevance for today’s harmonious post-
historical era, and so instead of reliving them meaningfully, we would enjoy them as 
perfectly and sometimes excessively reconstructed artifacts, like heritage films or 
steampunk or restoration hardwood.  
Luzhkov and Yeltsin tried to orchestrate this fabric of anodyne social normalcy by 
means of the Imperial reconstructionist aesthetic. Consider, for instance, the return of the 
double-headed eagle to the state insignia. Though it is possible to read this event as a case 
of “restorative nostalgia,” I believe its operational purpose was different, and it is 
possible to see this difference in the legislative and design history behind the new coat of 
arms. The original law, introduced by the Supreme Soviet in 1992, simply wished to copy 
the old Imperial symbol. However, this law did not pass. An altered law, adopted through 
Yeltsin’s executive order in late 1993, this time with heraldic expertise, made some 




changed, and most importantly, the eagle’s breastplate was subtly, but significantly 
transformed. Whereas the original text described it as “the historic coat of arms of 
Muscovy,” the new law described it simply as “a knight striking a dragon with his lance.” 
Moreover, a careful examination of the design reveals subtle differences between St. 
George and the anonymous knight. Interestingly, this statute too was struck down in 
1994, and the official insignia would only become law in 2000. 60 The story of the 
legislative debacle surrounding the coat of arms reveals two things. On the one hand, it 
was indeed interpreted by many lawmakers as part of an agenda of “restorative 
nostalgia,” a “project […] about truth,” to borrow Boym’s words.61 That is, 
the lawmakers read the eagle as a symbol of returning to pre-Soviet Russia, and many 
were apparently suspicious of this proposition. On the other hand, however, we might ask 
another question—why were Yeltsin, Putin and their “Heraldic Council” so comfortable 
with altering the coat of arms, and why did they so doggedly pursue the official return of 
the eagle for almost ten years, even as they were ready and perfectly willing to deracinate 
	 189 
its potential “restorative” political meaning? In short, Because the eagle was not really 
about restorative nostalgia. It did not have to communicate a pre-Revolutionary political 
project. In any case, this was not its primary function. The point of the coat of arms was, 
rather, to orchestrate the look and feel of post-Soviet Russia as a post-historical normal 
space, in the Baudrillardian sense. The eagle was not supposed to be taken literally, even 
though many legislators did take it literally. It was always supposed to be a retro 
aesthetic, and that’s why significant alterations to it were acceptable. 
 Another, far more prominent example of pre-Soviet retro stylization is the post-
Soviet plan for Moscow. The rhetoric that Luzhkov’s predecessor Gavriil Popov, and 
then Luzhkov and his urban planners have all used to describe their projects predictably 
tends towards ‘normalization.’ For instance, recalling a discussion regarding the 
restoration of pre-Revolutionary districting and street names in 1990, Luzhkov says, 
Let us get back to the wellsprings. […] We invited specialists, circled the historic 
districts on the map. […] And we discovered a genuine Moscow, the very one that 
existed underneath an artificial net of Brezhnevite and Kirovite enclaves. We saw 
a city which, with some transformations, nevertheless had retained a memory of 
the past. We heard old, forgotten names: ‘Tushino,’ ‘Nagatino,’ ‘Troparevo’…62 
 
Less than a decade later, a similar sentiment appears in the rhetoric of Luzhkov’s chief 
city planner, Aleksandr Kuz’min: 
The maxim of Moscow’s new General Plan up to 2020 is ‘A city convenient for 
people’s lives.’ It simply and clearly discloses the purely humanitarian direction 
of this important document of urban planning. Probably for the first time in our 
country’s practice in the composition of a document of this type, its authors were 
neither subject to political dictation nor under ideological pressure. […] Now, at 
the end of the 1990s, we are saying that we simply would like to see our capital 
city as a comfortable and convenient city.63 
 
In Kuz’min’s rhetoric, the idea of normalcy—here “comfort” and “convenience” 
predominates as the legitimating benchmark for his department’s ambitious urban plan. 
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In Luzhkov’s rhetoric, normalcy is presented in a historical sense, as “authenticity.” In 
both cases, post-Soviet normalcy is favorably juxtaposed to the terminated artificial 
Soviet project, which had committed crimes against authentic history in the case of 
Luzhkov, and against ‘normal’ urban development in the case of Kuz’min. 
This rhetoric of post-Soviet normalcy, which fuses together notions like 
“authenticity” and “convenience,” best explains the ideology behind Luzhkov’s infamous 
“Moscow style.” At the forefront of this style were marquee reconstruction projects 
which were, as the architecture critic Sabine Gölz has noted, “difficult to distinguish from 
new construction.”64 Beyond the marquee projects, Luzhkov also encouraged the 
construction of so many fin de siècle-inspired houses that one critic quipped that the city 
was being supplied with “two hundred architectural monuments per year.”65 Kathleen 
Smith has characterized the “Moscow style” as a “historical theme park” aesthetic, rather 
than a “museum” one.66 Moreover, Smith has also highlighted an apparent contradiction 
between Luzhkov’s self-styling as an ‘economic pragmatist’ and his investment of 
“significant state money” into projects like the grandiose reconstruction of the Cathedral 
of Christ the Savior. In Smith’s reading, this contradiction can be explained by a desire 
“to link larger civic goals to religious and nationalist views.”67 I would suggest that just 
as in the case of the Imperial coat of arms, nationalist messaging was not entirely the 
point. Convenience, comfort, post-Soviet technocratic pragmatism and expensive retro all 
went together precisely because they were part of rendering the ‘normal.’ Normalcy in 
this case denotes the innocuous space of aesthetico-political consensus in which 
consumer capitalism can exist. Vladimir Resin, Moscow’s foreman-in-chief in the 1990s 
has put this matter remarkably clearly:   
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Where did we find the means to undertake restoration on such a massive scale? 
[…] The funds came from the contributions of those who had profited during the 
rapid privatization [...] of the early 1990s. […] They wished to set up business in 
prestigious old buildings […]. Throughout the world such structures are the most 
expensive and the most coveted for successful business people.68 
 
Luzhkovan-Yeltisnist normalcy was about forging an agreeable lifeworld within which 
the stakeholders of the Yeltsin state—the New Russian businesses on the one hand and 
the amorphous urbanized capital-dwelling masses on the other, could feel themselves 
united, precisely in the way described by Lefort. That is to say, the post-Soviet ‘normal’ 
was supposed to be an ideological space that would obfuscate the real state of social 
divisions and make everyone in it feel somehow equal. Homo faber ideology (we are all 
the “upper hundred thousand,” the inheritors of aristocratic culture and politics) was well-
disposed to this kind of obfuscation. Yeltsin’s state simply met these ideas half-way. But 
just as with Kommersant, it was a devil’s bargain.  
The state, its servitors, the intelligentsia, the new “biznes” community (to borrow 
Kotkin’s ironic take on it), are all stripped of their conflicts and particularities, and are re-
imagined as a single, unified “New Russian” imaginary collective subject, over and 
against some equally imaginary non-subjects (be they the narod, or ‘the workers of 
Uralvagonzavod’ or the ‘red-browns,’ or ‘sheeple’ [bydlo]). The post-Soviet state 
reinforces this juncture by investing into collective spaces in which its collective subject 
can feel normal, as opposed to artificial. Vague feelings of nationalist authenticity, 
elicited by massive reconstructionist urban investments, push out and subsume the 
possibility of a more politically potent form of social discourse. And the post-Soviet 
condemnation of Marxism-Leninism also helps in this regard—the social-analytic 
toolbox that could help the so-called ‘elites’ sort out their real political interests and 
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divisions had been relegated to the dustbin of history, along with the failed Soviet project.  
Looking back on the 1990s from the vantage point of 2017, the story of the 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior provides the most apparent example of the peripeteias of 
anti-political normalization through Imperial retro. At the time of its construction, the 
Cathedral was promoted as a national revival project, with a whole series of televised 
commercials that were supposedly pitched to the many citizens of Russia who would then 
fund the reconstruction with their small donations. Luzhkov played along with this story 
by claiming that Moscow provided no budget for the building and that it was being 
financed by various private, public and corporate donors. Of course, as Smith has pointed 
out, this was absurdly unbelievable and the Cathedral was actually being funded through 
a massive corruption scheme.69 And even beyond the scheme itself, it was quite obvious 
to everyone in the 1990s that the very idea of non-corrupt Russian private, public or 
corporate donors was absurd. Still, the Cathedral’s construction was no mere cynical 
ploy. Rather, Christ the Savior was welcomed by its stakeholders, who paid for it at least 
partly out of a sincere belief that it was what the people wanted, and also because this 
venue allowed them to pretend to be respectable, both in each other’s eyes, and also in 
the eyes of the urbanized Muscovites, with whom they claimed solidarity—in the words 
of Pelevin, this church celebrated “a respectable Lord for gentlemen of respect [solidnyi 
Gospod’ dlia solidnykh gospod].”70 The belief in the Orthodox ‘people’ who wanted to 
see churches rebuilt, as well as the desire to view one’s self as “a gentleman”71 were all 
parts of the same homo faber discourse that was used by Yeltsinists, including the 
wealthy ones. Moreover, this feeling of ideological consensus about the Cathedral could 
coexist with the general knowledge that its construction was both corrupt and state-
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driven, because there was also consensus about the need to pretend that post-Soviet 
capitalism actually existed and that Russia was moving in a normal direction.  
By 2012, a few months after mass Moscow protests against Putin’s third term, the 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior finally ‘bore the device’ of its existence. After the “Punk 
Prayer” art protest action of Pussy Riot at the church, and the subsequent state-led, highly 
publicized and extremely controversial repressive campaign against it, this religious 
venue and virtually all other Russian churches could no longer so easily appear as a sites 
of consensus between the state and ‘society’ broadly defined.72 It is thanks to Pussy 
Riot’s critical action and the fallout from it, as well as broader political trends, that today 
Christ the Savior feels as normal as the Lubianka—that is, it is increasingly only normal 
for the Putinist state officialdom. As such, the contemporary status of Christ the Savior in 
public discourse is one of many indicators that the consensus about the need for 
aesthetico-political normalcy in Russia that had underwritten both Yeltisnism and 











IV. The Competent Manager:  
Stolypin for the Post-Soviet Nomenklatura 
 
“I am from the party of managers [khoziaistvennikov]!” 
 
Yuri Luzhkov, 1990 speech at the Mossovet73 
 
 
As Yeltsin’s state struggled to meet the pro-Yeltsin “New Russians” half way in 
the task of forging a ‘normal,’ supposedly non-ideological, make-believe capitalist 
lifeworld, the state was also trying to solve an internal ideological problem, created by 
the fact that most of its bureaucrats originated in the late Soviet nomenklatura. Literally 
thousands of apparatchiks, who had climbed the ranks during the late Soviet era by 
diligently drilling and reciting Marxist-Leninist dogma suddenly had to make a case for 
why they could keep their jobs. One answer that made a lot of sense was that these were 
the only people who had governing competence. Luzhkov’s thoughts on this matter are 
paradigmatic. At a gathering of the Moscow City Council [Mossovet] in 1990, he was 
asked, “what platform do you embrace? Are you a democrat or a communist? Or, maybe 
an independent?” Luzhkov responded: 
I have always embraced and continue to embrace the same platform. The 
managerial one [khoziaistvennoi]. […] I am from the party of managers 
[khoziaistvennikov]! […] This principle […] made it possible for us in Moscow 
government to have both clerks from the old system and also those who fought 
against this system, and also ones who came from other fields […] Such is the 
philosophy of executive power that we carried out from the very beginning of 
choosing cadres.74 
 
Luzhkov’s post-historical “philosophy of executive power” in which wolves lie with 
sheep in the competent administration of a de-ideologized metropolis surely was meant to 
appeal to the Muscovites who brought him and Yeltsin to power by showing up to the 
demonstrations against the Putschists in 1991 and against the Supreme Soviet in 1993. 
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The ‘democrats’ campaigning against the communists liked to claim that they were 
against “ideology.” This notion was present in the typical lament mentioned earlier, of 
wanting “to live in a normal country.” It expressed a desire simply to get on with life in a 
technocratically administered city, without having to engage in further political 
organizing against the powers that be, because those powers would, through some magic, 
end up fully representing their constituents’ will. Luzhkov was an expert in appealing to 
this depoliticized political imaginary, which allowed a lifelong Soviet executive like 
himself to advance significantly in his job, even though the rhetoric of Soviet démontage 
was strongly aimed against USSR’s dubious hierarchy of excessive executive power.  
Still, appeals to depoliticized managerial competence did not always work. There 
was no shortage of ‘states of emergency’ during the tenures of both Yeltsin and Luzhkov, 
during which the former nomenklatura, now reborn into post-Soviet bureaucrats, had to 
defend their positions from political assaults within and outside the legislature. So, the 
other constant presence in Yeltsin’s and Luzhkov’s politicking was the trope of staving 
off various populist barbarians at the gates. This rhetoric was coterminous with the homo 
faber ideology of the “upper hundred thousand,” but it was not quite the same, because 
the state’s sovereign calculus for forging friend-enemy distinctions did not always 
coincide with that of their presumed constituents. Namely, though a gamut of “red-
brown” public firebrand figures (Zhirinovsky, Limonov and Ziuganov, roughly speaking) 
really did try to contest political power, there were also some well-respected liberal 
figures who were not content with Yeltsin’s decisions. Plus, of course, there were many 
figures in the public sphere who denounced the manifestly anti-democratic, election-
rigging practices of the supposedly ‘democratic’ (because anti-‘red-brown’) Yeltsin 
	 196 
coalition. And the state had to answer to these critics as well—after all, they were more 
politically dangerous because they threatened to splinter the supposed consensus of those 
who not only voted for, but culturally legitimated and financially supported the post-
Soviet state project of ‘democracy’ against the presumed commu-nazis.75 One of the most 
enduring answers that the post-Soviet state formulated was “Stolypin.” 
 Appeals to the Stolypinist legacy had originated in the Soviet public sphere by 
way of samizdat/tamizdat—as discussed above, Solzhenitsyn’s 1970s tamizdat 
encomium of the tsarist prime minister was taken up by Govorukhin in The Russia That 
We Have Lost. But positive treatments of Stolypin appeared in Soviet official literature as 
well, when in 1979 the popular historical fiction writer Valentin Pikul’ published the first 
edition of his somewhat scandalous novel Evil Force [Nechistaia sila]. The book 
essentially told the story of how a cabal involving Rasputin, wealthy Jews, and lecherous 
aristocratic women together ruined Russia and brought about the Revolution. The rather 
open anti-Semitic rhetoric, among other things, was enough to get Pikul’ into trouble 
with the Party (which was privately no less anti-Semitic, but had to maintain basic 
decorum). On the sidelines of the main storyline, however, Pikul’’s book presented a 
picture of Stolypin and late Imperial society that was in general so glowing that 
Stolypin’s son Arkadii was moved to write a special review of the book in the émigré 
press in 1980, entitled “Crumbs of Truth in a Barrel of Lies.” While claiming that a 
majority of the novel was so slanderously false that “in a rights-based country the author 
would have to answer not to critics but to the court,” Arkadii Stolypin nevertheless 
expressed hopes that the novel was popular precisely “thanks to [the] crumbs of truth” 
regarding late Imperial Russia, and that this work would allow all of the closeted anti-
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communists in Soviet Russia “to lean on the still living pillars of the past, [..] our still 
recoverable national statehood [gosudarstvennosti].”76 
 By 1990, a positive myth of late Imperial Russia in general and Stolypin in 
particular, mostly sourced from Solzhenitsyn, was already a commonplace in Yelstinist 
anti-Soviet discourse. In the case of Govorukhin, this myth took the meaning of 
encouraging Russia’s ‘elites’ to cohere around a capitalist modernization project and to 
protect it from the “degenerate” lumpen masses. By 1994, with the release of his Great 
Criminal Revolution, evidently Govorukhin himself had evidently lost faith in the Yeltsin 
state’s version of that project. Still, myths of illustrious late Imperial servitors and loyal 
conservative intellectuals continued to circulate in the post-Soviet public sphere, and by 
the 2000s they became fully incorporated into the ideology of the Putinist state, peaking 
with Putin’s 2009 demonstrative laying of wreaths at the graves of several “state-minded 
men [gosudarstvenniki]”: Solzhenitsyn, the White general Denikin and the émigré rightist 
political thinker Ivan Ilyin.77 Though Stolypin’s name did not figure in the ceremony (he 
was buried in Kiev and still remains there), the others might as well have been surrogates 
for him. Either way, Stolypin Jr. would have certainly approved of Putin’s love of the 
“gosudarstvenniki” of yore. But what was the meaning of this notion of ‘state-
mindedness’ that the once and future President was extolling, and how did Stolypin 
specifically figure into it? What could Stolypin mean for the post-Soviet state?  
Thanks to the efforts of post-Soviet statist conservative intelligentsia figures who 
had been weaned on the late Soviet legacy of communicating with power, as well as late 
Soviet positive narratives about the late Imperial era, Stolypin came to embody the three 
central elements of post-Soviet state rhetoric: managerial competence, conservative 
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elitism, and excuses for authoritarian action today in the name of a democracy tomorrow. 
To see how this rhetoric took shape, I will now consider several related post-Soviet 
sources on Stolypin. First, I will examine Sviatoslav Rybas’s 1991 biography, The 
Reformer [Reformator] coauthored with L. V. Tarakanova. Then, I will consider the 
republished 2003 version of this biography, released under a different title (Stolypin) 
through the Lives of Extraordinary People series, with slight but telling modifications, 
and this time with only Rybas’s name on the cover (it was subsequently republished four 
more times as of 2014). Lastly, I will examine the reception of Rybas’s book in the 
educational materials of the leading Putinist parliamentary party, United Russia. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the Soviet 1960s and 1970s 
produced two versions of conservative discourse, and though the passive ‘harmonious 
nationalist’ one ended up clearing past the hurdles of censorship, the activist conservative 
rhetoric forged by individuals like Solzhenitsyn remained influential. In 1974, as he was 
about to go into exile, and several years after having published in France his first 
encomium of Tsarist society, August 1914, Solzhenitysn called on Soviet leaders to 
“carry out your duty soberly, responsibly and decisively” and “reject the dead letter” of 
Soviet ideology. Solzhenitsyn suggested that Soviet leaders take up Russian nationalism, 
as Stalin had done during the war, “for the sake of the living narod.” At the same time, he 
comforted the nomenklatura about the moral and practical possibility of preserving their 
authoritarian hierarchy by purifying it and making it more competent: “though freedom is 
moral, it is only so up to a certain point […] while order also, is not immoral, as a 
sustainable and placid regime,” and “it isn’t authoritarianism as such that is unbearable, 
but its forced, day-to-day ideological lies.”78 By 1991, the nomenklatura was finally 
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ready to hear these ideas, while Sviatoslav Rybas (1946- ) was ready to restate them.  
Though he is listed among “prominent Russian Nationalist Intellectuals” as of 
1985 in Yitzhak Brudny’s research,79 Rybas was not so prominent prior to the 
Perestroika. His print runs were not enormous (375,000 copies between 1983 and 1985), 
especially compared to such authors as Astafiev and Bondarev. Still, he was clearly a 
successful young writer close to the Russian nationalist elite circles who were in charge 
of the Molodaia gvardiia publishing house, where Rybas had published most of his 
works.80 After the fall of the USSR Rybas found a niche in the new social landscape. In 
the 1990s he was among the initiators of the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior and became an honorary member and professor of the Russian Academy of 
Military Science. Today, when he is not writing biographies of Stalin and Shulgin 
(among others), he maintains an active LiveJournal page, on which he mostly inveighs 
against post-Soviet ‘color revolutions’ and treacherous liberals.81  
Rybas’s biography and ideas embody the mix of continuity and change that 
Russian nomenklatura conservatism had to undergo to survive past Perestroika, through 
the Yeltsin era, and into Putinism. He proves that the long-running relationship of 
nationalist intelligentsia as mentors for state servitors did not have to terminate after 
Perestroika, as long as both parties switched rails at the right time. To do so, the old-new 
conservatives would have to use the opportunities opened up by Yeltsinist anti-Soviet 
discourse. As we have seen in the case of Luzhkov, the libertarian-technocratic ideology 
of ‘wanting to live in a normal country’ made it possible for former apparatchiks to re-
legitimate themselves as competent managers [krepkie khoziaistvenniki]. Additionally, 
the monarchist, nostalgic elitism articulated by Govorukhin also opened up possibilities 
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for state servitors to pick up the same mantle. Both of these vectors are central for 
Rybas’s interpretation of Stolypin. On the one hand, he is an ideal aristocrat, as in 
Govorukhin’s account, who truly deserves his social prominence; on the other hand, he is 
the ultimate ‘competent manager,’ a picture of enlightened capitalist authoritarianism. 
Later, as Rybas rewrites his biography of Stolypin for the Putin era in 2003, Stolypin’s 
governmental métier acquires a distinct whiff of Putin-style hybrid authoritarianism, 
described by Putin’s ideologists as “managed democracy.”  
 Rybas’s Stolypin is the ultimate activist conservative, who perfectly embodies 
“the connection between excellence and rule,” to borrow Robin’s formulation.82 At one 
point, he is compared to Levin from Anna Karenina—Rybas quotes Tolstoy’s 
explanation of his character’s admiration for the free capitalist peasant’s labor and says 
that “Petr Stolypin viewed life in just this same way.”83 Some pages later, we learn about 
his admirable loneliness as a competent aristocrat at the top of the late Russian Empire’s 
political food chain: “he had no hope for [support from the] Russian public. He was 
alone.” It was a collective loneliness, though—in Rybas’s rendering, the human condition 
of the Russian aristocratic capitalist was apparently a typical sign of the times, which 
were “forging together the Russian noble and the bourgeois liberal into a single new 
social type.” Such hybrid harbingers of the future, Rybas continues, were the ones 
…who created a New America on the south of Russia, who created the great 
peasant Siberia, the first-class factories, the engineers, the pilots, the zemstvo 
intelligentsia… where did they come from? From the ‘superfluous’ ones? From 
the idiocy of Russian life? We cannot answer these questions without Stolypin. 
Stolypin is not so much a personality, as a name for a whole epoch of our life, 
which was broken by a terrible cataclysm and which can be reborn, if we return to 
common sense. It might seem strange, but it is nevertheless the case that while 
common sense ideas are always straightforward, they are usually connected to an 
extreme conflict of sides.84 
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Outdoing Govorukhin, Rybas here emphatically extols Stolypin as a symbol of an 
interrupted Russian capitalist modernity that can be reclaimed in the post-Soviet era by a 
reborn technical class of factory-managers, ‘the engineers, the pilots,’ and so forth.  
However, whereas Govorukhin’s rhetoric for the most part stops there, at the level 
of a generalized Stolypinist ethos, Rybas pushes Stolypin’s elitism into an encomium of 
the tsarist minister’s authoritarian statecraft. Just prior to the section quoted above, Rybas 
explains that Stolypin’s loneliness was caused by the fact that he had to pass virtually all 
of his reforms by fiat, without the input of Russia’s fledgling parliament. This is because 
his ideas were too “radical” for the Duma, Rybas tells us.85 This trope of loneliness 
intensifies through repetition. At one point Rybas describes Stolypin as “the last Roman,” 
the last servant of a “Russia” that “we no longer have.”86 At another point, he wonders, 
“who supported Stolypin?” And he answers: “it is possible to say: everyone and no one 
[…] the narod’s hope bent towards Stolypin.” Rybas’s narod here is not so much a social 
entity—not even the flawed intelligentsia version of it—as it is a metonymy for the state 
as a whole, a referent of Russia as a depersonalized national political subject. Despite 
Stolypin’s constant rigging of election laws to eliminate oppositional undesirables from 
the Duma, and despite his subsequent constant avoidance of passing laws through his 
own, maximally rigged Duma, it is nevertheless clear to Rybas that the tsarist minister 
was doing what Russia wanted and needed from him.87  
Stolypin’s loneliness, in other words, is distinct from the loneliness of the homo 
faber—that is, the pilots and engineers building a “new America” in Crimea in the 1900s 
and, ipso facto, the managers and engineers building a new Russia in the 1990s. Stolypin 
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transcends the hopes and wishes of even those people. He is not really accountable to 
them—he is only accountable to Russia the state, a transcendent entity that speaks 
through the tsarist minister and is not at all reducible to the parliamentary representative 
system. If what the state needs is radical reforms, then Stolypin will force them through 
and will not tolerate dissent. Indeed, he will bravely turn the Russian ancien régime 
upside down to save it. This very notion is already captured in the title of the 1991 book, 
The Reformer. To drive the point home, Rybas also makes sure to refer to Stolypin 
throughout the text as the “Reformer,” with a capital R, as if a commitment to aggressive 
reform defined the very core of the minister’s entire being. Then, as we get into the 
details of Stolypin’s political life, Rybas notes several related “paradoxes.”88 One is that 
“it was precisely Stolypin, who was not a ‘westernizer,’ but a man who loved and 
understood Russia, who was fated to carry out a reform that would destroy the peasant 
commune.”89 Or, another paradox: “He was on the right, a conservative defender 
[okhranitel] of the natural path of life, but at the same time he reached out to the 
liberals.”90 Or, yet another paradox: “he, a landowner and a nobleman, was brought by 
history to carry out bourgeois reforms, which would destroy his native world.”91  
In short, Rybas’s Stolypin embodies the conservative paradox outlined by Robin, 
that “if you want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.”92  And it is easy 
to see how this paradox spoke to the post-Soviet state leaders for whom Rybas, by virtue 
of his institutional background, was writing his book. Quite obviously, for Yeltsin, 
Luzhkov and all of their former nomenklatura underlings to survive into the post-Soviet 
era they too would have to be willing to “destroy their native world.” They too would 
have to make strategic common cause with “the liberals.” They too would have to accept 
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some version of “westernization” as the only path forward. But to what extent? When and 
how would the ancien régime re-assert itself? In the 1991 edition of the book, Rybas 
answered this question by highlighting Stolypin’s patriotism and his inward-gazing 
imperialism. Rybas’s Stolypin opposes imprudent foreign wars (read: Afghanistan), he is 
committed to the vision of a “Grand Russia” (read: post-Soviet Russian territorial 
integrity), and he is even excited about a future partnership with the United States.93 In 
other words, the ancien régime must modernize its ideology so as to stay in power, 
because that is what the state needs. Russia’s national interests must be protected. 
Incidentally, implicit in this logic is a classic Russian conservative line of attack on the 
state’s liberal critics—destabilization of the elites is dangerous because national security 
is on the line. By 2003, however, a new emphasis invades Rybas’s biography. Though the 
vast majority of the new edition remains word for word identical to the old one (Rybas 
makes no mention of this, nor of the fact that the name of his co-author is entirely 
missing from the new version), we can also observe some new insertions that have 
particular relevance for the age of Putin’s “managed democracy.” In this edition Stolypin 
is celebrated not only for his bold reformism and his patriotic sensibilities, but also for his 
authoritarian stewardship of a democracy to come.  
To put it briefly, in 2003 Stolypin turns out to have been Putin before Putin. For 
one, he is now approvingly described as a strong leader come to save a country in 
extraordinary times, as predicted “by the father of political science [politologiia], Niccolo 
Machiavelli.”94 In adding this tidbit, Rybas implicitly ties Stolypin to the popular 
historical perception of Machiavelli as the philosopher of political manipulation—the 
quintessential “political technologist [polittekhnolog]” avant la lettre. In the same place, 
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Rybas also adds a detailed description of how Stolypin rigged an election for the first 
time, to the zemstvo in Grodno in 1902. He subverted democratic institutions for a good 
cause, however: “he saw [the election] as risky business, because they [Lithuanians, 
Belorussians and Jews] would have sharpened the national contradictions.” And Stolypin 
was successful in rigging the election because he “looked upon things without 
dogmatism, he thought that new approaches were necessary.” Rybas concludes, thereby, 
that “the youngest governor turned out to be a ripe politician.”95  
Election-rigging for the sake of national harmony remains a centerpiece of 
Stolypin’s political accomplishments, but in Rybas’s view the Reformer’s main form of 
mastery actually had to do with rigging the parliamentary legislative process itself, but 
again for a good cause: a future, more perfect democracy to come. Thus, in a new 
introduction, Rybas notes how  
…it was obvious to Stolypin that the folk peasant masses [narodnaia 
krest’ianskaia massa], having lived through the trials of princely squabbles, the 
Mongolian invasion, the Time of Troubles, the Petrine modernization, justify state 
Power only in the figure of the Tsar-protector. Between the tsar and the people 
there is no mediation, no social pillars—such pillars must be built. One must build 
them, while sharing the tsar’s power.96   
 
On another occasion, we learn that “Stolypin could have repeated Pushkin’s thought that 
‘in Russia the government is the only European.’ In other words, it is the duty of power 
to improve the people’s life, without waiting for demands from the side of the people 
themselves, initiating reforms from the top.”97 At yet another moment, Rybas titles the 
section introducing Stolypin’s rigged Third Duma “A Specter of a New Russia.”98 
Finally, as he concludes his account of Stolypin’s political oeuvre Rybas now adds a 
quote from Rozanov: “Stolypin showed the only possible path for parliamentarianism in 
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Russia. […] Russia absolutely cannot survive parliamentarianism as another chapter in 
the history of trying to mimic the West.” The biographer then appends, “What’s there to 
add to this? Stolypin showed to all Russians, there’s no need to fear the new. There is no 
need to hide only in old traditions. Bravely meet the changes and fight for the good of 
Russia.”99 
In all of the cases of 2003 insertions mentioned above, Stolpyin appears as an 
ideologist of what we might call an interminable transition to democracy. The 
“European” reformist state has to “initiate reforms from the top,” it has to create 
“mediation” and “social pillars,” which will eventually improve the citizenry, presumably 
eventually rendering them European, too.  Stolypin’s rigged parliament is a “specter” of a 
less rigged future parliament. Lastly, with the Rozanov quote, Rybas reassures his readers 
that all of the political machinations are justified by an appeal to the Russian essential 
character, which makes it necessary to temper all democratic advances with a healthy 
dose of authoritarian Sonderweg, so that nothing gets too out of hand.  
Moreover, just as telling as these 2003 insertions are, so too are the various 1991-
era sentiments that Rybas feels are still perfectly appropriate for 2003. The story of 
Stolypin retains its ominous opening: “from a feeling of catastrophe that penetrates our 
society during the days when these words are being written, let us transport ourselves to 
the beginning of the century.”100 As in 1992, the reader of 2003 learns that “Stolypin is 
for us,” because his is a “quiet,” “bloodless revolution.”101 Fears of a “permeating 
catastrophe” and hopes for such a non-revolutionary revolution make perfect sense in 
1991, but how is it possible to continue saying such things in 2003, with minor updates in 
wording (“Perestroika” becomes “post-Soviet,” “twentieth century” becomes “twenty-
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first”102), or to reprint this work four times in subsequent editions, the latest of which was 
issued in 2014? The longevity of Rybas’s state of emergency is the flipside of the Putinist 
ideology of permanent transitionism. Stolypin’s—and Putin’s—manipulation of the 
democratic process on the path of necessary radical reforms is justified precisely by the 
fact that after them comes the flood. Eventually, when present-day extraordinary 
circumstances abate, such manipulative methods will no longer be necessary. In the 
meantime, both Stolypin’s and Putin’s hybrid authoritarianism is authorized precisely in 
the name of an empowered citizenry of the future. And though such a claim might ring 
distinctly more hollow in 2014, after a quarter century of ‘democratic transition,’ it 
nevertheless comprises an essential ideological pillar of Putinism to this day. 
*** 
 Let us now consider the curious Putinist institutional afterlife of Rybas’s book. 
About three years after the publication of the updated biography of Stolypin, sections of 
it end up duplicated almost verbatim in the second volume of a set of educational texts 
published for Putin’s United Russia party, evocatively titled Leaders.103 As I have 
discussed above, late Soviet conservative intelligentsia figures had been socialized into a 
system in which they served as ideological tutors for the state, and given that Rybas 
started out as a late Soviet conservative it is not at all surprising that his work would end 
up in post-Soviet state party materials. What is more interesting is the way in which the 
book contextualizes Rybas’s Stolypin as paragon of Russian conservatism writ large. In 
short, we can view United Russia’s educational edition as a case of nomenklatura talking 
back and showing the extent to which they have been able to incorporate the rhetoric of 
Stolypinism into their core ideology. 
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 In terms of direct influence, Leaders follows Rybas to a tee: the book’s chapter on 
Stolypin is a redux hagiography, complete with all of the inaccuracies originally 
introduced into Stolypin’s biographical myth by Solzhenitsyn in the 1970s and absorbed 
by Rybas in 1991.104 Moreover, occasionally Leaders describes Stolypin with almost 
verbatim repetitions of Rybas’s wording.105 The text also makes sure to mention Rybas’s 
1991 book as a source in its very short bibliography.106 However, beyond the substance 
of this rendition of his near-saintly vita, Leaders through its very structure also makes 
important modifications of Stolypin’s myth. Most importantly, Stolypin is placed as one 
of many world historical conservative figures from whom the good party members of 
United Russia are supposed to learn. 
Leaders, like Putinist state rhetoric in general, flaunts its enlightened 
cosmopolitan consciousness. For instance, the chapter on Stolypin is preceded by 
chapters on Ivan III, Cardinal Richelieu, Mikhail Speransky and Teddy Roosevelt. In this 
way, Stolypin joins a whole pantheon of brilliant Western or Western-minded 
conservative politicians. The book’s introduction, “To be a Conservative,” written by a 
certain Dmitrii Orlov, Ph.D [kandidat istoricheskikh nauk], achieves a similar effect by 
demonstratively citing Karl Popper, Alvin Toffler and Michael Oakeshott, as well as 
many other Western figures. The point of this approach is to emphasize the Western bona 
fides of contemporary Russian conservatism. One may compare the content of Leaders 
with Putin’s rhetoric regarding Europe. Consider, for instance, a collection of Putin’s 
thoughts in the collected volume Sovereignty, published by an imprint with the rather 
telling name “Europe” [Evropa] in 2006. There too, the President insists that “Russia 
was, is and will of course remain Europe’s largest nation. […] For over three hundred 
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years we have traveled hand in hand with other European nations, […] towards [various] 
social milestones. I repeat, we did all of this together, sometimes lagging behind but 
sometimes also moving ahead of European standards.”107 The reason for this emphasis on 
Europeanness has to do with trying to defang the traditional turf of Russian anti-despotic 
liberals as the “Westernizers.” Putin wants to insist on an alternate, conservatively-
inflected, but just as illustrious Western modernity project, in which Russia’s greatest 
statesmen have always participated. Stolypin, with his capitalist reforms, is a perfect 
example of such a statesman—which is why quotes of Stolypin predominate in Orlov’s 
semi-scholarly celebration of the conservative disposition. 
Orlov singles out a number of defining themes of international conservatism: it is 
undogmatic, realistic, modernizing, statist, stable, and anti-revolutionary. In all cases, 
Stolypin provides the necessary background music with his most famous aphorisms, such 
as “you desire grand tribulations, while we desire a grand Russia.” At the same time, 
Orlov’s rendering of conservatism with an emphasis on Stolypin also reveals the 
structuring paranoia of Putinism—that eventually, this permanently transitionist regime 
will have to give way to something else. This paranoia invades Putinsism thanks to the 
political consciousness of the late Soviet ‘middle class’—the tension between a desire for 
social transformation and a fear of social upheaval. Stolypinism is a natural outgrowth of 
that consciousness. Hence, Orlov’s Stolypinist conservatism is always subtly aware of its 
own insufficiency: one has to “make optimal decisions in far from ideal circumstances,” 
Orlov laments. Or, channeling the words of Stolypin, one has to “try to use an old musket 
well.” “The main principle of a Russian conservative,” Orlov continues, “is ‘do no harm.’ 
Security, stability of the social system are far more important to a conservative politician 
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than the success if this or that reform.” 108  
 Social upheaval inevitably will come after Stolypin/Putin, and that is a good 
reason to slow down the transition as much as possible. At the same time, however, the 
revolutionary telos is also a symbol of the eventual inevitability of the demise of the 
regime. By virtue of the constant presence of Russia’s historical memory, the 
conservative Russian state is always living in the end times. For that reason, Putinist 
Russia discursively can never actually reach ‘normalcy,’ even though a desire for 
‘normalcy’ lies at the root of the post-Soviet state. This sensibility is consistent with the 
logic of Putinism as it has been rendered by Sergei Prozorov: it both makes permanent 
Yeltsin’s “transition from nowhere to nowhere,” and it also makes permanent a 
“ceaseless trepidation before the specter” of the potential revolutionary event.109 
To sum up: within the articulation of Stolypinism as the core ideology of the post-
Soviet state we can see the following internal monologue: ‘on the one hand, we want to 
conserve the existing hierarchy; on the other hand, we cannot but be aware that this order 
is dubious, given that it arose out of a delegitimated late Soviet regime and also that it 
willy-nilly prevailed through the “great criminal revolution” of the 1990s. To justify this 
incongruity between our conservative desires and the deplorable object of conservation, 
we insist that stability is always better than revolution. But this justification holds only as 
long as we can pretend to be competent managers and as long as we continue to speak in 
the language of democratization—hence our insistence that “Russia is a country that 
chose democracy for itself.”110 But to sound like democrats, we also have to make it look 
like power is slowly but surely trickling down from our authoritarian hands, even as the 
moment of democratic plenitude is perpetually deferred, in the interests of national 
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security broadly defined.’ 
The example of Stolypin is particularly well suited for the self-concept of the 
contemporary Russian state. He is the consummate proto-Putinist “sovereign democrat” 
who puts an illegitimate regime on the path of reform, acknowledges the need to share 
power with the masses, but at the same time masterfully obfuscates the political process 
by first rigging the parliament and then ignoring it. All along, Stolypin claims to adhere 
scrupulously to the letter of the law and also insists that he is maneuvering for the sake of 
a more democratic regime to come—at some future date when Russia will no longer have 
to stave off revolution, which is nevertheless always just around the corner. As such, 
Stolypin embodies the concept of activist conservatism that Solzhenitsyn, who launched 
his modern-day cult, tried to convince Soviet leaders to adopt in the 1970s. In this light, it 
is not surprising that when laying a wreath on Solzhenitsyn’s grave in 2009 Putin would 
express his admiration for the late Soviet dissident writer as a “consistent state-minded 
man [gosudarstvennik].”111 
Stolypinism is to this day legitimated by the urbanized educated masses’ elitist 
self-perception. This feeling is perfectly reflected in Orlov’s statement in Leaders, that  
…The political platform of the United Russia party is based on an understanding 
of social reforms as gradual transformations, carried out democratically. A 
longterm, multifaceted modernization of the country with support from a 
responsible national coalition, that should include within itself the majority of the 
population—such is the future of Russian conservatism and national conservative 
leadership as we see it.112 
 
Aside from de rigueur claims of “majority population” support, the key Putinist 
stakeholder here is a “responsible [otvetstvennuiu] national coalition” which supports 
“multifaceted modernization.” As such, this stakeholder is indistinguishable from 
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Kommersant’s “well-to-do, […] politically-involved, […] business-involved people” who 
appear in Russia “alongside the development of capitalism.”113  
At some point in the last few years—most emphatically after the 2011-2012 mass 
protests against Putin’s third term—the picture of pro-Putinist consensus among all of the 
‘responsible capitalists/democrats’ has begun to crack. It was also at this point that 
Putin’s old tried-and-true rhetoric of “sovereign democracy” began to coexist in the 
public sphere with other, more reactionary (but also late-Imperial-inflected) ideologies of 
power, such as Alexander Dugin’s Eurasianism. However, at the end of the day Putin’s 
shift to Dugin is quite limited. Most recently, for example, it is rather telling that the 
‘systemic liberals’ who were invited in early 2017 to formulate a path out of Russia’s 
economic crisis came from a think-tank called the Stolypin Club.114 Given the regime’s 
origin and its continued existence, Stolypinism is far more organic for Putin than 
Eurasianism—a fact that Dugin himself has acknowledged with resignation.115 The 
enduring affectation for the late tsarist prime minister indicates the extent to which Putin 
and his bureaucrats are fully aware that theirs is a “hybrid regime” that uncomfortably 
combines authoritarianism and democracy, to use Ekaterina Schulmann’s influential 
characterization.116 Which means that the central ideological task for Russian elites today 
is to defuse the historical imaginary that continues to legitimate the very idea of 






V. Late Imperial Cinema for the Post-Soviet Narod 
“Not-cola for Nikola [Ne-kola dlia Nikoly].” 
 
Fictional Russian nationalist ad for Sprite117 
 
 
 In each example of contemporary Russian conservative discourse discussed 
above, the target audience has been presumed to think of itself as elites—they are the 
aristocratic “we” of Govorukhin, the “we” of Peresvet, the “politically-involved people” 
of Kommersant, the normal, convenience-seeking, retro-loving Muscovites of Luzhkov, 
and, lastly, the “responsible national coalition” of Putin’s United Russia. In every 
instance, either implicitly or explicitly, this target audience exists in opposition to, or at 
the very least in distinction from, an imagined narod. At worst, as in the case of 
Govorukhin, this populace is imagined as a horde of drunk lumpen masses with 
pitchforks. As we have already stated, this imaginary bifurcation of elites vs narod 
obfuscated post-Soviet politics and was ridden with dangerous implications. For instance, 
in the 1990s Ziuganov’s Communist Party was inverting the polarities on the elitist 
discourse and speaking on behalf of the narod being slighted by the elites, and the only 
reason the Communists never came to power was because the ‘democrats’ cheated. The 
explosive potential of a populace being interpellated in this way had to be contained. 
Moreover, by the late 1990s the ideology of “the upper hundred thousand” was no longer 
as effective either, since by now there were too many losers and too few winners in post-
Soviet capitalism. In short, the Yeltsinist story of “us” uniting against the nominal 
commu-nazis was becoming less and less electorally and politically convincing. 
Naturally, both of these pressures caused the post-Soviet state to look for other, 
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more inclusive and sociologically adequate ways of imagining its constituents. To that 
effect, the state could re-examine the Late Soviet discursive practices regarding the 
narod. As discussed in Chapter One, in the late 1960s Grigorii Pomerants reimagined the 
urbanized educated masses as the new narod and a junior partner for the new 
intelligentsia liberals. Solzhenitsyn, leaning on traditional Russian conservative 
Slavophile discourse, angrily resisted Pomerants’s post-industrial conceptualization of 
the masses. Whether they knew it or not, late Soviet liberals adopted Pomerants’s 
redefinition—they had to do so, because their whole articulation of political and cultural 
power depended on the size of their audience. Moreover, as I argued Chapter Two the 
conservative-minded filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov also accepted Pomerants’s terms, 
which is why his films enjoyed mass success, despite their subtly conservative nationalist 
messaging. It was again Nikita Mikhalkov who in the 1990s managed to satisfy the 
Russian state’s desire to speak to the populace more effectively. The last section of the 
current chapter will examine how Mikhalkov’s 1999 blockbuster, The Barber of Siberia 
fulfilled the ideological needs of the post-Soviet state.  
Around the time of his 1996 reelection Yeltsin launched a somewhat bizarre-
sounding project—a search for Russia’s national idea.118 In truth, Yeltsin was trying to 
come up with a more convincing mass communicative strategy, and as such, this was by 
no means a new challenge for the Russian state. Since the 1830s Imperial Russian 
ideologists appealed to some notion of narod as an organic, ethnonational base of support 
for the autocracy.119 A revamped version of the same notion resurfaced in Soviet rhetoric, 
especially during World War II, when, to quote Solzhenitsyn, “Stalin […] unveiled the 
old Russian banner, partly even Orthodox vestments [khorugv’], and we won!”120 The 
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1990s, however, were different. After all, the dominant discourse on social reality that led 
to the formation the post-Soviet state claimed to be “anti-ideological.” Post-Soviet 
Russians were all supposed to get on with their normal, and hopefully increasingly 
convenient lives and, as the libertarian fantasy went, the state would just get out of the 
way. Moreover, this discourse also tracked with the logic of late-twentieth-century 
consumer capitalism, in which mass ideologies have to be “hidden.”121 So, the post-
Soviet Russian state had to re-learn how to do an old trick in the new context—how could 
the Russian narod still be conceived of as a maximally inclusive, loyal collective, given 
the advent of a post-communist democracy and consumer capitalism? 
In truth, aspects of this problem were already being solved during the late Soviet 
era, through a discourse on the Russian high cultural canon, elaborated in a partnership 
between the state and the intelligentsia. Canonical culture had already been revived by 
Stalin in the 1930s, but after his death, in the age of late Soviet television and mass-
culture it began to play a different role. Chapters One and Two of this dissertation have 
shown how mass cultural producers like El’dar Riazanov and Mikhalkov became 
successful by selling canonical Russian culture as an appealing, Gestalt fantasy image to 
an urbanized mass audience (as opposed to the mostly imaginary peasants and former 
peasants supposedly reading the Village Prose oeuvre). In the post-Soviet era this vector 
would intensify through various marketing campaigns, such as the ones behind Peresvet, 
Bank Imperial and Kommersant. Moreover, we have also discussed how a fantasy image 
of the pre-Soviet era became a cornerstone aesthetic ideology of post-Soviet urban 
planning projects, all of which were designed to render a plausible capitalist lifeworld. 
And even beyond such ‘elite’ products as Kommersant and Moscow architectural 
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revivals, post-Soviet Russian capitalism also tried to involve the Russian populace as 
much as possible in the consumption of ethnonational fantasies. Russians, regardless of 
their self-perceived cultural or economic social status, were invited to both recognize 
themselves as the narod and also to participate in the Russian capitalist market by 
enjoying products like Pelevin’s satirical soft drink, “Not-Cola for Nikola [Ne-kola dlia 
Nikoly].”122 In that particular case, life actually ended up plagiarizing art—in 2005, the 
company Deka hit the motherlode by manufacturing a kvas (Russian root beer) called 
Nikola, and actually marketed it with Pelevin’s slogan (“Kvas is no cola, drink Nikola 
[kvas ne kola, pei Nikolu]”).123 
If the post-Soviet state was to be successful in its plan to consolidate the Russian 
narod around some revamped notion of the “Russian national idea,” it would have to take 
the above-mentioned developments to heart. Thinking of Russians as Orthodox peasants 
was not going to work. Recognizing them as urbanized consumers of mass culture and 
marketing campaigns would work. Thinking of the “Russian national idea” as a “set of 
principles capable of inspiring Russian citizens to unite as a nation” was also not going to 
work.124 After the fall of the Soviet project, grand narratives were out of style and the 
state would have to figure out a more subtle, less narratively flagrant way of promoting 
an imaginary of its loyal populace. In this regard, Russian leaders like Yeltsin were 
mostly clueless, but there was one conservative-minded figure near the state who was 
well-positioned to articulate the message in a plausible way—the filmmaker Mikhalkov. 
Stephen Norris has suggested that the effective winner of Yeltsin’s “national 
idea” competition was Mikhalkov, with his 1999 epic blockbuster The Barber of 
Siberia.125 This film was a success on many levels. It was an actual “blockbuster,” which 
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is to say that Mikhalkov actually managed to make a Russian movie that many people 
went go see at the theaters—an almost singular event during this decade (the other true 
blockbuster Norris mentions from the 1990s is Aleksei Balabanov’s Brother).126 
Mikhalkov’s film was also produced and marketed with the most advanced Hollywood 
technologies available, as well as the most recent ‘technologies’ of Russian post-Soviet 
capitalism—the filmmaker not only used the best Kodak stock and Dolby sound, but also 
availed himself of marquee projects from Luzhkov’s reconstructed Moscow, such as the 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the Iberian Gates (see Figure 23, below). He even 
asked Yeltsin to shut off the ruby red stars atop the Kremlin, a legacy of Soviet state 
symbols, for a night of filming. Additionally, Mikhalkov displayed his Western cross-
marketing mettle by promoting the film together with a whole set of “Brand ‘Russia’”  
	
Figure	23:	Casual	nineteenth-century	life	goes	on	around	Luzhkov’s	newly	reconstructed	Iberian	Gates 
products, including the vodka Russian Standard, as well as two perfumes, “Cadet No. 1” 
and “Cadet No. 3.” Mikhalkov then managed to have the premiere take place in the 
Kremlin, where bitter political rivals happily lavished praise on his picture, granting 
Barber an aura of collective unification. Finally, Mikhalkov used the making of Barber 
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to launch a whole era of state-funded Russian epic blockbusters.  
As Norris notes, Mikhalov wanted to say that “Russians should feel proud of their 
past and of their homeland,” and it is true also that, to quote one of Norris’s surveyed 
critics, “Mikhalkov was able to do what Govorukhin had tried to do before: bring back 
the ‘Russia we lost.’”127 But how did these feelings of “pride” and collective nostalgia 
invite a more extensive mass buy-in than the elitist message of Govorukhin? Why did 
Mikhalkov’s nostalgic collectivity appear as broader, as more socially inclusive than the 
elitist “we” of Russian homo faber discourse, a fact that liberal film critics felt keenly and 
decried?128 In short, what was the nation-stitching ‘message’ of Mikhalkov’s Barber, and 
how did it side-step the problem of having to speak to the nation in an age when national 
messages were passé? To get at the collective communicative strategy of Barber one has 
to keep in mind that ‘the medium is the message’ of this film. Or to put it another way, 
Barber’s means of production is a central part of the narrative through which the film 
speaks to the post-Soviet Russian public.  
The basic storyline, set during the reign of Alexander III (briefly played by 
Mikhalkov himself), involves Jane Callahan (Julia Ormond), a beautiful American 
woman who comes to Russia to help her shady and somewhat deranged business partner 
McCracken fundraise for the construction of his steam-powered tree-chopping machine, 
called ‘The Barber of Siberia.” Accidentally, Jane meets the junior officer in training 
(junker) Andrei Tolstoi (Oleg Menshikov). Jane likes Andrei, but at the same time uses 
their chance encounter to get ahead in her business venture by gaining an audience with 
General Radlov, the commander in charge of Andrei’s military academy. Jane is willing 
to let Radlov court her, so that she can secure money for McCracken, who is pretending 
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to be her father. In the process, Andrei ends up upstaging Radlov’s advances and 
proposes to Jane himself. Jane is taken aback, because she never expected this decent 
young man to fall in love with her—after all, not only she is an American swindler, she is 
also apparently a prostitute. Andrei, however, is unswayed by Jane’s confession on both 
counts and during an emotional sex scene Jane accepts his proposal. But even after this, 
Jane thinks she can have her cake and eat it. She continues her long game with Radlov, 
infuriating Andrei. Everything comes to a head at a performance of Mozart’s Marriage of 
Figaro at Radlov’s academy. Andrei, who plays the leading role in the student opera, 
interrupts the act, rushes across several audience rows and whips Radlov with a violin 
bow. Radlov claims the whole thing to have been a terrorist attempt on the life of a Grand 
Prince and Andrei gives a false confession to this effect, out of vague and unexplained 
feelings of honor. As a result, Andrei gets sent off to Siberia, while Jane secures the 
money for McCracken’s machine. In the last scene of the film, Jane makes her way to 
Siberia to find Andrei about a decade later, where she discovers that he is now a 
humdrum barber, married with children from his peasant maid. Jane departs and 
presumably another decade later writes a long letter to her son Andrew about who his real 
father is. The process of Jane’s letter-writing, as well as Andrew’s bizarre extended 
confrontation with his US Army drill sergeant, “Mad Dog” over the cultural worth of 
Mozart, takes place as a parallel storyline to Jane’s exploits in Moscow. In the end of the 
film, we see how Andrew prevails over his dull-witted drill sergeant. Upon learning of 
his Russian ancestry Mad Dog declares, “that explains a lot.” This also happens to be the 
promotional tagline of the film. 
Through its plot, Barber expresses the feeling of perceiving one’s self as 
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subaltern to Western progress, falling in love with the West, then being disappointed that 
the romance is unrequited, and then also magically ‘winning’ the encounter. Russia is the 
object of McCracken’s maniacal desire for wealth, to be achieved through mass 
deforestation. Jane is a beautiful cultured Western woman on the outside and an 
American liar and whore on the inside. She fails to make a choice between love and 
business and then spends the next two decades suffering pangs of remorse. In the end, 
Russia definitely ‘wins’ on two counts—Andrei has turned into a wholesome sibiriak, 
while the uncouth and utilitarian American sergeant Mad Dog has been cowed by 
Andrei’s biological son. But most importantly, Russia also wins on a third count—that 
the whole story has been told through a mastery of Western technology, Western digital 
aesthetics, Western actors, and Western capitalist marketing. Mikhalkov raises so much 
money for the film that he can make a bona fide Western movie star play the defeated 
and guilt-ridden American hooker. He can use expensive Hollywood techniques to render 
a stunning, authentic-looking fantasy of Moscow from the age of ‘invented traditions.’ 
He can even make all of the Russian actors speak English, despite the fact that neither 
them, nor the characters whom they play (nineteenth-century Russian aristocrats) are or 
were ever fluent in this language.  
Altogether, Barber’s ultimate message for the masses is, ‘we can spend lots of 
money like the Americans, we can make movies as well as the Americans, we can speak 
English as well as the Americans, we can market our patriotism as well as the Americans, 
and we can even hire expensive Hollywood actors who will tell us that we are better than 
them, as long as we pay them enough.’ 129 This is precisely why Jane spends so much 
time extolling Russia’s trans-rational essence, its oddities of character, its extreme 
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commitment to values of honor, self-sacrifice, “laws of the heart,” and so forth. She is an 
authentic inauthentic Westerner, here to tell us how authentic we are.  
How does the presumed “we” of Mikhalkov compare to the “we” of Govorukhin? 
In subject matter, there is certainly a good deal of elitism in Mikhalkov’s film. For that 
matter, Mikhalkov himself, as a blue-blooded aristocrat and the director of Barber and 
the creator of post-Soviet Russia’s first commercially successful independent movie 
studio (Tri-T) embodies the image of the ideal post-Soviet Stolypinist homo faber. But as 
a mass-market filmmaker, Mikhalkov does not really direct his work to this elitist 
audience. In fact, his Barber works precisely by not asking its audience to think of itself 
as either ‘intelligentsia’ or ‘narod.’ If anything, the political imaginary of this film is 
supposed to break along the lines of Russian vs Western—but here too, it is not so much 
opposition to the West or distinction from it, as it is a fantasy of incorporation of it that 
propels the film’s message. Basically, the Russia of Barber is the epitome of Pelevin’s 
“Not-Cola for Nikola.” It is a desirable consumer product, generated by post-Soviet, 
recognizably Western capitalist means of production, to be consumed by someone who 
wants to satisfy two desires at once: a desire for national authenticity and a desire to 
enjoy a quality Western consumer product.  
The consumers of Mikhalkov’s “Not-Cola” are able to unite not along some 
vague sociological lines, but as a nation-wide audience that really enjoys this product, 
whose specific contents are infinitely variable. In The Barber of Siberia, “Russia” is a 
beautiful tsar, gorgeous state pageantry, honorable junkers, good vodka, vibrant folk 
traditions, glittering buildings. Russia is also “Russian Standard,” “Junker No. 1” and 
“Junker No. 3” perfume. Russia is Siberia, Russia is moments of greatness from Russian 
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history, and so forth. Over a decade later, Ilya Kalinin would describe the mature Putinist 
ideology of Russianness as а 
a patriotic collage composed of […] elements of all ideologies, various versions 
of history, and ruinized fragments of various epochs, which can be found just as 
equally in the forests of Mordovia as in the swamps of the Northwest, on the 
bottom of the Black Sea and in the steppes of the Southern Urals. An 
administrative unity of territory and shared land—or more specifically the cultural 
layers buried in it—supply this ‘unity in multiplicity’ that the official discourse of 
the national idea searches out. The long-sought applied dialectic, which would 
make peace between unity and difference, is finally discovered in the past, which 
has been turned into a museum, an Еxhibition of the Achievements of the 
National Economy [VDNKh].130 
	
Reading Kalinin’s description of mature Putin-era patriotism, it is clear that Mikhalkov 
formulated these principles about fourteen years before the fact. He actually showed the 
state how to do it, and Putin happily obliged.  
As Norris points out, in the wake of Barber Putin (who soon became president) 
was happy to maintain and expand the Patriotic Cinema Fund, thus formalizing the 
national funding arrangements that Mikhalkov had had to seek out on his own. Putin was 
also happy to adopt the rhetoric of Russia being “more European than Europe,” so 
prominently featured in Mikhalkov’s film.131 And Putin was also happy to downplay in 
official discourse the logic of politicized collective identities like “intelligentsia” and 
“narod,” adopting instead a notion of all-inclusive inter-ethnic Russian narodnost–as–
culture, which would allow membership for everyone who speaks Russian and likes 
Russian things.132  The extent to which the basic principles of post-Soviet Russian 
patriotic messaging suggested by Mikhalkov have entered the state’s essential ideological 
arsenal can be judged by Putinism’s capstone aesthetic project: the 2014 Russian Winter 
Olympics in Sochi. Its opening ceremony starts with “ABC’s” of Russian greatness, in 
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which a little girl has a dream that starts with her naming cliché Russian items in the 
order of the Russian alphabet, and then continues as a series of extremely expensive-
looking, beautifully choreographed set pieces. Each set piece displays in grand fashion as 
many myths of Russian greatness as possible—from a fairytale Ancient Rus, to illustrious 
Imperial Russia, to glorious Soviet industrialization, to the Space Age. In addition, the 
creators of the ceremony try to reference as many internationally-acclaimed “Brand 
Russia” products as possible, including Stravinsky, Ballet Russe, the Polovetsian Dances 
of Prince Igor, Malevich, Kandinsky and constructivism, among other things. Moreover, 
the Olympics provided a perfect opportunity to introduce an element of ‘Jane Callahan’ 
in real life: the entire arena is packed to the brim with a captive audience of exhilarated 
Westerners.  And lastly, perhaps in gratitude to their intellectual forefather, the organizers 
included Mikhalkov himself in the Olympics (see Figure 24, below), both as an extra in 






This chapter has tracked the ways in which the pre-Soviet past came to inform the 
discursive field of the post-Soviet Russian state and its stakeholders. I first showed how 
the anti-Soviet politics and elitist sensibilities of the Yeltsin coalition led a filmmaker like 
Govorukhin to idealize the late Imperial era as a time of Russia’s interrupted alternate 
conservative modernity. I then showed how a similar conception of this past, pitched to 
the same audience, informed the playful advertising campaigns of financial firms like 
Peresvet and Bank Imperial. The case of Kommersant revealed the extent to which late 
Imperial categories of the political imaginary, like “the upper hundred thousand” were 
used to forge a dubious political consensus among the ‘democrats’ who supported Yeltsin 
in the 1990s and Putin in the 2000s. Section III discussed how Yeltsin’s and Luzhkov’s 
reconstructionist activities would create an aesthetic consensus among the ‘democrats,’ 
by orchestrating the fantasy of a ‘normal’ capitalist lifeworld powered by Imperial retro. 
Section IV examined the way in which a Stolypinist ideology and a late Imperial 
historical consciousness made it possible for late Soviet nomenklatura to transform 
themselves into respectable post-Soviet activist conservatives, engaged in the task of 
permanent modernization of Russia towards a permanently deferred democracy to come, 
with a permanently looming threat of political cataclysm on the horizon. And the last 
section showed how late Imperial aesthetics could undergo Mikhalkov’s slick Hollywood 
treatment and become the cornerstone of a mass consumerist patriotic ideology. 
Mikhalkov’s Barber of Siberia places the prevalent imaginary sociopolitical notions like 
“intelligentsia” and “narod” in abeyance, and instead peddles a more universal Russian 
cultural consensus about the enduring worth of an endlessly expanding collage of 
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appealing objects from the past, combined with contemporary fantasies of a successful, 
“European” Russian present. The elitism we first observed in Govorukhin, to which 
Mikhalkov surely subscribes, is not by any means cancelled out by Barber—rather, it 
becomes a source of demiurgic power for the filmmaker, who completely masters post-
Soviet capitalist ‘means of production’ and thus renders a product that everyone can 
enjoy. The Putin state then cultivates the same kind of mastery, and demonstrates it 
particularly well during the 2014 Sochi Olympics—the ultimate “Not-Cola” product for 
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Chapter Four 
The Russia That They Have Lost: 
The Rise of Post-Soviet Liberal Counter-Discourse on the Imperial Past 
 
 
The previous chapter started out in Perestroika era and showed how a historical 
imaginary of the pre-Soviet past served as the crux behind the ‘homo faber’ form of anti-
Soviet discourse, which made common cause with Yeltsin’s victory and then legitimated 
the rise of the post-Soviet power elites. Even before the advent of Putin the discourse of 
the homo faber, as well as the historical imaginary underpinning it, served a conservative 
function—namely, it provided cultural justification for the rather undemocratic means 
through which the post-Soviet hierarchy sought to protect itself from potential political 
renegotiation. The post-Soviet state and a substantial part of its ostensibly ‘democratic’ 
constituency together made the argument that the nascent Russian political and economic 
order, warts and all, was the only kind of regime that would allow Russia’s enlightened, 
reform-minded, productive “upper hundred thousand” to survive the ever-looming 
onslaught of an uncountable, malevolent ‘red-brown,’ ‘lumpen’ horde. The major 
question for this last chapter of dissertation is: did a counter-discourse to the one of the 
homo faber also take shape, both during Perestroika and the ensuing post-Soviet era? Or, 
to put it another way, did the history and memory of the pre-Soviet past among the late 
Soviet mass technical intelligentsia that brought Yeltisn and then Putin to power have to 
end up as neo-Stolypinism—understood as a combination of market capitalism, elitism, a 
kind of libertarian comportment, and resistance to the ever-looming threat of revolution? 
Was it possible to extract some other value system from the pre-Soviet past as it was 
recalled by the intelligentsia figures who shaped the post-Soviet order? Is it possible to 
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reconstruct a critique of post-Soviet power, with origins in the same textual tradition and 
social conjuncture as the one underpinning the discourse of the homo faber? Finally, to 
what degree has such a counter-discourse shaped the increasingly distinct and 
empowered opposition to the Putinist social settlement? 
To begin answering these questions, let us briefly return to the dynamic described 
in Chapter One, in which the late Soviet liberal intelligentsia championed Russia’s pre-
Soviet past in the struggle for de-Stalinization. With all due caveats, my dissertation 
accepts that this really was a liberal humanist story. Akhmatova’s early-Thaw defense of 
the principle that literary masters and literary traditions going back to the Russian 
Imperial era should determine the quality of literary writing independently of the state 
was a structurally liberal position. Thinkers like Pomerants and Lotman thought about the 
possibility of inheriting eternally noble humanist values from the pre-Soviet 
intelligentsia. Cultural producers like Eidel’man and Okudzhava forged proto-political 
audiences among the late Soviet urbanized, educated masses. Their works and 
performances enunciated both the cultural values of Imperial humanist noblemen, and 
also lent support to liberal political notions like legalism and possibly parliamentarism. 
Moreover, due to Soviet censorship constraints, all of these liberal ideas were often 
expressed through the language of historical allegory. This idiom could easily make its 
users sound elitist—after all, positioning one’s self as a rightful heir to the high culture of 
Imperial-era nobility would mean thinking of one’s self as a kind of neo-aristocrat. The 
Soviet liberals themselves, however, usually imagined their ‘nobility’ as one of humanist 
virtue, such that anyone could become a member of the group by reading the right books 
and thinking the right thoughts. Moreover, this virtue was becoming more and more 
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accessible for the wider public, thanks to the post-War expansion of higher education, as 
well as the efforts of mass culture filmmakers, such as Motyl,’ Riazanov, Bondarchuk 
and Mikhalkov, all of whom contributed to turning the pre-Soviet Russian cultural and 
canonical heritage into an appealing consumer product. 
As we recall, in his argument with Solzhenitsyn Grigorii Pomerants characterized 
Soviet liberal intellectuals’ mission in terms of communication with the ‘new narod’—
the educated ‘technical intelligentsia’ class that was now a mass bearer of liberal 
humanist cultural values and that was on the road to assuming political power in Soviet 
society. As far as the political valence of this group went, it was oppositional vis-à-vis the 
Soviet status quo, but the specific direction of that opposition was not pre-determined at 
the outset. There was consensus among the liberals that existing Soviet power hierarchies 
were morally and operationally rotten, especially given that they had gone largely 
unreformed since the post-War late Stalin years. Liberal anti-Stalinism was, above all, a 
discourse aimed at wresting power from those hierarchies and putting a stop to their 
obstruction of justice, their repressions against innocent people, their anti-Semitic and 
otherwise xenophobic practices, and their limits on free political speech. However, Soviet 
liberal discourse was not categorically opposed to Soviet socialist ideology as a whole, 
and there was no inherent reason why the anti-Stalinist commitments of the liberals had 
to transcode into the homo faber libertarian capitalist value system that prevailed 
politically in the 1990s. Moreover, when the transcoding did take place, a critique of it 
also emerged. In this chapter’s first section, we will observe one moment of this critique 
by examining the game show What? Where? When? and the short story “The Queen of 
Spades” by Ludmila Ulitskaya—two cultural products of the 1990s that tried to navigate 
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through the debate on high culture, humanist values and capitalist enticements that was 
taking place in the liberal public sphere during Perestroika and the post-Soviet era. 
Subsequently, we will consider Pelevin’s post-Soviet critique of the elitist ‘speaking 
subject’ that in the 1990s was enunciating the homo faber discourse of the era. In the 
third section, we will discuss a subtle critique of inheritance of the Russian Revolution as 
the historical horizon of the pre-Soviet intelligentsia in Boris Akunin’s “political 
detective” novel, The State Councilor. Lastly, I will close the chapter with a reading of 
two post-2000 films—Alexander Sokurov’s Russian Ark and Leonid Parfenov’s A Nation 
in Bloom, both of which approach the Imperial era as culture to be preserved, rather than 
inherited. This tweak, I conclude, offers the possibility of a more consistently liberal 

















I. Our Whole Life is a Game: 
The Queen of Spades and the Antinomy of Post-Soviet Liberal Capitalism 
 
The Queen of Spades symbolizes secret malevolence. 
 
Alexander Pushkin, “The Queen of Spades”1 
 
In 2002, the writer and prominent post-Soviet liberal figure Tatyana Tolstaya 
penned an essay titled “Merchants and Writers.” Her text starts off with the lament that 
“Russian literature is scared of dealing with the subject of money.”2 The essay then goes 
on to list several abortive attempts in Russian classics to describe an appealing, honest, 
entrepreneurial individual. The list of failed capitalists includes Tolstoy’s Levin, 
Chekhov’s Lopakin, Goncharov’s Stolz, and just about all of Ostrovsky. And Tolstaya’s 
solution to this anti-bourgeois problem of the Russian cultural canon is simple—to write 
a new literature that will celebrate the capitalist can-do spirit. Thus, Tolstaya decided to 
run a literary contest, inviting authors to submit “interesting, funny, and empathetic short 
stories about entrepreneurs.”3 The results of the contest, however, were uninspiring—
apparently, Tolstaya mostly ended up receiving soft-core pornography involving oil 
tycoons. Almost a decade earlier, in 1993 The author Viktor Pelevin had penned an essay 
entitled, “John Fowles and the Tragedy of Russian Liberalism,” which dealt with a 
similar issue. Pelevin, too, pointed out Chekhov’s Lopakhin as the closest thing to a 
respectable bourgeois hero in Russian letters. But for Pelevin, it was clear that the 
morally preferable protagonist of Chekhov’s play is Raneveskaya and her “cherry 
orchard,” which for him symbolizes a steadfast refusal to engage “in the battle for money 
or for social status as a worthwhile life goal.”4 Pelevin’s essay does not entirely ignore 
Tolstaya’s concerns—it acknowledges that the age of the “cherry orchard” may finally be 
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over in Russia, that “a change of climate” has taken place, and that Russia’s post-Soviet 
future might very well depend on the entrepreneurial homo faber like Lopakhin. 
However, Pelevin is far more cautious about this possibility than Tolstaya: 
…the whole misfortune lies in that fact that the former place of [Ranevskaya and 
her cherry orchard] is being taken up not by a productive homo faber, but by some 
shady criminal goodfellas, who can be mistaken for a middle class only after a 
fifth pint of vodka. Moreover, the majority of present-day antagonists of [the 
cherry orchard] simply find it impossible to understand that the petty bourgeois 
ethos— especially the self-celebratory kind— has not become any less banal as a 
result of the fall of Marxism.5 
 
For Pelevin, a new Russian virtuous entrepreneur may be necessary, but his creation is 
nothing to cheerlead. Pelevin, unlike Tolstaya, does not see the celebration of “the petty 
bourgeois ethos” as a morally appropriate task for the Russian intelligentsia. 
Furthermore, he is rather skeptical about those who would present themselves as this new 
homo faber class in the first place. 
 The fundamental problem being articulated both by Tolstaya and Pelevin is that 
homo faber values and Russian canonical high culture do not easily mix. The imperial-era 
humanist intelligentsia figures who forged the Russian cultural canon were more or less 
united by an anxiety about capitalism and Western bourgeois mores. A century later, the 
Soviet individuals who called themselves the ‘liberal intelligentsia’ presided over a social 
transformation in which the homo faber acquisitive bourgeois ethos became the 
discursive foundation of anti-Soviet politics and the subsequent post-Soviet political 
regime. Chapter Three showed how figures like Govorukhin deployed their own version 
of the pre-Soviet past to support their homo faber sensibilities; however, the source for 
this recollection was not Russian canonical literature. The preeminent pre-Soviet hero of 
the new Russian “upper hundred thousand” was Stolypin, not Chekhov’s heroes. 
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Similarly, politicians like Yeltsin and Luzhkov backed restorative projects that focused 
on pre-Soviet material culture, rather than classic Russian thought. In that regard, we 
might also mention that the favorite philosophers of conservative anti-Soviet dissidents, 
such as Solzhenitsyn and contemporary power elites, such as Putin himself have almost 
always been White émigré figures, such as Nicholas Berdiaev and Ivan Il’in, who drew 
their lineage from the conservative fin-de-siècle publication Vekhi, which was outside of 
the Imperial-era intellectual mainstream. Though today the members of Vekhi are often 
mentioned in Russian cultural discourse, they still remain on the fringes of the long-
nineteenth-century canon. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter One, it was precisely the 
liberal humanist canon that had served as the idiom of anti-Soviet resistance among the 
mainstream of the late Soviet mass intelligentsia. Did all of that heritage simply get 
bulldozed by the Yeltsinist transition or did it have a role to play in critiquing the 
victorious anti-Soviet democrats’ homo faber discursive transvaluation? The present 
section will argue the latter, focusing in particular on a curious reception of Pushkin’s 
story, “The Queen of Spades” in two post-Soviet cultural products—the popular high-
brow quiz show, What? Where? When? and the story “The Queen of Spades,” written by 
Ludmila Ulitskaya, one of the most recognized and widely published post-Soviet writers. 
 
What? Where? When? 
For decades, Vladimir Voroshilov was a household name in Russia, due to his 
role as the creator, producer and host of both the USSR’s and post-Soviet Russia’s 
popular, long-running television game show. Voroshilov was born in Simferopol, Crimea 
in 1930, moved to Moscow in 1943, and in 1954 got his first job at a Soviet Army theater 
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traveling between military bases in East Germany. He quickly lost this job for excessive 
fraternizing with the locals and returned to Moscow, where he went on to work for a 
number of prominent theaters. He kept getting fired from productions, due to creative 
differences and a bad temper, and in 1966 ended up working on early Soviet television, 
which was at this time still a relatively uncensored creative space in Soviet Russia.6 
However, in 1968, as the events of Prague Spring led to a tightening of screws in the 
Soviet public sphere, Voroshilov got blacklisted from TV work. Fortunately, he still had 
friends at the studios, who arranged for him to continue working as a freelancer. He 
continued to design and shadow-direct gameshows in an anonymous capacity, until 
eventually, by 1977 or so, he finalized the formula of What? Where? When?, which 
became his most successful and enduring project, by far.7 
Distilled to its mechanical essence, What? Where? When? was (and still is) a 
battle of wits. On the one hand, there is a team of six players, called the znatoki (literally, 
‘cognoscenti’). They spin a roulette wheel, which lands on one of twelve questions 
submitted by the audience. Each question is a riddle, often requiring a high degree of 
cultural erudition to solve, and the team gets one minute to brainstorm an answer. If the 
question is answered correctly, the znatoki get a point. If not, the point goes to the 
audience, whom Voroshilov also always called a team. The first team to gain six points 
wins the game. The all-powerful adjudicator of answers and disputes was Voroshilov 
himself, who would almost never appear on screen, but would lead the whole show as a 
disembodied voice, watching and directing the movements of a hand-held camera. This 
particular aesthetic innovation was allegedly a result of censorship at first, given 
Voroshilov’s shaky political status in Soviet television circles, but it worked well enough 
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that he never sought to change it, and a disembodied master of ceremonies has continued 
to run the show in the wake of Voroshilov’s death in 2001 (today, the show’s leader is 
Voroshilov’s adopted son, Boris Kriuk).8 In the 1970s and early 1980s, the prizes for the 
znatoki and for those who submitted questions were primarily rare books. In the late 
1980s, however, the prizes began to mutate towards other things, and by 1991 they 
morphed into money, as we will discuss below. 
Remarkably, over the last five decades What? Where? When? has snowballed into 
a vast social phenomenon in the Russophone world. Literally thousands of amateur clubs 
of znatoki have and continue to operate throughout the fifteen (now former) Soviet states, 
the Eastern Bloc, and post-Soviet diasporas in Israel and the United States. The teams 
have self-organized into leagues and staged competitions. During the late Soviet era the 
best teams were occasionally invited to Moscow and some made it onto TV. Meanwhile, 
the actual TV show’s popularity has long been truly staggering. For instance, the show’s 
1986 season finale was being actively watched by 46.8% of everyone who had their TV 
sets on at that moment in time in the entire USSR. In 2002, long after USSR’s collapse, 
the show’s audience still amounted to 120 million viewers.9 The mass cultural success of 
What? Where? When? hinged on its sociopolitical imaginary—specifically, the fact that it 
peddled a feeling of partaking in elite intelligentsia culture to the urbanized mass 
intelligentsia (that is, Pomerants’s new narod—see Chapter One), which liked to think of 
itself as an elite. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that in 1990 Voroshilov began to 
refer to What? Where? When? as an “elite intellectual club.”10 
The vicarious elitism promoted by What? Where? When? was entangled with two 
sets of values—on one hand the idealization of liberal humanist commitment to high 
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cultural erudition and intellectualism, and on the other hand the idealization of the 
glittering, successful consumerist Cold War West. During the late Soviet era, these 
conceptions were not felt to be contradictory, because they both had an anti-Soviet 
valence. Voroshilov’s intellectualism was juxtaposed to the dull-witted, uneducated 
Soviet regime and its apparatchiks. However, this liberal core of the show also went 
along with such vaguely Western—and for that reason anti-Soviet—aesthetic elements as 
a roulette wheel, cocktail bars, live performances of semi-underground Soviet rock stars, 
and music videos by bands like Queen, Abba and Boney M, which the producers 
apparently got past censorship by means of misleading credits (“youth band from East 
Germany,” for example).11 By the very late 1980s, however, Perestroika was in full 
swing and the Gorbachev’s modernization agenda was increasingly looking like it would 
proceed along capitalist lines. Capitalist enterprise was legalized in 1988, while glasnost’ 
policies made it possible to talk about the appeal of Westernism precisely as Western 
capitalism, rather than simply Western mass culture. Accordingly, the libertarian, 
acquisitive, bourgeois discourse of the homo faber was becoming increasingly prominent 
among the ascendant ‘democrat’ parliamentary camp. What? Where? When? reacted to 
this situation by doubling down on imagining a synthesis of both value systems. To pull 
this off, as periodically happens in Russian history, they called in the Varangians. 
In 1989, when joint ventures with Western corporations became legal in the Soviet 
Union, Voroshilov quickly moved to acquire a bona fide capitalist sponsor for his 
show—the Swedish corporation TetraPak. At this time the show also began to phase out 
book prizes; instead Voroshilov would reward winners with stock options for the show. 
To cap off this transition, Voroshilov invited a team of “Swedish Professors” to come 
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play with the aid of simultaneous translators. One of these professors was Gad Rousing, a 
scholar of prehistoric Scandinavian archeology and, more importantly, one of the owners 
of TetraPak. To emphasize the thoroughly intellectual cachet of his players, Voroshilov 
had a number of them wear their medieval-looking academic caps and gowns (see Figure 
25, below). Moreover, the game’s screening was interrupted with an ad reel for What? 
Where? When? that was ostensibly pitched to Western viewers. The ad made Voroshilov 
look like the spiritual leader of an enormous Russian social movement by juxtaposing 
him with huge crowds of people while the English-language voiceover declared: 
“Attention future sponsors! When you buy shares of the International What? Where? 
When? Club, you stimulate the intellectual potential of this country!” (See Figure 26, 
below).12 The team of Swedish professors lost badly that evening, and I do not know if 
any Western viewers were swayed into buying shares of the show. But it is my contention 
that the point of the whole gambit was to present the idea of the West knocking on 
Russia’s door as a utopian fusion of high culture and big money—Gad Rausing embodied 
this juncture, while the ad presented Western capitalism as consistent with humanist 
cultural value, hence its framing of investment in What? Where? When? as an intellectual 
duty, rather than a sound financial decision. 
By 1990, just as the Yeltsin coalition juxtaposed the Imperial flag to the Soviet 
one, and just as the stylized neo-Imperial newspaper Kommersant went to print, 
Voroshilov’s “elite club” moved into a new venue, where it remains to this day—a small 
Catherinian-era ‘hunting cabin’ in Moscow’s historic park, Neskuchnyi sad. Then, in 
December of 1991, as Yeltsin was finalizing his takeover of the Kremlin, Voroshilov 









roulette table was now adorned with large stacks of cold hard cash. The players were 
dressed up in tuxedoes. Every show would start with the logo of an owl under an Imperial 
crown, accompanied by Herman from Tchaikovsky’s opera The Queen of Spades, 
singing, “Our Whole Life is a Game!” Next, the eighteenth-century French aria of the 
Countess, from Act II scene ii of the opera would accompany a methodical placement of 
the money on the roulette table in a dark room, candlelit by several candelabra, with 
Voroshilov’s cranky, disembodied voice directing the croupier (See Figure 27, below). 
The lights would then go on to reveal a tight, extremely well-dressed crowd huddling 
over the roulette table. Lastly, to the accompaniment of the theme of Richard Strauss’s 
Thus Spake Zarathustra Voroshilov would state, night after night: “good evening here, in 







What was the reason for Voroshilov’s injection of this operatic, kitschy imperial 
aesthetic into his show? And why the stacks of money? On the one hand, his stylistic 
choices dovetailed perfectly with the times—Chapter Three has shown the extent to  
which imperial retro was the leading style of the era, especially among those who were 
taking power. Homo faber discourse, mainstreamed by the likes of Govorukhin, had 
turned pre-Soviet Russia into a lost object of nostalgia and Russian capitalism was all set 
to dress up in Stolypinist garb. On the other hand, however, Voroshilov’s fantasy 
aesthetic went quite a bit beyond homo faber discourse. The choice of a Catherinian 
venue, the emphasis of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century style—as opposed to 
early twentieth-century Stolypinism—all of these visual elements went back to the 
Gestalt image of pre-Soviet Russia that had been produced by late Soviet liberals in the 
1960s and 1970s, as discussed in Chapter One. The meaning of that aesthetic, if we 
recall, was supposed to be liberal humanist, emphasizing the eternal value of the canon of 
high culture from Russia’s Golden Age. Pushkin and Tchaikovsky—the two main source 
texts for Voroshilov’s aesthetic—were mainstays of that canon. The game What? Where? 
When? had originated precisely out of this late Soviet liberal milieu, and in the late 1980s 
the show was being criticized for selling out to neo-bourgeois temptations. As book 
prizes were getting replaced by fine china and eventually cash, critical publications 
lamented that “the znatoki have plunged into the material world, and that soon [the show] 
will be giving out fur coats and automobiles.”13 That initial wave of opprobrium hinges 
on the antinomy between money and culture, and Voroshilov was struggling to reinvent 
his show with regard to this conflict. And it was precisely for that reason that Voroshilov 
introduced both money and The Queen of Spades to the show. 
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Altogether, the money and the opera were a leap into the belly of the beast. The 
show indeed wanted to prevent the look of players competing for fur coats and 
automobiles. Voroshilov wanted his game to look more glamorous than the sullen, petty 
bourgeois homo faber ethos that a character like Lopakhin—extolled by Tolstaya and 
derided by Pelevin—might suggest. The players instead would be made to look like ultra-
wealthy aristocrats from the world of Pushkin, wagering huge sums of money with 
abandon. Similarly, the kitschy tsarist aesthetic of the show was not meant to elicit the 
same kinds of nostalgic emotions as Luzhkov’s Imperial-retro architecture. There was 
nothing real about the look of Voroshilov’s show—on the contrary, it was always 
supposed to appear as a playfully excessive fairytale site, full of “sparklers and fireworks 
in the midst of half-ruined, cold and dreary Moscow.”14 What? Where? When? did not 
want to stage any kind of imaginary authentic return to a ‘Russia That We Have Lost.’ 
Rather, Voroshilov wanted his players and its audience to enjoy the Golden Age myth, 
and to view the stacks of cash as an organic part of that myth, rather than making the 
prizes recall the mundane reality of the early post-Soviet chase for petty bourgeois 
comforts.  
On first glance, it seems like the opera reference is there precisely to highlight the 
myth. Thus, on one occasion, in a long-form introduction to the opening of the show’s 
Summer 1995 season, Voroshilov spends several minutes narrating the history of the 
Neskuchnyi sad park that surrounds the gameshow’s venue. He wistfully narrates such 
tidbits from the park’s history, such as “over there was where Pushkin and his wife 
Natalie used to go to the summer theater. Over here is where Ivan Turgenev fell in love. 
[…] In the evening, when the hunters got tired, they would go to this little hunting lodge, 
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to relax, to enjoy some tea and play cards. They would go home around dawn.” He 
concludes his narration with a reference to Princess Shakhovskaya, the presumed 
prototype for Pushkin’s character: “Sometimes, Princess Shakhovskaya, ‘The Queen of 
Spades’ would visit—her summer home was here, nearby. Can you hear her voice?”15 
Here, it seems that the show is entirely about the inheritance of the cultural prestige of the 
players’ illustrious Golden Age ancestors. 
On the other hand, however, Voroshilov’s use of “The Queen of Spades” story 
also implies a more subtle understanding of the social dynamic underpinning the show. 
To understand how, we must recall both Pushkin’s and Tchaikovsky’s variant versions of 
the narrative. In Pushkin’s 1834 story, an ethnic German Russian officer, Hermann, 
whom one character describes as a man “with the profile of Napoleon and the soul of 
Mephistopheles,”16 obsessively watches his aristocratic Russian friends play the card-
game Pharaoh, but never participates himself, for fear of losing his family’s hard-earned 
capital. Hermann then overhears the miraculous tale of the Old Countess, who long ago 
had gotten herself into an enormous card debt, but was able to get out of it by playing 
three secret cards, taught to her by a mystical Parisian courtier. Hermann is impressed by 
the story, which offers him the possibility of having his cake and eating it— playing 
cards for big money, while taking no risk. So, he decides to try his luck with the countess. 
In order to get into her private chambers he seduces Lisa, the tyrannical countess’s 
impoverished lady-in-waiting. Once in Lisa’s confidence, Hermann surprises the 
countess in her boudoir, tries to extract her secret by force, and the old lady dies from 
fright. The night after her funeral, the countess’ ghost visits Hermann and tells him the 
secret- to win at Pharaoh, he must wager on a 3, a 7, and an Ace. Hermann tries it and 
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loses everything when instead of wagering on an Ace, he accidentally bets on a Queen of 
Spades. In conclusion, Hermann goes crazy, and Lisa marries someone else.  
The version of the story in Tchaikovsky’s opera differs significantly. Premiering 
in 1890, with a libretto written by the composer’s brother, the opera makes two important 
modifications to Pushkin’s story. For one thing, Tchaikovsky’s Herman (now spelled 
with one ‘n’) pursues the secret of the three cards because he is poor and in love with 
Lisa, who is now a rich granddaughter of the Countess, rather than her poor, tormented 
lady-in-waiting. Thus, almost right up until the very end of the piece, Tchaikovsky’s 
Herman is a perfectly likable operatic protagonist, very much unlike Pushkin’s greedy, 
yet risk-averse original hero. For another, the action of Tchaikovsky’s Queen of Spades 
has been moved  five decades back, to the Catherinian late eighteenth century, a historical 
setting which is supported by a score stylized to sound like Haydn and Mozart, complete 
with a little classical pastorale in the second act. The stylization culminates with the 
Countess’s aria, just prior to her encounter with Herman—for the sake of period 
authenticity, Tchaikovsky has her sing a section of a French eighteenth-century opera. 
Tchaikovsky’s two alterations of Pushkin’s original story significantly change the 
narrative’s ideological subtext. Pushkin’s story turns on a clash of Russian aristocratic 
versus German bourgeois values. The Russian aristocrat gambles in order to throw 
himself at the mercy of fortune and even to show his personal disdain for filthy lucre. 
Actually winning money here is beside the point, which is why the Countess had received 
mystical assistance in the first place—she needed it to save herself from dishonor, not to 
get rich. Hermann, meanwhile, wants to take the miraculous advice that had been 
intended for an aristocrat, and to use it for his inglorious bourgeois purposes. In the end, 
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the Countess—or the Queen of Spades—has the last laugh. Hermann is a kind of petty 
demonic parvenu on the Russian aristocratic social scene, and he is brutally and justly 
punished for his violation of the aristocratic code of honor. None of this context is present 
in Tchaikovsky’s opera. Here, the ideological matrix is a kind of nostalgia for the 
hegemony of aristocratic culture. The backdrop to Herman’s tragic downfall is an 
appealing image of an aristocratic era prior to the French Revolution, prior to the rise of 
the bourgeoisie, and therefore prior to the social problematic of Pushkin’s Hermann. 
Keeping this background in mind is essential to understanding what “The Queen 
of Spades” was doing in Voroshilov’s show. On the most basic level, the fact that “The 
Queen of Spades” is directly associated with the theatrical placement of money on the 
roulette table introduces an equivocation—are we meant to think of Tchaikovsky’s opera, 
or of Pushkin’s story, with its bourgeois context? Or a bit of both? The Catherinian cabin 
and the Tchaikovsky references seem to repress Pushkin’s version of the story, and yet it 
is precisely Pushkin’s version that seems far more germane for the What? Where? 
When?’s players and audience in the 1990s. Voroshilov’s constituents had spent a decade 
and a half of their Soviet existence valorizing the show as a competition for cultural 
prestige, in which the players, the would-be players and the audience recognized each 
other as part of the same social elite. Implicit in this competition was the consensus that 
the desire for cultural prestige was morally upright. This was, after all, the so-called 
‘secular religion’ of the Russian intelligentsia, which celebrated the love of culture and 
the noble pursuit of high cultural erudition. The intelligentsia supposedly prioritized this 
humanistic ethos above their earthly concerns. However, what Voroshilov understood 
about his audience was what Hermann’s noble friends understand about him in Pushkin’s 
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tale—that the myth of noble competition for cultural prestige had been vastly overblown, 
and that all of these people actually really wanted money. The engineers, the scientists, 
the teachers that had made Voroshilov’s Soviet show successful had been forced to 
compete for cultural capital alone—what they had really wanted was the monetary kind. 
But Voroshilov also understood that his audience and his players wanted to repress this 
dirty bourgeois secret, or even better, somehow culturally to legitimate it. To a degree, 
this work of legitimation was already being done by ‘bringing in the Varangians’ and 
selling shares, but that was a one-time stunt and now, after 1991 Voroshilov needed a 
more permanent solution. Ergo the new formula. 
Ultimately, the placement of the money together with the Aria of the Countess, 
can be read in three ways—it either represses, sublimates or ironically highlights the 
implicit tension between the desire for culture and the desire for money. The ‘repressive’ 
reading is the most obvious. The players and the audience pretend to be aristocrats, 
engaged in some kind of laudable, refined cultural business, while the real social drama 
of the 1990s, in which the former Soviet ‘middle class’ is out to get rich, as are their 
liberal leaders, as are the new capitalists sponsoring Voroshilov—in short, the story of 
zero-sum competition among the “upper hundred thousand” discussed in Chapter 
Three—is disavowed.  
Meanwhile, on the level of sublimation, we might easily interpret the show as 
participating in the general process of transvaluation towards the homo faber discourse of 
the ‘democrats’ who ended up taking power in the 1990s. To that effect, we might 
consider the theme of “Thus Spake Zarathustra,” which follows the aria of the Countess. 
Clearly, the theme’s Nietzschean message refers to the game as a venue in which only the 
	 250 
strong survive. To be fair, the quote from Strauss is actually the oldest part of the show’s 
enduring aesthetic, going back to the early 1980s. But in the context of the 1990s, it 
acquires a new meaning. The crucial assumption now is that the show’s players and 
viewers are the strong ones, fit to make it in this brave new post-Soviet world. This 
messaging comes to a head on the night of December 11, 1993. That evening, Voroshilov 
has two guests in attendance, both of them running for parliamentary office as part of 
Yeltsin’s coalition, in an election that is wrapping up that very night. One of the guests is 
himself a former player. And the other is Anatoli Chubais—the face of Russia’s post-
Soviet economic transition, the architect of Yeltsin’s privatization reforms. On such an 
auspicious occasion, Voroshilov makes an exception and comes out onto the set. 
Whereupon he and Chubais engage in the following conversation: 
Chubais: What’s fantastic is the way you started. A game for money that can be 
earned by your mind- that’s exactly what we need, […] that’s what we’re working 
for in government. […] 
Voroshilov: You know, someone once said about your leader, Premier Gaidar, 
that “this is simply a smart person.” My God, finally this country has people being 
called smart, and it’s not even an insult, it’s a compliment! […] You know, I think 
we’ve got over 200 clubs throughout the country, throughout Russia. We strive to 
become smart people. We’re not a political organization, so we will be voting our 
conscience. But I think we’ll all be voting for smart people. For smart Gaidar and 
his smart team. 
Chubais: You know, what’s important to me is that the people sitting here and 
the people watching TV right now are the kinds of people who want to make their 
own decisions. […] These are the people who will lead all of Russia forward. […] 
Voroshilov: You will be counting on these people. And we will be counting on 
you.17 
 
The homo faber discourse of this interaction is clear—What? Where? When’s players and 
viewers are educated cultural elites, and it is for that very reason that they are ready to 
“make their own decisions” in post-Soviet Russia by voting for privatization and 
capitalism.  
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 However, beyond repression and sublimation, there is also an ironic interpretation 
of the show’s aesthetic and its social import, also made possible by “The Queen of 
Spades.” Sometimes Voroshilov’s game communicates the irony intentionally, and 
sometimes by accident. Tending towards the intentional, there is the implicit message of 
using Herman’s aria, “Our Whole Life is a Game!” as the show’s signature motif. It first 
appears in the winter of 1990. But Herman, let us recall, sings this aria in the opera’s last 
scene, when he has decided to play cards instead of marrying Lisa. Lisa has, by now, 
committed suicide and Herman’s song is a cynical paean to luck, which is life’s only 
meaning—the other famous line from this aria is, “let the unlucky man cry”—a rather 
fitting, if bitter message for the post-Soviet 1990s. And tending towards the accidental, 
there are the various ways in which the image of the show’s players as either cultured 
aristocrats or as successful post-Soviet capitalists constantly splits at the seams. The rapid 
devaluation of currency is quite palpable—sometimes, you can actually observe zeroes 
being added to the sums from game to game (compare Figures 28 and 29, below).  And 
the players winning all of this money can’t actually afford to buy their own tuxedos. 
Every game night, they get dressed in the park outside the pavilion, sometimes in biting 
Moscow winter cold, and they trade a proverb among themselves, “the tux isn’t yours, so 
don't get it wet [ne mochi kazennyi frak].”18  Or, consider another revelatory moment: the 
equivocating prizes given to the game’s Most Valuable Players at the end of each season 
in the early 1990s. Each MVP would receive a glittering crystal owl, a complete 86-
volume reprint of Brockhaus & Efron’s fin-de-siecle Encyclopedic Dictionary, and a 
timeshare!19 On the one hand, a set of intellectual, maybe even aristocratic prizes; on the 
other hand, the dream of all boring mid-nineties Muscovites. Or yet another, perhaps 
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most cutting irony: in the early 1990s Voroshilov repeatedly announced at the beginning 
of the show that What? Where? When? “is the only place in Russia where you can earn 
money with your mind,” But who was providing this money? Well, it just so happened 
that in 1993 the show’s main financial sponsor was the bank MMM—that is, post-Soviet 
Russia’s most infamous Ponzi scheme, which defrauded literally millions of those who 
thought of themselves as the middle class—i.e. the viewers of What? Where? When?.  
Yet perhaps we should grant Voroshilov some degree of ironic self-awareness. 
Both behind the scenes and on set, Voroshilov’s show overtly failed to block out a bleak 
post-Soviet reality with its fantasy, and this was, I think, the additional reason behind 
Voroshilov’s use of “The Queen of Spades.” This theme was intentionally designed to 
‘bare the device’ of his TV wonderland, to allow us to have it all three ways—to believe 
in the possibility of enduring humanist values surviving the transition to capitalism, and 
also to glorify the transvaluation of those values into the terms of homo faber discourse, 
and also to understand the irony of both positions vis-à-vis the social reality of the 1990s. 
Herman’s Aria and the Aria of the Countess, combined with the over-the-top, theatrical, 
kitschy use of the Imperial aesthetic, allows us to both believe and disbelieve. And to top 
it all off is Voroshilov’s own subject position. Voroshilov, after all, also has a place for 
himself in his interpretation of “The Queen of Spades.” He is neither Hermann nor the 
Countess, exactly, but he does certainly present himself as a kind of post-Soviet  “mix of 
Napoleon and Mephistopheles.” Indeed, sometimes he even dressed up to fit the part (see 
Figure 30, above). In other words, he was happy to embody the devilish force that 
accompanies many typical nineteenth-century stories about gambling. He knowingly 













of Chubais and MMM in on the fun, and on top of that, he also invites his audience in on 
the fun, should we prefer to enjoy our TV ironically. 
 
Ludmila Ulitskaya’s “Queen of Spades” 
At about the same time as Voroshilov was steering What? Where? When? through 
the epochal transitions of the early 1990s with the aid of Pushkin’s tale and 
Tchaikovsky’s opera, the celebrated and widely published post-Soviet author Ludmila 
Ulitskaya also recalled this story, publishing a text with the same title in her second 
collection of stories and novellas, in 1998. From the context, it is clear that her “Queen of 
Spades” is set in the early 1990s and tells the story of Anna Fedorovna, a middle-aged 
eye doctor of German Russian heritage on her father’s side, living in a famous Stalin-era 
house for writers and artists, along with her mother, the ninety-something-year-old Polish 
noblewoman Maria Czarniecka, known as Mour, as well as with her forty-year-old 
daughter, Katya, and Katya’s two children. The story begins with the surprise arrival of 
Marek, Anna’s ex-husband. Marek had emigrated to Israel in the 1960s and then moved 
to Johannesburg, South Africa, where he became a fabulously wealthy foot doctor and 
businessman. Now, on a cold December day in the mid-1990s, after not seeing or 
speaking with any of his former family for almost forty years, Marek has come to 
Moscow on a business trip. Marek’s visit swiftly disturbs the balance of power in the 
house. His daughter and grandchildren immediately fall in love with him, largely because 
he showers them with extremely expensive presents. Marek then departs, but invites his 
progeny to come join him in Greece in the summer, at his villa. Mour, seeing her power 
slipping away, categorically opposes her family’s trip, but Anna decides to make it 
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happen anyway and hides all of the preparations from Mour. On the day that the kids are 
supposed to depart for the airport, Anna wakes up in the early morning to go buy milk for 
Mour’s coffee. During her brisk walk, as she contemplates her impending triumph and 
savors the thought of slapping Mour across the face, Anna slips, falls on the icy street and 
dies instantly. Once the news makes it back to the house, where Mour is already enraged 
because the secret of the trip is out, Katya slaps Mour across the face, in response to 
which Mour utters her final words, “What? what? All the same, everything shall be as I 
wish.”21 Katya then pours some milk into Mour’s coffee.  
What force endows Mour with her despotic power in the household? Why does 
Marek disturb the household’s power arrangement? And what does “The Queen of 
Spades” have to do with it? The overt foundation of Mour’s power is her biographical 
linkage to an impressive cultural past. In an early characterization, we learn about her 
famous lovers: “Their name was legion. Reams had been written by the best pens in 
praise of her pale ringlets and the ineffable secrets of her soul, and from the portraits of 
her that were conserved in museums and private art collections you could have studied 
the trends of early twentieth-century painting.”22 Ulitskaya also supplies her narrative 
with lots of tiny references to Mour’s Silver-Age carousals. We hear names like 
“Maetsky” and “Caspari,” tidbits about some precious diadem lost in a card game, the 
involvement of the famous Russian painter Bakst, and so forth. At some point, Anna 
catches Mour in her room, at her little card table, sitting “in the pose of an absinthe 
drinker”—a reference to Picasso’s 1901 painting, on exhibition at the Hermitage Museum 
in St. Petersburg. Later, the narrator discusses Mour’s success in the Soviet cultural 
milieu as well. We are told that in the 1930s “Mour understood that “the age of decadent 
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poets and unruly heroes was over,” and so she made a “foray into the realm of the new 
Soviet literature,” where she eventually landed an excellent match, “a truly classical 
Soviet writer, a genius of duplicity, wearing the mask of an ascetic but with nouveau 
riche passions raging in his breast.”23 The “classical Soviet writer”—likely a reference to 
Alexander Fadeev (1901-1956, the head of the Soviet Writers’ Union and the father of 
Ulitskaya’s childhood friend, Maria Aliger)—had the good sense to die soon after 
Stalin’s death. 24 As a result of a lifetime of expert trading on her social status and 
cultural capital, in the early 1990s Mour and her whole household live in the apartment of 
an easily identifiable Stalin-era building across the street from the Tretyakov Gallery, 
where a number of prominent Soviet official writers were housed, thanks to the Soviet 
cultural patronage system. 
 Ulitskaya goes to such great lengths to give Mour’s backstory in order to explain 
Mour’s power as a despotism of culture—a form of despotism that had been supported 
not only by the Soviet Writers’ Union, but also by the mass Soviet technical 
intelligentsia’s valorization of earlier epochs of Russian cultural achievement, 
particularly with respect to the fin-de-siècle era. In that regard, it is unsurprising that 
Ulitskaya is a typical representative of the technical intelligentsia milieu—she was born 
to a biochemist and an engineer during their war-time evacuation near Ufa in 1943, that 
same year returned to Moscow, received a degree in the sciences from Moscow State 
University in 1967, got her first job at the Institute of General Genetics, and also entered 
into two marriages with scientists—first a physicist and then a geneticist.25 It was 
precisely Ulitskaya and her peers who liked to play games of inheritance vis-à-vis the 
pre-Soviet past throughout the late Soviet era. Mour, in Ulitskaya’s story, is presented as 
	 257 
an embodied bearer of that past, while Mour’s daughter Anna Fedornva, an accomplished 
eye surgeon, is a typical member of the technical-scientific elite, quite like Ulitskaya 
herself. It is precisely this cultural arrangement that explains Mour’s explicitly Freudian 
reign of castration in her household—at one point we are told that 
...fatherlessness had thus become a deep–rooted inherited condition in their 
family, firmly established over three generations. It would never have occurred to 
Anna, Katya, or even Lenochka, who was approaching puberty, to introduce into 
this home, so completely and utterly the domain of Mour, even the most modest 
and insignificant male. Mour, filled with a magnificent disdain for her female 
progeny, had accorded them no such right.26 
 
Mour tyrannizes her household like Freud’s Primal Father dominates his horde, and her 
reign expresses a kind of collective castration anxiety of the Soviet intelligentsia, vis-à-
vis its imagined cultural masters. Indeed, the tribal family metaphor of Freud’s Totem 
and Taboo is quite fitting for the kind of familial perspective that Ulitskaya ascribes to 
late Soviet intelligentsia social relations, as evidenced by her memoir, in which she 
venerates the still living pre-Soviet generation of various babushka-type figures who still 
inhabited Moscow’s Arbat district in the 1960s, when Ulitskaya came of age.27 
 However, what’s remarkable about Mour is that for all of her cultural cachet, she 
does not exhibit even a shred of the kind of positive liberal humanist values that 
Ulitskaya so thoroughly associates with Mour’s generation of people. Mour is no 
Akhmatova. Similarly, she stands in opposition to the dynamic described by Zubok, 
where the elder generation of Arbat inhabitants and Moscow State University professors 
“could not help passing on to their students their manners, habits, ethical standards, and 
aesthetic attitudes—while keeping their political views to themselves.”28 Mour’s power 
has nothing to do with “ethical standards” and everything to do with the flow of cultural 
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capital. She is an embodiment of the fetish of culture, which apparently could easily flow 
from a generation of fin-de-siècle aristocratic intellectuals straight into the Stalinist 
nomenklatura. Her cachet never made anyone better as a person, but it did allow her to 
hold on to her elite status through seemingly irreconcilable eras. In a word, then, Mour 
embodies the idea of nobility in the old, original sense of the term—not nobility of virtue, 
but nobility of status pure and simple, passed down the ages successfully, and always 
deployed to keep power from others. To be sure, her power starts to look a bit ridiculous 
in the 1990s, when Mour apparently wields it in order to acquire French cosmetics from 
late-night infomercials, but the point of her apparent devolution is precisely to mark her 
out as someone who is consistently sensitive of where power lies in a given moment in 
time. Mour’s mastery of acquisitive consumerism of the 1990s has come to replace her 
mastery of Soviet cultural institutions, just as the latter had originally replaced her 
mastery of the illustrious world of fin-de-siècle bohemian intelligentsia.  
The conflict and resolution of Ulitsakaya’s story hinges on Marek, who 
successfully contests Mour’s power, even as the “Queen of Spades” ends up having the 
last word. Marek, the story’s catalyst, embodies a whole cluster of late Soviet 
intelligentsia fantasies. He is a typical example of a late Soviet educated urban mid-level 
professional without much love for the Soviet state, who has finagled his way out of the 
country and made a fortune abroad. By the time he returns, he is a foreigner in his former 
homeland. And Ulitskaya takes great pains to emphasize Marek’s complete 
transformation into enviable foreignness— he arrives in the dead of winter without a 
coat, in nothing but a light-colored suit and “a woolen scarf of a blood-red hue and a 
quality so superb as almost to turn material values into spiritual ones.”29 He’s got a deep 
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South African tan, he owns a villa on an island in Greece, and he is also staying at the 
opulent Baltschug Hotel, not too far from Mour’s home: “it had been transformed over 
the last few years into something quite magnificent, like the crystal bridge in the fairytale 
that in a single night spans from shore to shore.”30 The “fairytale” description of the 
Baltschug almost verbatim mimics an onlooker’s description of What? Where? When’s 
Imperial fairytale aesthetic (see above). The fin-de-siècle hotel’s recent reconstruction 
signals the advent of Luzhkov’s Imperial retro agenda for 1990s Moscow (see Chapter 
Three). And though the narrator apparently ironizes Marek’s sublime fusion of “material” 
and “spiritual” values through the red hue of his expensive scarf, the point is nevertheless 
that such a fusion has taken place. Marek is the old Soviet liberal intelligent, but now 
with a villa in Greece. Moreover, as a rich Russian foreigner, Marek can afford to enjoy 
the opulence of a reconstructed Imperial Russia, and all that without having killed or 
defrauded anyone, as far as we know (though who knows what he did in Apartheid-era 
South Africa—sensitivity to postcolonialism is beyond Ulitskaya’s purview).  
 From his luxurious position in the Baltschug, Marek threatens Mour’s dominion. 
The refurbished post-Soviet rendition of her Silver Age past doesn’t belong to her 
anymore, but to him. Conversely, Marek no longer registers the whole system of cultural 
capital that makes Mour’s household obey her. This comes through in his final 
conversation with Anna, where they get to the subject of Mour: 
“… a real miracle how a curse can turn into a blessing. This monster, this 
demon of egoism, the Queen of Spades, has destroyed everything, has put 
everyone in their graves. And how do you bear it? You are simply a saint.” 
“Me? A saint?” Anna stopped in her tracks as if she had walked into a 
lamppost. “I am afraid of her.. and there is my duty… and I feel sorry for her.” 
[…] 
“How can I help you? What can I do for you?” 
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She waved a gray mitten at him. “Walk me back home.”31 
 
Marek does not comprehend the whole castration dynamic through which the daughter is 
entangled with the “demon of egoism.” He offers a distinctly post-Soviet way out for his 
progeny—his money can buy all of them a stay at his villa in Greece, and Anna is 
tempted to take it, if not for herself then for her children. And it is precisely on this level 
that Ulitskaya’s story connects to Pushkin’s original tale. 
 At first glance, it seems like Mour is called “The Queen of Spades” simply 
because she is old—Anna points out that she has “outlived even Marxism.”32 There are 
also some direct references to Pushkin’s story. Anna has German ancestry on her father’s 
side, like Hermann. Mour is an actual noblewoman from the ancien régime, thus recalling 
the image of the old Countess in Tchaikovsky’s opera. Moreover, on a structural level 
Ulitskaya copies Pushkin’s idea of a sudden turn of fate at the end of the story, such that 
the devilish force prevails and punishes the gambler who would dabble in it. Anna 
decides to gamble against Mour by defying her, and she loses her life in her moment of 
triumph, quite like Hermann, who loses all of his money and his mind as he wagers on 
the last of the three fateful cards. But why does Mour have to win? This has to do with 
her uncanny nature, which Ulitskaya’s story also imports from Pushkin. 
As is well known, Pushkin was influenced by E.T.A. Hoffmann’s tales when he 
wrote “The Queen of Spades” (“Gambler’s Luck” in particular is relevant, given its 
theme of playing cards as a demonic activity that eventually destroys the apparently 
lucky gambler).33 As is also well known, Hoffmann’s “Sand Man”  initiates Freud’s 
discussion of “the uncanny,” which according the founder of psychoanalysis denotes the 
feeling of encountering  “the return of [the] repressed.” 34 In Freud’s case “the repressed” 
	 261 
is castration; in the case of Pushkin’s story, as I have read it above, Hermann’s 
“repressed” is, essentially, the cultural transvaluation initiated by the advent of the 
bourgeois era. As for the post-Soviet cultural context, there are two “repressed” elements 
that threaten to return. For one, we have already seen the way in which What? Where? 
When? tried to negotiate the transcoding of Late Soviet liberal humanist values into post-
Soviet homo faber rhetoric—a process that both the show and its audience approached 
with quite a bit of disavowal and bad faith. For another, scholars like Alexander Etkind 
have argued that late- and post-Soviet Russian culture has been dominated by constant 
returns of the repressed memories of Stalinism.35 Ulitskaya’s short story combines both 
of these vectors. The manifest irony of Ulitskaya’s ‘countess,’ Mour Czarniecka, is that 
she is both the consummate aristocrat and the consummate Stalinist, and the “repressed” 
of Anna Fedorovna (and by extension her whole generation of Soviet intelligenty) is that 
they are faux-aristocrats born out of Stalinism. Of course, such a conclusion on its own is 
not particularly daring—way back in 1974, in his famous anti-Pomerants essay 
“Obrazovanshchina,” Solzhenitsyn had bemoaned the collusion between the regime and 
its nominally oppositionist liberal elites that had been created by that very regime (see 
Chapter One). The same critique was articulated by the sociologists Lev Gudkov and 
Boris Dubin in the 1990s and was quite common in the post-Soviet public sphere.36 But 
Mour’s critique—by way of her final victory—is less about origins and more about 
values. The remarkable continuity of Mour’s entirely unethical, self-serving, acquisitive, 
non-humanist, and at the same time fully aristocratic reign through almost a century of 
Russian history suggests a different truth about Stalinism and the post-Stalin era—that 
the intelligentsia that was birthed out of its conjunction might never really have been 
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humanist, it was always already bourgeois, driven by the acquisition and management of 
capital, perhaps not necessarily of the monetary sort, but certainly of the sort that led to 
social power and the good consumerist life.  
The basic idea of Stalinism as Russia’s bourgeois Thermidor was articulated by 
some writers and thinkers of the 1930s, such as Andrei Platonov and Mikhail Lifshitz, 
and in the late-Soviet era it was reiterated by scholars like Vladimir Papernyi, Richard 
Stites and Vera Dunham.37 But what Ulitskaya’s short story stages is the realization in the 
1990s that the nominally anti-Stalinist, Yeltsinist intelligentsia that saw itself as finally 
getting its long-desired clean break with the past, was deluding itself. Mour symbolizes 
the absolute mastery of the drive for acquisition and management of cultural capital that 
had been a mainstay of both the early Soviet and the late Soviet era. Marek and Anna, for 
their part, challenge Ulitskaya’s version of the old countess to a duel, by announcing to 
her the advent of a supposedly new era in Russian history, with supposedly new 
Westernist homo faber values, and therefore a time in which Mour should have no 
dominion. And Mour fatefully wins the epochal contest in order to prove that what seems 
like change is actually not, that the whole story of the post-1950s intelligentsia forging a 
new, anti-Soviet value system for the future had been a sham, repressing the supposed 
liberals’ entirely banal desire for mastery over material comforts. As we have already 
mentioned earlier, this was precisely the realization made by Voroshilov in the 1990s. In 
both cases, the uncanny “Queen of Spades” lays bare the device of the intelligentsia’s 
disavowal of prestige. 
So, to return to the original question—why did liberal humanist values get 
transcoded so easily into support for post-Soviet capitalism? Voroshilov and Ulitsakaya, 
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through their readings of the “Queen of Spades” suggest that on a certain level, this 
transcoding had always been a fact. In Ulitskaya, this critique is revealed textually, 
through the uncanny victory of Mour over her household. In Voroshilov this critique is 
revealed implicitly, through the cynical practice of his post-Soviet show. In both cases, 
the logic of the “Queen of Spades” invades the present-day context and makes the 
critique possible—and this is also ironic. Pushkin, a quintessential pawn in the game of 
Russian intelligentsia’s distribution of cultural capital, suddenly finds a voice in the post-
Soviet era and speaks the truth of this ‘bourgeois’ cultural dynamic. Indeed, Pushkin 
announces this truth precisely to a late-twentieth-century Russian intelligentsia that had 
convinced itself that its worship of Pushkin had everything to do with ineffable humanist 
values and nothing to do with the acquisitive bourgeois ethos. In both Voroshilov and 
Ulitskaya, the “Queen of Spades” ends up working as a Russian classic that talks back to 
those who are most invested in mastery over the Russian classic. Pushkin’s tale is 
uncanny precisely because it returns as repressed critique, within a framework in which 
we least expected to hear it. But the critique must surface, precisely because there is an 
antinomy between the discourse of humanist high culture and the discourse of acquisitive 













II. Can One Check Out of the Insane Asylum? 
Viktor Pelevin’s Critique of the Intelligentsia Elite Speaking Subject 
 
“A real chance to join the elite. […] There 
will never again be another one.” 
       
A street ad in Viktor Pelevin’s Empire V38 
 
 In Section I, above, I have highlighted one aspect of autocritique that arose within 
post-Soviet intelligentsia circles in response to the advent of homo faber discourse. “The 
Queen of Spades,” an object of venerated pre-Soviet Russian cultural past, uncannily 
reveals the truth of transvaluation of intelligentsia values and announces considerable 
skepticism regarding the moral good of a supposedly liberal post-Soviet order. Moreover, 
the use of Pushkin in Voroshilov and Ulitsakaya complicates the discourse of liberal 
inheritance of pre-Soviet humanist values, as it had been originally enunciated by the late 
Soviet intelligentsia. Inheritance of the liberal humanist tradition turns out to be 
complicated by the morally dubious late Soviet, and then post-Soviet social order. All of 
this is not to say that behind a discourse of liberal values there were always only 
calculations of personal gain, and that the likes of Lotman and Eidel’man were simply in 
bad faith about this mundane social truth. It is to say, however, that the social institution 
of the late Soviet intelligentsia, whose discourse forged its concept of cultural 
inheritance, will have to be critiqued in order to understand why its commitment to 
liberal humanism lost out and got transcoded into a valorization of acquisitive capitalism 
during the course of the social transformations of Perestroika and the Yeltsin era. 
 In the section below, I consider another post-Soviet critique of homo faber 
discourse, launched by Viktor Pelevin, arguably post-Soviet Russia’s most widely cited 
author, whose essay “John Fowles and the Tragedy of Russian Liberalism” is the source 
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of the term homo faber that I deploy in my analysis (see Chapter Three), but whose 
oeuvre I have thus far not considered closely. Either on purpose or by accident, Pelevin’s 
post-Soviet literary project produces a critique of the Russian historical imaginary and its 
elitist speaking subject, both of which stand at the heart of the anti-Soviet discourse of the 
liberal intelligentsia that took power in the late 1980s and the 1990s. 
*** 
 Chapter One showed how the Soviet liberal discourse on the pre-Soviet past 
turned late Soviet cultural elites and their audiences into inheritors of the old Imperial 
elites’ perennial struggle to wrest power from a despotic state. Additionally, the liberal 
intelligentsia produced an appealing Gestalt image of a beautiful lost world from before 
the Revolution. Chapter Two showed how Soviet conservatives, too, emphasized the 
Revolutionary watershed, yet articulated a counter-narrative that it was in fact the liberal 
elites, in the guise of Soviet power, who had brought about the destruction of the good 
old days. In Chapter Three, we saw how in the very late Perestroika era, the political and 
the aesthetic vectors of Soviet liberal fantasies about the Imperial past, as well as some 
conservative ideas about the end of the beautiful pre-Soviet era in the conflagration of the 
Revolution, were fused together into the discourse of what Sergei Prozorov has called 
“liberal conservatism,” which ended up underpinning both Yeltsin’s and Putin’s rule.39 
Through cultural products like Govorukhin’s films, the structurally liberal, 
parliamentarian desires of the late Soviet mass educated class came together with the 
understanding that normal, parliamentarian development of Russia was “shot down like a 
bird in midflight.” The beautiful Gestalt image of Russia before the Revolution 
heightened the emotional tenor of what was imagined to have transpired in 1917—Russia 
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was both aesthetically and politically on a good, normal trajectory prior to the 
Revolution, which ushered in an aesthetically and politically abnormal  regime. The anti-
Soviet democrats and anti-Soviet conservatives debated as to what exactly made the 
Soviet regime abnormal—democrats such as Govoruhkhin argued that it was the lumpen 
mob; conservatives such as Solzhenitsyn blamed the liberal elites. Both anti-Soviet sides 
hoped, however, that the advent of the post-Soviet era would mean a return to normalcy. 
From the liberals’ perspective, the new regime would be normal not only because it 
would be capitalist like the West, but also because those with the best ideas about how 
Russia should be ruled and what it should look like—i.e. the cultural elites and their 
educated followers—would be in charge, while keeping away the mob with their uncouth 
desires. From the conservatives’ perspective, the post-Soviet regime would be normal 
because it would maintain statist order and keep the overeager liberals at bay, while 
actively carrying out reforms necessary for the geopolitical and spiritual good of Russia. 
 The post-Soviet writer Viktor Pelevin became a famous satirist of the post-Soviet 
‘new normal’ with his bitingly ironic 1999 bestseller novel, Generation P, though he had 
broken onto the literary scene in 1991 and was already widely read throughout the 1990s. 
The subject-position from which Pelevin launches his critique was, according to “John 
Fowles,” that of the “sovok”—in this context a late Soviet puttering intelligent, who 
busied himself with all sorts of useless, but interesting activities, because he did not have 
to worry about problems of economic or social survival, thanks to Soviet labor and 
welfare policies: 
The denizens of Russia (and, by the way, not even just the intelligenty), 
automatically, without desire or participation, experienced an additional, non-
functional psychic level, that additional space of recognition of one’s self and the 
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world, which in a normally developing society is available to only a few. For life 
to follow the laws of the glass bead game, one needs a Castalia. Russia of our 
recent past was precisely such an enormous surrealist monastery, whose 
inhabitants didn’t face the problem of social survival, but rather eternal spiritual 
questions, asked in an ugly, parodical form. The sovok whiled away his days very 
far from normal life, but not far from God, whose presence he didn’t notice. 
Living on the dumpster closest to Eden, the sovki chased their forcibly opened 
spiritual eyes with the portwine Kavkaz, until eventually they were kicked out of 
the Cherry Orchard and commanded to gather bread by the sweat of their brow. 
Now, this non-functional appendix of the Soviet soul has turned into an 
unaffordable luxury. Miranda is off to defend the [House of Parliament] and soon 
after that ends up in the grips of Caliban, who has taken off his Komsomol pin 
and blocked all of her familiar walkways with an untraversable barrier of clothes-
stands. 
 
With his mentioning of the sovok’s existential state of “living on the dumpster closest to 
Eden” Pelevin calls by another name what the iconic late- and post-Soviet singer-
songwriter Boris Grebenshchikov referred to as “the generation of janitors and 
watchmen,” and what the anthropologist Alexei Yurchak has described the state of living 
in “vnye,” a state of liberating ‘indeterminacy’ vis-a-vis Soviet official discourse and its 
institutions.40 Prozorov, for his part, has interpreted the same concept as a condition of 
the “workless slave,” an individual who has been ejected from Hegelian history, but not 
as a result of bringing this history to its final synthesis of mass recognition.41 The point of 
all of these characterizations of “inoperative,” or “workless” or indeterminate Soviet 
“being” is to identify a particular form of ideal discursive subjectivity that was made 
possible by the late Soviet era, which would stand in contrast to that of the homo faber. 
Pelevin’s sovok is a kind of homo non-faber, a human subject unplugged from all of the 
vain pursuits that characterize the ‘normal’ life of liberalism—the rat-race of capitalism, 
the chase for political rights, the chase for prestige, and so forth. Pelevin’s books, 
especially recent ones such as Empire V (2006) and Batman-Apollo (2013) contain 
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hundreds of pages of catecheses on the subject of vanitas vanitatum—the pointlessness, 
from the perspective of the Buddhist Absolute, of all social pursuits, especially post-
Soviet ones. Pelevin’s sovok is someone who allegedly had felt that absolute, liberating 
pointlessness organically, with his “forcibly opened spiritual eyes.” 
 There are two aspects that interest me in Pelevin’s ongoing and today already 
quite long-winded critique of “normal” life: one is the conditions of possibility of the 
‘inoperative subject’ who levels this critique, and the other is the imagination of the 
past—including the pre-Soviet past—which underpins the idea of vanitas vanitatum as a 
perpetually relevant conclusion to be drawn by Pelevin’s enlightened indeterminate 
beings. To get at both points, I will close-read Pelevin’s 1996 novel, Chapaev and the 
Void (Chapaev i Pustota in Russian), the urtext for the kind of ‘Socratic’ dialogues on the 
subject of Buddhist enlightenment that then went on to predominate in his later novels. I 
will consider the novel’s premise—a form of time travel between 1919 and 1995, 
accomplished, ostensibly, by a patient in a post-Soviet insane asylum. I will also examine 
the novel’s didactic conclusion, framed in terms of “checking out of the insane 
asylum”—where it is possible to embrace an attitude of inner detachment from a given 
historical moment, while at the same time gaining sufficient mastery over the present 
moment’s social rules.42 I will show that both premises hinge on an elite subject, who 
continually imagines for himself an eternal return of the conditions of his own elite 
status. This premise of eternal return implies a model of inheritance of the past that 
constantly forecloses the possibility or moral worth of future-oriented action. Lastly, I 
will claim that through the repetition-compulsion of his texts, Pelevin comes to critique 
and unmake the very form of social imaginary that makes the existence of his elitist 
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speaking subjects possible. 
 Chapaev and the Void’s premise is a peculiar form of time travel—the chapters 
alternate between 1919 or so and the present, sometime around 1995 or so (in the second 
chapter, the novel refers to the 1995 Schwarzenegger blockbuster True Lies). The novel’s 
five even-numbered chapters, taking place in 1995, concern Petr Pustota (literally, ‘Petr 
Void’), a 26-year-old man, who has exhibited narcissistic delusional ideations since he 
was 14, and who presently believes himself to be living through the second year of the 
Russian Civil War, as a Russian decadent poet. Petr is confined in a Moscow insane 
asylum with three other inmates, all of whom share a delusion described as “the splitting 
of false personalities,”43 and who are being treated for this delusion through an 
experimental, “collective” and “cathartic” form of talk/dream therapy.44 Hence, aside 
from Petr’s own delusion, we also encounter the delusional narratives of three other male 
inmates, with a chapter dedicated to each. Those include an angry low-life man named 
Maria, who is suffering from an “anal Agamemnon complex” regarding Russia and the 
West (personified by Schwarzenegger, with whom he has bizarre cyborg sex)45; Serdiuk, 
a suicidal alcoholic with an intricate Japanese samurai fantasy; and lastly Volodin, a 
‘New Russian’ mobster, who dabbles in Buddhist enlightenment with the aid of 
psychedelic mushrooms. Meanwhile, within the novel’s odd-numbered chapters as well 
as the introduction, altogether occupying approximately 54% of the text, Petr lives his 
life as a poet and White sympathizer of aristocratic background, who in 1919 joins the 
entourage of a certain Vasilii Chapaev. Chapaev, in Petr’s account, is a legendary 
Bolshevik commander by day, but by night is a grand mystic of an indeterminate, but 
likely ancient age and illustrious provenance. Chapaev’s entourage includes two adepts—
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the stunningly beautiful and unapproachable Anka, and also a certain Kotovsky, who 
mostly just inhales lots of cocaine, an activity he describes as “thinking about Russia.”46  
Both the 1919 and the 1995 chapters try to pass themselves off as the authentic 
part of Petr’s life, while branding Petr’s existence in the other era as delusion. Thus, we 
should conclude that both eras are equally delusional and dreamlike, despite the fact that 
in both eras the dominant discourse of the time (Bolshevism in 1919 and new Russian 
discourse in 1995) is calling upon its subjects to act vigorously and decisively to forge a 
brave new reality. Still, the framing of Petr as a post-Soviet delusional man is more 
convincing, for two reasons: one is that Petr’s delusion makes sense in terms of his 
background as someone who came of age in the late Soviet era and was socialized into its 
“glass bead game”; and the other reason is that Pelevin is a post-Soviet author, whose 
whole oeuvre is fixated on the post-Soviet condition. If 1919 and 1995 are brought 
together in his novel, then it is to reveal some less obvious truth about 1995, rather than 
about the past. This is all the more obvious considering that the novel’s ‘truth’ about the 
past is so manifestly absurd—after all, it reimagines the legendary Soviet simpleton 
cavalryman Chapaev as a mystic with a Buddhist superweapon, who drives a private 
armored limo and casually passes between the worlds of the living and the dead. 
Taking the post-Soviet insane asylum setting as the site of relative reality in the 
novel, let us consider how thoroughly Petr’s 1919 identity has been worked out from his 
vantage point in 1995. The stylization of the past happens by way of Petr heavily citing 
some writers, like Soloviev and Blok, while also being dismissive of other writers, like 
Bunin, Aleksei Tolstoi and Valerii Briusov. The period detail with which Petr 
experiences 1919 is quite thorough. If Petr is a crazy-man from 1995, then he is a 
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remarkably well-informed one. How did he acquire this mastery of the era? At one point, 
the novel describes some of Petr’s highly intricate drawings at the insane asylum: 
From my first glance at the two-meter cardboard, covered with tiny multi-colored 
figures, I felt my own deep connection to this strange object. […] It looked like an 
illustration to Tolstoy’s novel War and Peace, due to the multitude of actors, 
abundance of detail, and the intricacy of the depiction. I have in mind the kind of 
illustration which might fit all of the heroes of the novel and its entire plot.47 
The enormous story-board of Petr’s life explains on the level of plot just how exactly the 
man who thinks he’s in 1919 has managed to work out his alter-temporality so 
thoroughly. The work that Petr has put into his ideations, combined with the knowledge 
that he had been constructing them since he was 14—that is, starting in 1981, the final act 
of the Brezhnev-era social deep-freeze—makes his whole delusion look like a 
particularly byzantine exercise of a sovok who for years has been playing his “glass bead 
game […] on a dumpster closest to Eden.” Kanashnikov, the director of the insane 
asylum, refers to Petr as an homme de lettres [literator]; he could have just as well called 
him an intelligent. Petr is the consummate well-read sovok, who has given meaning to his 
life by developing extreme erudition in a useless domain of knowledge—the literature, 
politics and social life of 1919. In fact, to mark out the gratuitousness of his erudition the 
text even adds a moment when Petr gets confused as to whether his interlocutor, 
Kanashnikov, is referring to Nabokov Sr. the Constitutional Democrat or Nabokov Jr. the 
future writer, and currently still “Vovka,” a schoolmate from the Tenishevsky Secondary 
School, now (in 1919) hiding out in Crimea.48 
 Another question about 1919—what makes Petr a poet of the times? For one, Petr 
is apparently well-embedded in the literary circles of the 1910s—the novel’s first chapter 
describes his random encounter with Briusov and the drunk “disobedient wolfhound” 
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Aleksei Tolstoi in a seedy Moscow cabaret, the Muzykal’naia tabakerka [literally, 
Musical Snuffbox], whereupon they briefly chat about Blok’s recently published poem, 
The Twelve.49 For another, Petr constantly displays his own modernist poetic tastes—
specifically, his love of bold imagery. Thus, in his first encounter with Kanashnikov, he 
finds the asylum director’s description of “a bull locked in a museum hall” an 
“extraordinary image.” At another point, Kanashnikov’s describes how “some people 
remain behind to sort out nonexistent business with the shadows of an extinguished 
universe”—to this, Petr responds, “that is marvelous. It’s almost Balmont.” A page later, 
Kanashnikov’s describes “Russia, that over and over tries to carry out her ill-starred 
alchemical wedding with the West,” and Petr finds this image “excellent” as well.50 
Petr also gives us examples of his “decadent” comportment, presented as a mix of 
daring, irony, high-brow ennui, and cynical readiness to master the unappealing 
circumstances in order to survive. In this regard, the first chapter sets the tone. First, Petr 
exhibits a touch of irony and ennui when describing to his friend-turned-Chekist, Grigorii 
von Ernen, how he had shot some Bolsheviks in Petersburg: “What was I to do? When I 
was running away from them, I was shooting back. You of course understand that I was 
firing at a specter that had been woven together by my own fear, but I wouldn’t have 
been able to explain that on Gorokhovaia [the Chekist headquarters—PK].”51 Then, just 
after killing von Ernen, Petr sits down at his grand piano and plays his “favorite Mozart 
Fugue in f-minor” (here, Pelevin makes a mistake—the piece he apparently has in mind 
has fugue-like elements, but is actually a Fantasia, K. 608). In that same moment, he 
describes his “melancholy,” which “had no relation to the excess with von Ernen,” and 
puts on the Chekist’s leather jacket, because “despite the riskiness of some of my literary 
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experiments, I was nevertheless not enough of a decadent to put on my coat, which had 
already become a funeral shroud, and besides was shot through in the back.”52 When 
other Chekists arrive at the apartment, Petr decides to play their part—he grabs von 
Ernen’s Chekist briefcase, which is comprised of a large tin can full of cocaine and blank 
arrest orders, does lots of cocaine with his new underlings—who are, stereotypically, 
Sailors of the Baltic Fleet, and one of whom has apparently dabbled in cannibalism—and 
off they go to the Tabakerka to “carry out our [Party] line.”53 In this way, Petr 
successfully starts pretending to be a Chekist, while at the same time taking no delight in 
his new role or showing any interest in its Bolshevik ideology. By the end of the novel, 
he will be privately writing poetry in memory of the executed Nicholas II, while publicly 
performing his Revolutionary verses—a situation that Petr comes to identify as “the 
eternal, unchangeable fate of a Russian intelligent [...] to watch the Emperor’s final 
outing with an inner gaze, while speaking out-loud about the [...] callused genitals of the 
Proletariat—always, I thought, always it will be so.”54 
On that last note, let us now consider Petr’s Revolutionary poetics. These are 
captured not only in the three cases of Petr performing poetry in the novel, but also in the 
moments when Petr must present himself as a proper Chekist agent. Thus, while 
observing a performance of a Dostoyevsky-inspired play at the Tabakerka, Petr realizes  
...that everything happening around me is not a conspiracy against me [...] but 
simply a mystical call. I immediately decided to heed it and turned to the 
withdrawn sailors: 
—Lads, stop. This is treason. 
Barbolin lifted an uncomprehending gaze at me. 
—The Englishwoman shits,— I threw out at random. 
It seemed like these words had some kind of meaning for him, because he 
immediately reached for his rifle. I held him back: 




The meaning of “heeding the mystical call” is revealed in the fact that Petr can speak as a 
Revolutionary and write Revolutionary poetry “at random,” without comprehending or 
caring for the words. Those words end up having “some kind of meaning” for the 
Bolsheviks and that is all that is needed to make Petr’s ploy successful. Petr then 
proceeds to write a poem in the style of Mayakovsky, calling for Revolutionary terror. 
The “fitting text” is written on a Chekist arrest order and is “ready after just a few 
minutes.”56 Petr then performs it with a gun in his hand and shoots at the chandelier at the 
end, sending the whole cabaret ablaze with gunfire and panic. Needless to say, the 
Bolshevik sailors love it: “I didn’t get you at first, Pet’ka. I didn’t see your soul. But 
you’re a fine fellow. Gave a good speech.”57 Later in the novel, Petr does another 
Bolshevik poetry performance—once again, the poem takes a second to write, once again 
it is concluded with a couple of gunshots, and once again the performance is well-
received by the Red Army audience, whom Petr now describes as a “dark sheeple 
[temnoe bydlo]” that “rises after every social cataclysm” and “forces everyone else to live 
according to its cowardly and secretive laws.”58 
 If Petr is quite good at channeling Revolutionary tongues into his poetry without 
even understanding what he is saying, then his spiritual master, Chapaev, is even better. 
Indeed, Chapaev, whom Kanashnikov would describe as a “splitting” of Petr’s “false 
personality,” is really Petr’s ego ideal. As soon as they meet each other, Petr concludes 
that Chapaev “is playing the same insane game as I am, but for far longer, with more 
virtuosity, and possibly of his own free will.”59 At another point, Petr observes Chapaev, 
who otherwise tends to come off as an exquisite intelligent, giving a folksy speech to his 
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Red Army troops and using the word “zaruka” the process. The word doesn’t actually 
exist in Russian; it seems to be a case of Chapaev’s populist stylization, but when Petr 
asks him about it the mystic replies,  
You know, Petr, when you have to speak to the masses, it is entirely unimportant 
as to whether or not you understand the words you pronounce. What’s important 
is that others should understand it. You simply have to reflect the expectations of 
the mob. Some do it by studying the language of the masses, but I prefer to act 
directly. So if you want to know what the word ‘zaruka’ means, you will have to 
ask those who are standing on the square right now, rather than me.60 
 
Chapaev here is just as derisively dismissive of his Bolshevik audience as Petr. In his 
personal life he has nothing to do with the Red cause at all—just a few pages after the 
above encounter, Petr, Chapaev and his alleged niece Anka are wearing aristocratic 
clothes and toasting with champagne and refined foodstuffs on board the legendary Red 
Army commander’s luxurious train car, which is nevertheless pulling a whole division of 
rowdy, degenerate Bolsheviks behind it to the front lines. All of Chapaev’s mystical 
mastery then comes to head when the Red Commander/Ancient Mystic talks to Petr 
about his stay in the insane asylum in 1995. Within the context of their conversations, the 
asylum chapters appear as nightmarish visions, which Chapaev asks Petr to write down. 
After reading them, Chapaev declares: “wherever you might end up, live according to the 
rules of the universe in which you ended up, and use those rules to rid yourself of them. 
Check yourself out of the insane asylum, Pet’ka.”61  
 Chapaev’s existence and his advice all come down to maintaining mastery of 
one’s circumstances, however absurd they might be, while also practicing radical 
subjective withdrawal from those circumstances—hence, Chapaev’s champagne toast “to 
all those who even in these days do not stop struggling for freedom.”62 The point of the 
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toast is emphasize Pelevin’s Buddhist hobby-horse—that real freedom is won in a 
struggle of subjectivity to let go of its investments in reality. Through this unbelonging 
Pelevin’s subject makes himself superior to both the “dark sheeple” and the scoundrels 
like von Ernen—that is, the pawns and the kings of the absurd world in which they 
operate. If someone like von Ernen is despicable for contributing to the forging of the 
present, then someone like Chapaev is the one who can survive it unscathed, precisely 
because he does not believe in anything real, but at the same time knows how to get by. 
And therein lies the linkage between 1919 and 1995.  
During his stay in the insane asylum Petr encounters Maria, a man “who has 
become a real bitch lately,” and is for that reason well ready to take on the post-Soviet 
world:  
I would put everyone who doubts the reality of the world on trial. They belong in 
prison, not the insane asylum. [...] You see that Mercedes 600 Series parked over 
there? [...] Is that an illusion, you say? [...] You know who drives that illusion? 
The commercial director of our looney bin, his name is Vovchik Maloy and they 
call him The Nietzschean. [...] So think about it. That bandit might have had ten 
people rubbed out to get himself this car. So what, did those ten men give up their 
lives for nothing if this is an illusion? [...] You have to read newspapers and feel 
emotions when doing so. Not to doubt the reality of the world. It’s during the 
Soviet regime that we lived among illusions. But now the world has become real 
and understandable. Got it?63 
With his monologue, Maria functions as Petr’s foil, and also generally embodies a kind of 
low-life version of the discourse of the homo faber. Puttering about in one’s own dreams 
and doubting the reality of the present is no longer acceptable. As the homo faber would 
say, moving into the new era means giving up illusions. One must “feel emotions” for 
this absurd world, despite the well-known fact that it is dominated by mobsters. One must 
envy The Nietzschean’s fancy Mercedes and desire a similar one. Petr and Chapaev, on 
the other hand, suggest some other way—a path that combines both mastery and non-
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commitment. And this conclusion appears to be eternally relevant in Russia. ‘The new’ 
perennially appears on the horizon and beckons us to involve ourselves in it, and then this 
‘new’ turns out to be rather disappointing, and so on, in an eternal return. And the ideal 
Pelevinist subject himself has to carry out what in his final poem Petr calls “eternal non-
return”: “Because in a world that has the property of disappearing to who knows where, / 
It is best not to make vows, but simultaneously / to say ‘no, no’ and ‘yes, yes.’”64 
 Now, let us step back from Pelevin’s world and pose certain questions about its 
structure, ideology, and aesthetics. First off, what are the sociological conditions of 
possibility of becoming a Petr or a Chapaev, or for that matter a sovok? Secondly, what 
are the consequences of Pelevin’s historical imaginary of “eternal return” of Russia’s 
disappointing futures? And thirdly, why has Pelevin been writing novels for the last 
twenty years with essentially the exact same didactic point as Chapaev and the Void? 
 To tackle the first point: it is not at all an accident that Petr and Chapaev are 
aristocrats. Most of Pelevin’s novels are about elites. Pelevin’s novels brim with 
protagonists and Buddhist gurus who are almost always high elites, sometimes real but 
more often mythical ones. In that regard, we might consider Count Tolstoy in t, the 
vampires Osiris and Enlil in Empire V and Batman-Apollo, the millennia-old she-
werewolf A Huli in Sacred Book of the Werewolf, or more recently the many hypostases 
of the ghost of Emperor Paul in The Custodian. In every one of these cases, the 
individuals who attain to Buddhist enlightenment start out at the very top of the social 
order and then decide to renounce their subjective investment in that order, either by 
withdrawing or by pursuing a task of what Tolstoy called oproshchenie—literally, 
‘simplification [of one’s self].’ Almost the same characterization goes for Pelevin’s 
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favorite pre-Soviet “Sovki,” Ranevskaya and Lokhankin. Those individuals are also 
elites, who attain the enlightened truth of Buddhist inaction by accident—they simply 
cannot embrace the necessary comportment for succeeding in the modern reality 
surrounding them.  
Elitism is crucial to Pelevin’s post-Soviet imaginary because the writer almost 
always reacts to the post-Soviet discourse of the homo faber, and that discourse is 
thoroughly elitist. We might also mention that Pelevin’s novels’ target audience appears 
to be the post-Soviet haves, the middle class of Western-minded Russian techies and 
hipsters.65 Pelevin’s post-historical, “whatever being” vantage point of the sovok is 
simply the flipside of homo faber discourse, produced by the same speaking subject. His 
idealized homo non-faber can “check out of the insane asylum,” he can achieve social 
mastery. Or perhaps he (in Pelevin it is almost always ‘he,’ rather than ‘she’)  is someone 
whose mastery has already been handed to him by the sheer circumstance of having been 
socialized into the urbanized intelligentsia circles of the late 1980s. The scene of a non-
elite giving up the vain world almost never takes place in Pelevin. As the post-Soviet 
writer Ariel Brakhman of t would put it, the leading hero has to be “a demon with ennui 
and a salary starting at a hundred thousand dollars a year. [...] What kind of Byronism 
could there be if you had no money? That’s not Byronism then, it’s just posturing.”66 
Conversely, the masses, however defined, do not have any positive bearing in 
Pelevin’s writing. Sometimes the narod is characterized as an unruly mob with its own 
hive mind, which cannot be controlled, but whose emotional waves can be successfully 
surfed by adepts such as Petr and Chapaev. Other times—as in Generation P—‘the 
people’ are the consumer masses, defined entirely by their “oral and anal wow-
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impulses.”67 Still other times, as in Empire V and Batman Apollo ‘the people’ are an 
enormous herd that produces a drug called bablos (from “bablo,” meaning “money” in 
post-Soviet slang) for a race of vampiric supermen, who manipulate the sheeple through 
the dark arts of “glamour” and “discourse.” What is absolutely unthinkable in Pelevin, 
however, is that one should actively try to subjectivize one’s self as a member of the 
wider circles of the non-elites. All a decent person can do is stay away from both the 
mindless mob and the scoundrels who would lead them for personal gain. And if one 
does decide to ‘simplify one’s self’ à la Tolstoy, then this is done not for the sake of the 
narod, but for the sake of saving one’s own soul from suffering. Withdrawal—whether to 
Inner Mongolia as in Chapaev or Optina Pustyn’ as in t, or the Buddhist vampire heaven, 
as in Batman-Apollo, or Idyllium, as in The Custodian—is the only option for a member 
of an elite who finds self-interested action despicable and collective action impossible. 
How is Pelevin’s historical imaginary constructed? The basic premise of Chapaev 
and the Void, is a parallel between 1919 and 1995. In it of itself, this analogy is not rare 
in post-Soviet discourse—for instance, in Chapter Three of this dissertation Govorukhin 
drew analogies between February 1917 and the early 1990s. The meaning of Pelevin’s 
analogy, however, is opposite of Govorukhin’s. Pelevin discovers the injunction to do, to 
participate in the forging of a new reality as the dominant discourse of the Reds in 1919 
and the new Russians of the 1990s. Meanwhile, both realities for Pelevin are absurd, full 
of wanton violence, lowbrow tastes, and terrible people. Hence, once Petr successfully 
checks out of the insane asylum while still remaining in 1919 in his own mind, he easily 
finds the newest version of the Tabakerka, which is once again located on Tverskaya, and 
he easily gets past the bouncer by reminding him that “I was just here not long ago with a 
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few buddies, remember? That was also when you got hit in the crotch with the butt of a 
rifle.”68 Petr’s ‘memory’ from 1919 happens to fit 1995 perfectly. Lastly, once Petr is in 
the venue and orders his usual vodka/drug cocktail, he observes the place and describes it 
in the exact same words as he had in 1919: “the venue has changed very little—it still 
looked like a middling restaurant with pretensions of chique.” And then two pages later: 
“the public was quite motley, but as always happens in human history, the majority was 
comprised of pig-faced profiteers and richly adorned whores.”69 Once Petr goes out with 
guns blazing, the novel concludes with him getting into Chapaev’s armored car, which 
has magically reappeared outside. The fact that Chapaev returns from 1919 to drive off 
with Petr into the sunset of Inner Mongolia (essentially, Shangri La) is the novel’s final 
symbol of the eternal return of Pelevin’s problem—the need to survive both physically 
and morally in a perpetually deranged, unreal world. 
 Another mainstay of Pelevin’s historical imaginary is wistful remembrance of a 
bygone past. Hence, while in von Ernen’s apartment, Petr discovers that the place was 
recently abandoned by “a well to do Constitutional Democrat (i.e. Imperial-era middle-
class) family,” and that “despite the disorder and abandonment, one could see traces of 
old life, lit up by the light of the pre-war era.”70 Despite the fact that within the world of 
Chapaev and the Void it is undeniable that the recently lost pre-Revolutionary era 
appears with the same kind of positive emotional register as it does in Riazanov’s or 
Mikhalkov’s films, it would nevertheless be inconsistent with Pelevin’s general project to 
treat this particular past as somehow more authentic. After all, in “John Fowles,” 
Generation P and also the opening of Empire V, this kind of nostalgic affect is directed 
towards the late Soviet past. In other Pelevin novels, the bygone past can be in medieval 
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China as in Sacred Book of the Werewolf, or ancient India as in other parts of Empire V 
and Batman-Apollo, or late-eighteenth-century Russia as in The Custodian. All of this 
suggests that the point is not to say that that there really was a certain past that was more 
‘normal’ than today, and that can somehow be recovered. If anything, the past always 
appears as a mythical place in which tastes were better and people were more spiritually 
attuned. Hence, medieval China appears in A Huli’s memories as a time when wise, 
refined courtly monks knew that she was a werewolf and happily conversed with her. 
Ancient India from the time of the Buddha is recalled by Osiris in Batman-Apollo as an 
era when a whole lot of people were able to achieve Nirvana, which is today only 
available to a few especially enlightened vampires like himself. A similar story occurs in 
Chapaev and the Void, when Petr is given a tour of the underworld by its overseer, Baron 
von Jungern. The “Black Baron” tells Petr that there used to be a time when his mounted 
unit, composed entirely of spiritually enlightened and now eternally-living troops, used to 
receive new recruitments several times a day, and it seems like “it’s only now that the 
narod has turned shallow somehow.”71  
For Pelevin, the point of easier attainment of Enlightenment is always located in 
the past. Or, to put it another way, the history and memory of the past is precisely what 
can be more easily manipulated to create myths and models of Pelevin’s kind of 
Enlightenment. Pelevin’s brand of post-Soviet “magical historicism,” to borrow 
Alexander Etkind’s recent term, constantly involves subjectivities whose experience of 
the absurd, unbearable, or otherwise confounding present forces them to busy themselves 
with transforming the past into myth.72 In the context of Petr, this dynamic is particularly 
stark, because it doubles back on itself. As Kanashnikov surmises in the first 1995 
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chapter of the text, Petr has produced his “splitting of false personality” as a result of 
living through the epochal changes of 1991: “you belong to the generation that had been 
programmed to live in one kind of socio-cultural paradigm, but then ended up in an 
entirely different one.”73 Petr’s delusion doubles his present condition—i.e., by imagining 
himself as a symbolist poet living through 1919, Petr has found himself living in another 
era in which he feels out of place. And Petr’s cure for his condition—his realization that 
the only way to deal with the absurdity of the world is to respond casually “yes, yes” and 
“no, no” to it—might very well only be possible for a subject who experiences himself as 
liminal vis-a-vis the historical moment in which he finds himself. It is possible to say that 
for Pelevin it is only those who can recall a past under a different regime—that is, the 
sovki today, or the White symbolists in 1919, or eternal life-forms like vampires and 
werewolves, all of whom have straddled one or more historical divides—who are best 
positioned to achieve a sense of “inner freedom” vis-a-vis the present. 
Altogether, then, Pelevin corrects the intelligentsia’s myth of its ability to inherit 
the past. For him, a form of inheritance is possible, but not because some set of values 
have survived to be reclaimed. Rather, inheritance takes place when those who think of 
themselves as elites once again re-experience the Russian cycle of history, where periodic 
regime change returns the palpable feeling of the repetitive and unbearable absurdity of 
human life. Every regime change in Russia involves the rise of the dark sheeple, the rise 
of scoundrels to power, and the rise of a few chosen elites who are capable of looking 
over the unfolding chaos and declaring that they want no part of it. In this way, Pelevin 
answers the historical discourse of the homo faber: while the latter surveys a century of 
Russian history and describes the 1910s as ‘normal,’ the 1920s-1980s as ‘abnormal’ and 
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the 1990s onwards as ‘new normal,’ Pelevin responds by saying that it has always been 
‘abnormal’ all the way down. 
On the one hand, by refusing to call post-Soviet Russia a return of the ‘normal,’ 
Pelevin appears as a critic of the gung-ho homo faber rhetoric of ‘transition,’ whether to 
democracy or capitalism. Elsewhere Pelevin jokingly refers to it as a “transition from 
nowhere to nowhere.”74 On the other hand, Pelevin’s long view of the eternal return of 
the “absolute unbearableness of Russian life in all of its aspects”75 is a perspective of the 
exact same discursive subject as the one producing homo faber rhetoric. It is simply 
another version of the typical intelligentsia lament observed by Nancy Ries, “why is 
everything always so bad with us?”76 and it is only available to those who think of 
themselves as having the right to make such laments—i.e., those who think of themselves 
as the intelligentsia. Pelevin’s sovok, the homo non faber who survives the cataclysms of 
1991 and then launches a scathing critique of the new regime, does not stand on any more 
solid ground than the committed Yeltsinist ‘democrat’ or Putinist conservative. To put it 
bluntly, this individual is an outcome of late Soviet social institutions, which produced 
the fundamental ideology of the Soviet mass intelligentsia ‘class’—that is, a large group 
of Soviet people from usually not particularly glamorous social origins, socialized in 
Soviet educational institutions (often fairly middle-brow ones), who then for some reason 
decided that they could inherit the elite self-concept and comportment of someone like 
Chekhov’s Ranevskaya (or Stolypin, for that matter). The problem is that there is no 
reason why this basic ideology has to be acceptable, and we have already discussed in 
Chapter Three the problems with maintaining it—problems that have become particularly 
palpable during the Putin era. Pelevin’s discourse does not transcend those problems, 
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because it maintains the existence of the speaking subject. Pelevin’s circular historical 
consciousness, which has also been deployed by intelligentsia figures like Dmitry Bykov, 
simply contributes to the idea that this subject will continue to exist forever.77  
I do think, however, that Pelevin on some level understands the inherent problem 
with this ideology—that is why his texts so compulsively repeat the trick of elites 
unmaking themselves. Pelevin’s repetition compulsion points to his schema’s constitutive 
impossibility. Moreover, the same impossibility is also hinted at by the extremely 
cartoonish descriptions of what happens when Pelevin’s characters reach Nirvana—for 
instance, A Huli turns into a rainbow, Osiris completes a Zelda-like videogame level, 
Baron von Jungern’s men go through a flash of light and reappear on huge white 
elephants, and so forth. Desubjectivizing Nirvana appears to be the only laudable goal of 
an elitist false consciousness, but at the same time the sheer repetition of this moral 
lesson suggests that the point is to give up the ideology entirely, as opposed to trying to 
“check out of the insane asylum” by playing by its rules. But perhaps Pelevin’s texts, or 
maybe Russian literature—insofar as it remains an institution administered by the 
intelligentsia—simply cannot get there. Perhaps the main conclusion that we should 
derive from the bad infinity of Pelevin’s post-Soviet texts is the need to reform the very 
foundation of the speaking subject who publishes, reads, lauds and critiques them. 








III. Detecting the Political:  
The Conflicted Moderate Liberal Imperial Past of Akunin 
 
That’s Russia’s eternal misfortune. Everything in it is 
twisted. Fools and scum defend the good, while martyrs 
and h-heroes serve evil. 
 
Fandorin, in Boris Akunin’s State Counsellor79 
 
Thus far, I have discussed two forms of critique of the discourse of the 
‘democrats’ who oversaw the post-Soviet transition,  In the first section, Voroshilov and 
Ulitskaya reveal the ‘repressed truth’ of embourgeoisement as a desire operating 
alongside the late Soviet- turned post-Soviet intelligentsia’s talk of liberal humanist 
values. In the second section, Pelevin, maybe not entirely on purpose, reveals the doomed 
nature of the very speaking subject of the disaffected Russian intelligent, who through 
repetition compulsion finally realizes that he cannot critique homo faber discourse insofar 
as he continues to speak from the same elitist locus as his post-Soviet ‘liberal-
conservative’ counterpart. In both cases, attention to the workings of the pre-Soviet past 
serves as a fulcrum through which the critique can be reconstructed. In Voroshilov and 
Ulitsakaya, the pre-Soviet past of Golden Age Russian canon uncannily reveals the 
workings of cultural capital underneath liberal humanist moralizing talk about Russian 
canon. In Pelevin’s Chapaev and the Void, Petr’s delusion about Russia’s pre-Soviet and 
Civil War-era past reveals the inadequacy of the elitist speaking subject who claims to 
inherit the cycle of Russian history and his own place in it. Below, I turn to another 
typical formation of post-Soviet liberal discourse—the concept of the sislib, ‘the liberal 
within the system,’ and demonstrate how the pre-Soviet past frames the basic coordinates 
of liberal collaboration with a semi-odious regime, that on some level must be opposed, 
	 286 
but on another level must not be radically disturbed and in some circumstances also 
deserves to be assisted. My example is Boris Akunin’s bestselling historical fiction novel, 
The State Counsellor (2000) as well as its 2005 screen adaptation. 
I briefly mentioned the idea of the sislib in the Stolypinist section of Chapter 
Three, where I argued that Stolypinism is the predominant ideology of the Putin regime 
and that it reappears especially clearly in instances when a sislib is asked to come in and 
help carry out reforms on behalf of the state. Boris Akunin, is not, properly speaking, a 
sislib—he is a private writer and not by any stretch of the imagination a member of or 
mentor to the power elites. However, he is among those post-Soviet cultural actors who, 
despite their liberal rhetoric and oppositional outlook, nevertheless forge successful 
alliances with near-state projects. This is evident on the level of fairly big budget and 
commercially successful film adaptations of Akunin’s novels, including State Counsellor 
(produced by Mikhalkov, with money from the state and input from the state-run Channel 
One). Of course, that would make Akunin no different than the majority of Russian 
liberal cultural producers, who find ways to carry out projects in the context of a regime 
that is neither ideologically monolithic, nor even particularly well-informed of its own 
participation in the Russian public sphere, especially when it comes to media output other 
than nightly news and political talk shows. Akunin’s mass-media success is a result of a 
much freer relationship between post-Soviet liberal intelligentsia and power than what 
had been possible in the late Soviet era. In fact, my reading of State Counsellor attempts 
to outline the liberal perspective on that relatively free relationship. What makes 
Akunin’s novel into a “political detective” is precisely the fact that this book tries to 
detect the political fissures implicit in the post-Soviet liberal subject. Secondly, I will 
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show that the liberal version of the late Imperial era, as it has been outlined by Akunin, 
both enables the post-Soviet liberal subject and also disempowers him, precisely because 
it ends up too easily underwriting the need to achieve concord with the state, so as to 
prevent a Revolution that still looms as a threat, rather than an open political potentiality. 
On the simplest level, State Counsellor is a cat-and-mouse game with late 
Imperial-era leftist revolutionary terrorists from the People’s Will Party on one side and 
the state on the other. The revolutionaries are led by a man named Green and his Battle 
Group, which starts the novel with a bang by killing a certain high-placed General 
Khrapov onboard the latter’s train to Moscow. On the side of the state, the forces are a bit 
more complex and comprise the ‘whodunit’ of Akunin’s detective. The main cliff-hanger 
of the novel is not who killed Khrapov, or even whether Green will be caught, but rather: 
who is the high-placed traitor who leaked and continues to leak crucial information to the 
Battle Group? The only person absolutely beyond suspicion is the State Counsellor, Erast 
Petrovich Fandorin. The hero of a whole series of Akunin’s novels, Fandorin starts out 
State Counsellor as the de facto, but not de jure chief of police, overseen by his patron, 
Prince Dolgorukoi, the governor of Moscow. At first it is up to Fandorin to carry out the 
investigation of Khrapov’s murder. Soon, however, Fandorin’s search and authority get 
subverted by the arrival of Prince Pozharsky from Petersburg. For the remainder of the 
text, Pozharsky apparently successfully ferrets out the Battle Group, while Fandorin 
chafes under his arrogant new boss and is perplexed by the continuing nefarious activities 
of the Battle Group in Moscow (these involve a few more murders and an ‘expropriation’ 
of a bank). Eventually, at the very end of the novel, Fandorin discovers that Pozharsky is 
the one passing sensitive information to the Battle Group and that he has been doing it all 
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along, so as to kill the Prince’s enemies among the power elites—all so that he could get 
ahead and become the official chief of Moscow Police. This intrigue occupies the odd-
numbered chapters of the novel. The even-numbered chapters, meanwhile, are dedicated 
to Green and his team. Green, a man with quick reflexes, calm nerves and a seemingly 
powerful intellect, has had a whole string of impressive killings of high Imperial officials, 
all thanks to tip-off letters that he has been receiving for some time, always typed and 
signed with the acronym “TG.” Once Green finds himself in Moscow after the killing of 
Khrapov, things begin to get complicated until eventually he realizes that all along he has 
simply been a pawn in Prince Pozharsky’s game. In conclusion, Green dies, but not 
before watching his revolutionary partner-turned-lover, Igla (meaning, “Needle”) explode 
Pozharsky and everyone else in her house with her homemade explosives. 
 The structural choice of the novel, with its positioning of chapters as a 
confrontation of Fandorin and Green, at first gives the story the feel of a staged battle 
with clear sides. Sometimes, the novel’s characters describe their conflict as a schoolyard 
game of “Cossacks and thieves”; at other times they call it a war—Green likens it to the 
1812 battle at Borodino, replete with enemies in distinct uniforms and also some basic 
rules of combat, especially regarding civilians.80 At the same time, the novel’s basic 
premise, the idea that makes the novel a “political detective” (as promised on the verso of 
the title page), is that the two sides are not so simply distinguished. Thus, at a certain 
point, an agitated and therefore slightly stuttering Fandorin declares that “Russia’s eternal 
misfortune” is that “everything in it is twisted. Fools and scum defend the good, while 
martyrs and h-heroes serve evil.”81 Indeed, Green is more a “hero” than “scum.” He and 
most of his Battle Group are not wantonly brutal. Green’s moral flaws, which ultimately 
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prove fatal, are his naiveté, arrogance and his fundamental irrationality. On the level of 
naiveté, we are meant to smile dismissively at Green’s “theoretical” musings, such as 
“What will we have to do with people like Kozyr [a professional bank robber- PK] in a 
free, harmonious society?” Green answers that  
…there will remain dangerous professions that will require people of an 
adventuring sort. [...] They will delve to the bottom of the seas, they will conquer 
unreachable mountain peaks, they will experiment with flying apparatuses. And 
later, after another fifty years, we will have to explore other planets. 82 
 
Green’s musings here recall Soviet propaganda, in particular the Stalinist 1930s, with its 
marquee mass-media projects such as the conquest of the stratosphere and so forth. The 
fact that Green consistently refers to himself as a “man of steel”83 brings the point 
home—that he is a kind of naïve proto-Stalinist type. He is not outright evil, but we 
should judge him for failing to realize that his ideas about the harmonious future society 
might instead bring great social evil.  
On other occasions, we learn about Green’s other failings. For instance, we find 
out about how his sense of self-importance motivates his revolutionary activities, so 
much so that even when he does an honorable thing by defending his town’s Jewish 
quarter from a pogrom in 1881, the narrator tells us of his disappointment that  “fate had 
prepared him [...] not for a blinding flash that would rise up out of the wheels of a gilded 
[Imperial] carriage and shake the whole world, but a pointless death […] for the sake of 
pitiful, uninteresting people, with whom he had nothing in common.”84 Green also uses 
synesthesia to sort out friends from foes—another flaw, which gets him killed. At the 
beginning of the novel, we are told that in Green’s view, “everything in the world has its 
color, all objects, concepts and people [...] Green never tried to figure out why 
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[something] receives the color that it does for him—he simply received it as knowledge 
for future reference, and it rarely got him in trouble, at least in the context of people.”85 
Whether or not Green’s synesthesia has been successful in the past, it certainly fails him 
now, twice. On the first occasion, Green greets the high-end prostitute Julie who has 
apparently arrived to help him rob a bank, and perceives her as “emerald, light and 
celebratory. [...] were Green’s fate to have turned out differently, he would likely have 
fallen in love with such a woman.”86 On the second occasion, he meets Rakhmet, a 
member of his Battle Group who had just been apprehended and released by the 
Okhranka (the Imperial Era’s secret security services). The color of Rakhmet’s soul after 
his run-in with the law is apparently still the same: “Rakhmet’s gaze was clear, brave, 
even insouciant. And his color remained the same, cornflower-like. Traitorous blueness 
did not get any thicker.”87 Green is wrong about both Rakhmet and Julie. Rakhmet is, in 
fact, a traitor, and Green only finds out about it from his secret source, “TG,” i.e. Prince 
Pozharsky, who had turned Rakhmet into an Okhranka spy and then sold him out to 
Green on purpose. And as for Julie, in the end we learn that she was Pozharsky’s lover all 
along and was the one leaving Pozharsky’s “TG” notes for Green.  
 Green’s synesthesia is a foil for Fandorin’s hyper-rational “deductive method.” 
Green’s unexamined arrogance is a foil for Fandorin’s constant self-examination of his 
own motives in serving the state—this point is driven home by the opening of Fandorin’s 
first chapter, in which the State Counsellor tries to figure out why he serves “odious [...] 
or stupid” members of the state like Khrapov—is it because of a sense of duty, or because 
of “careerist calculations,” he wonders.88 Lastly, Green’s political utopian naiveté is a foil 
for Fandorin’s complicated feelings about his own line of work. Fandorin is willing to 
	 291 
entertain many of Pozharsky’s justifications for the need for unscrupulous actions for the 
sake of national security. He stays quiet when the Prince explains to an underling that 
“our state is unjust and unclean. But it’s better like this than mutiny, blood and chaos. 
[…] You and I are janitors. We clean outhouses, so that shit doesn’t pour out onto the 
street.”89 On another occasion, Fandorin objects to Okhranka arrest methods, but once the 
operation’s director, Myl’nikov successfully apprehends Rakhmet, Fandorin “feels 
himself obliged” to this “unpleasant, but not dumb, not at all dumb” man.90 Even so, 
Fandorin puzzles as to “why any business involving politics always leaves a taste of 
rottenness and dirt,” and he also expresses his own desire for maximally moral action on 
behalf of the state. Fandorin too thinks of a janitorial metaphor: “a good groundskeeper 
[dvornik] is always in a snow-white apron, because he doesn’t gather dirt with his hands 
[...] but works with a broom and a shovel, and knows how to use them correctly.”91 
 Given his personal qualities, and particularly his desire for pursuing national 
security goals in the most honorable way possible, Fandorin is obviously the ideal liberal 
hero in Akunin’s eyes. And in the end, that is why Fandorin walks away from 
government service. Once Fandorin realizes that the Battle Group had been led by the 
Prince all along, Pozharsky’s explanation— that he was using the Battle Group to kill off 
incompetent elites to clear the way for much-needed reforms in Russia— is unacceptable. 
Then, once Pozharsky gets hoisted on his own petard because Green has figured him out, 
Fandorin refuses the offer to become official chief of Moscow police, because his new 
boss, Grand Prince Simeon will not condemn Pozharsky’s actions, nor even acknowledge 
them, all for the sake of maintaining “the prestige of power,” which is “more important 
than anything else.”92 This is Fandorin’s red line. Occasional Okhranka double-dealing 
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had been tolerable; murder of incompetent bureaucrats by means of revolutionaries is not. 
It is also for this reason that Fandorin allows Pozharsky to be hoisted by his own petard—
because “evil shall consume evil,” i.e. Pozharsky’s self-created Battle Group shall kill 
him. But to make this ending tie up, the novel has to introduce not one but two deus ex 
machine devices, which are not readily apparent, but are ideologically significant. 
 At the end of the novel, Pozharsky dies at the hands of Green and Igla, because 
the revolutionaries have figured out the mystery of “TG” on their own and have captured 
Julie. Fandorin also knows that Green and Igla know, and he also knows that they have 
laid a trap for the Prince. Green then confronts Pozharsky about his double-dealing, to 
which the Prince responds that no one will believe him, and suggests that the State 
Counsellor “keep quiet” so as “to keep your dignity, which is so valuable to you.”93 
Meanwhile, Pozharsky himself is on the way to apprehend Green, not realizing that he is 
walking into a trap. Presumably, if Pozharsky had acted differently with regards to 
Fandorin, the State Counsellor might have considered telling him about the trap, but no 
such luck. However, here the novel presents a subtle contingency. By letting Pozharsky 
walk into Green’s trap Fandorin has apparently accepted that he would rather passively 
tolerate the revolutionaries’ evil, than abet the evil of Pozharsky. The State Counsellor 
does not know that Pozharsky will outwit Green somewhat, resulting in their mutual 
deaths. Green, too, does not know that his side is doomed. Once Pozharsky is under his 
gun and tells him the truth about “TG,” Green feels forlorn and wonders, “how should 
one live on” and “knows that it will be difficult to find the answer.” At this point, Green 
is about to execute Pozharsky, but suddenly, out of nowhere, Julie leaps for Green’s gun. 
Pozharsky reacts quickly, whips out his own gun and shoots the revolutionary. Then, 
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after watching the whole scene unfold, Igla activates her bomb and kills everyone in the 
room. And thus, “life ended just as it should have—with a momentous fiery flash.”94 The 
Battle Group pulls off its final assassination of the new Chief of Police, and Fandorin also 
wins—the cynical rogue agent Pozharsky has been killed off by his own revolutionary 
creation, and the Battle Group, too, died with him.  
Julie’s action miraculously achieves political equilibrium for the novel. Fandorin 
had been ready to let the revolutionaries live another day, but now he doesn’t have to live 
the consequences of this outcome. But there is also a second deus ex machine in the last 
scene: Pozharsky’s confession to Green. Fandorin, if we recall, had let Pozharsky go to 
his death because the latter was a bit too cynical in his methods. In principle, however, 
Fandorin would probably agree that the Imperial bureaucracy could use some fresh air. 
But now, in the last pages of the last chapter of the novel we suddenly find out that 
Pozharsky is quite a bit worse than he had let on. In his final conversation with Green the 
Prince reveals the full extent of his careerist selfishness. We learn that General Khrapov 
was not killed off for being an ossified idiot, but for being Pozharsky’s rival, “who 
couldn’t stand me and did everything in his power to block my career.” The Moscow-
based Gendarmerie and Okhranka chiefs whom Green killed with Pozharsky’s help also 
weren’t eliminated because they were ‘bad’—the former died “because of a dirty trick” 
he played on the Prince; the latter died because he was about to capture the Battle Group 
on his own, which “would be unfair” to the Prince. And  just to make himself look even 
more odious, Pozharsky also mentions two more murders by the Battle Group, which 
happened prior to the novel’s action—Green apparently was used as a tool for killing a 
romantic rival of Pozharsky’s Petersburg boss, plus a young career rival “who was 
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blocking my sunshine.”95 So, in the end, it turns out that Pozharsky was lying to 
Fandorin—he was not at all a cynical exponent of government killings for the sake of 
national security, he was simply eliminating people who were in his way.  
But why does Akunin introduce this extra bit of characterization for Pozharsky, at 
the very last moment? I think he does it because if Pozharsky really had been acting out 
of misguided national security concerns, then he wouldn’t have necessarily deserved to 
die. It is my sense that Akunin’s “political detective” novel instinctively detects the 
boundaries of Fandorin’s ‘liberalism-within-the-system” and finds them wanting, but 
does not quite know how to verbalize its discomfort and papers over the mess by neatly 
killing off all the ‘bad guys.’ To get at this discomfort, let us consider Fandorin’s literary 
roots. Fandorin is a scion of the sensibilities of late Soviet liberals like Eidel’man and 
Okudzhava (see Chapter One), particularly their commitment to legalism. “Liberal 
institutions,” in Eidel’man’s reading of Lunin, were above all defined by standardized 
and transparent legal norms, and this is clearly Fandorin’s political ideal as well. He 
serves his state because he believes that the implementation of such norms in it is 
possible, albeit in the near future. He quits once it becomes clear to him that the state will 
remain too extra-legal and non-transparent for his liking. At the same time, Fandorin (and 
Akunin) are also heirs of late Soviet and Perestroika-era ‘liberal conservative’ discourse 
opposing the Russian Revolution. It has been observed that much of the characterization 
of Akunin’s revolutionaries is derived from Yuri Trifonov’s 1973 novel about People’s 
Will terrorists, Impatience [Neterpenie]—unsurprisingly, Trifonov’s conclusion in that 
novel had been that the radicals’ commitment to the revolutionary ethos of “impatience” 
had been a bad idea.96 Govorukhin’s perspective on the Revolution is also relevant for 
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Fandorin’s political imaginary. Fandorin agrees with Pozharsky when the Prince explains 
to him that “we are a thin line, holding back an angry and dumb elemental force.”97 
Fandorin agrees that “a revolution will throw [our state] backwards to Ivan the Terrible,” 
and that “there will still be no justice, but just new thieves, and once again they will have 
everything and others nothing.”98 Fandorin agrees with Pozharsky that “time is ticking 
and Russia has very little of it left.”99 It is true that Fandorin himself never says such 
things, but when Pozharsky points them out the State Counsellor keeps quiet, because 
these arguments are convincing. Indeed, they are so convincing that they provide enough 
cover for Pozharsky to almost let the Prince get away with it.  
Pozharsky’s perniciousness turns on the fact that ideologically, he is not wrong. 
His rationale is precisely what makes Fandorin lament that in Russia “Fools and scum 
defend the good, while martyrs and h-heroes serve evil.” And Akunin’s solution to this 
quandary is garbled. He cannot abide the Revolution, so he has to kill off his 
revolutionaries. At the same time, he cannot disagree with Pozharsky outright. Indeed, he 
endows Pozharsky with preternatural prescience about Russia’s coming post-
Revolutionary Soviet era, with its “new thieves” and “no justice.” So, Akunin’s solution 
is a deus ex machine for his own unsettled conscience. The liberal writer is profoundly 
discomforted by the idea that on the one hand he cannot give up the post-Soviet liberal-
conservative mainstream perspective on the evil of Russian Revolution, and that on the 
other hand he knows very well that this perspective is precisely what enables cynical state 
manipulators like Pozharsky to outwit righteous liberals like Fandorin. Much simpler, 
then, to turn Pozharsky into an entirely self-serving villain at the end, rather than keeping 
him around as a Faustian force ‘that does good.’ And that same trick also makes it much 
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simpler to have Fandorin walk away from the state to save his clear conscience. Akunin 
knows that Fandorin has to walk away, he knows that the national-security rationale of 
preventing revolution does not mix with proper liberalism. But it is much easier for us to 
accept Fandorin walking away, once we know that Posharsky murdered a bunch of rivals 
in power and was not at all interested in ‘clearing the way’ of incompetent Imperial 
bureaucrats for the sake of the state. 
Ultimately, the “politics” that Akunin “detects” in his mass-market historical 
fiction novel lie in the fact that in post-Soviet Russia, the rhetoric of national security 
regularly acquires liberal allies for cynical authoritarian leaders. This alliance is made 
possible by a shared ‘liberal-conservative’ discourse on the Russian Revolution as a kind 
of eternal telos of overly left-leaning politics in Russia. The Russian Revolution functions 
as the undisputed futurity of Akunin’s Imperial-era characters. The wise villains know it, 
but so do positive characters. Even twenty-something underlings opine that “Russia 
awaits monstrous tribulations” if the gradualist Imperial state enlightenment project 
stalls.100 And all Fandorin ever does, vis-a-vis these ideas, is listen along with us, the 
readers. In all cases we cannot but agree that the ideas and the prognoses about Russia’s 
looming fate are correct. What we do not hear in this constant din of forthcoming history, 
however, is that the Revolution will not have to turn out the way that it will. The basic 
argument of 1920s and 1930s leftists—‘when did it all go wrong?’—is simply not an 
argument for Akunin and his reader base. In their historical imaginary, there is no point 
where the Revolution could have gone right, and that is why it is undoubtedly, manifestly 
evil, despite the fact that it is served by “martyrs and h-heroes.” And needless to say, 
such a conceptualization of political opposition puts major dampers on just how a good 
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liberal should resist the odious state today.  
But why does Fandorin only ever listen to these ideas? Why doesn’t he ever 
respond with his own, and why doesn’t he ever voice the same dire prognoses? It is my 
sense that his silent, detective posture subtly pushes Akunin’s novel to the point of almost 
realizing that the future does not have to be like this. With Fandorin’s quiet gestures and 
also with The State Counsellor’s symptomatic need for a deus ex machine at the end, 
Akunin’s novel almost crosses the threshold of where this post-Soviet popular writer’s 
moderate Russian liberalism would end, and a more left-wing form of discourse on 
















IV. A Russia That They Have Lost 
These people are ancient Russia for us. We’re not 
from it, we’re from the Soviet one. 
 
Leonid Parfenov, A Nation in Bloom101 
 The major issue of this dissertation as a whole has been the problem of genealogy 
in Russian liberal cultural discourse. Easy historical analogies have yielded an extremely 
problematic historical self-image for both late- and post-Soviet cultural elites, but as we 
have already seen in Chapter One, a number of liberal figures always understood the 
tenuousness of their peers’ strategies of inheritance. For instance, despite the fact that 
thinkers like Pomerants and Lotman wanted to outline some mechanism through which 
they could inherit the imperial intelligentsia’s ethical comportment or their social role 
vis-a-vis the narod, both of these individuals had their doubts about this operation. They 
recognized that in their modern social context establishing communion with imperial 
history and aristocratic cultural elites would not be easy. I also concluded Chapter One 
with the figure of the ‘bad bard’ in Okudzhava’s Gulp of Freedom. The ‘bad bard,’ I 
originally argued, arose from an anxiety within Okudzhava’s communicative strategy, in 
which political concord between the liberal author and the liberal audience was assumed 
to exist on its own, silently, because ‘everyone already knows everything.’ The ‘bad 
bard’ is the communicator who miscalculates his audience. While this figure doesn’t 
explicitly point to the problem of inheritance, it does implicitly suggest that assumed easy 
historical allusions, in which ‘everyone already knows everything,’ may be more trouble 
than they are worth. 
As I have argued in Chapter Three, by the early 1990s the discourse of pre-Soviet 
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inheritance was well on its way to forging the legitimacy of a new, and not particularly 
liberal post-Soviet order. Meanwhile, sections I-III of this chapter have shown how a 
liberal critique sometimes consciously and sometimes instinctively arise with regards to 
post-Soviet deployments of the imperial past. Altogether, they suggest that the whole 
discourse of historical inheritance must be dismantled for post-Soviet liberal discourse to 
rediscover its “power of resistance” (to borrow Lipovetsky’s term) vis-a-vis the 
conservative discourse of Putinism.102 Dismantling that discourse would have to involve 
realizing two concepts: 1) that the pre-Soviet intelligentsia’s subject-position and social 
imaginary is not our own, and should not necessarily be reclaimed; and 2) that the 
‘future’ of the Revolution and its consequences for the imperial intelligenty is also not 
our own. Accepting these two formulations would mean editing the formula of “Russia 
That We Have Lost.” For post-Soviet liberal discourse to be a counterweight to Putinist 
conservatism, the perspective on the Imperial era will have to change to the “Russia That 
They Have Lost,” with the recognition that making this past speak to “us” is no easy task. 
 Today, the “Russia That They Have Lost” is an easier perspective to maintain 
than it had been in the 1990s. Chapter Three has shown how in the early post-Soviet era, 
massive state-funded restorative nostalgia projects, from Luzhkov’s Cathedral of Christ 
the Savior to Mikhalkov’s Barber of Siberia appeared to take shape with mass consent. 
Certainly, there were always ironists like Pelevin, who joked about “a respectable Lord 
for gentlemen of respect” and “not-Cola for Nikola,” but the blockbuster success of films 
like Barber generally made it seem like statist investment in glittering imperial retro was 
the right strategy. In this regard, Stephen Norris has argued that Mikhalkov’s Barber 
ushered in a whole era of successful “patriotic blockbusters,” which were made possible 
	 300 
through a productive working relationship between prominent post-Soviet studio heads, 
such as Mikhalkov and Karen Shakhnazarov at Mosfilm, and state resources, disbursed 
through outfits like Channel One and the Patriotic Film Fund, among others. Incidentally, 
the 2005 adaptation of Akunin’s State Counsellor was produced in precisely such a 
way—at Mikhalkov’s studios, shot on Shakhnazarov’s historical set, and it was quite 
successful at the box office (though at the cost of removing almost all traces of the 
novel’s liberal ambivalence regarding the state).103  
In the wake of the Bolotnaya protest movement, however, a prominent discursive 
position aimed at critiquing the social imaginary of both the Russian state and the liberal 
opposition has emerged. The most succinct summation of this critique is captured by the 
mainstream impact of the radical neo-avant-garde poet Pavel Arsen’ev’s protest slogan 
from December 10, 2011, “You Do Not Even Represent Us/You Cannot Even Imagine 
Us [Vy nas dazhe ne predstavliaete].”104 The fact that Arsen’ev’s slogan “went viral” 
during the protest winter indicates the extent to which the contemporary Russian liberal 
self-consciousness was at that moment finally ready on a collective scale to put in 
question the “you” and the “us,” the collective identities that have framed relations 
between the Russian state and the liberal opposition possibly for as long as sixty years.  
Dovetailing with these developments there has also taken shape an increasingly 
prominent discourse of opposition to Putin’s deployment of history-inflected patriotism. 
Here too, the question was: who does the past really belong to, and who are the ‘us’ and 
the ‘them’ in this arrangement? In the Russian academic circles in January 2012 Ilya 
Kalinin provocatively described the Putinist strategy of using the past as a “patriotic 
collage,” deployed by a “nouveau riche,” who “hasn’t got his own family jewels” and 
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thus tries to sell gems that don’t belong to it “to their actual owners.”105 In February 2012 
Pussy Riot carried out its “punk prayer” action on the site of the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior. The show-trial that resulted out of that action upset the intelligentsia’s imperial 
nostalgia consensus about the recently restored site and highlighted the problem of 
inheritance of this past. In the words of Pussy Riot’s Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, 
pronounced at her trial in 2013, “the aesthetic of Putin’s regime is an aesthetic of 
protection,” which “consistently cites and recreates the aesthetics of two regimes 
preceding it historically— the [...] Imperial one and [that of] socialist realism. [...] The 
recreation of these aesthetics is being pursued so hamfistedly and unreflectively that the 
ideological apparatuses of the present political regime do not deserve any praise.”106 The 
flop of Mikhalkov’s Sunstroke (2014) among the wider public and liberal critics was 
another indicator that since 2012 “hamfisted and unreflective” and by now thoroughly 
clichéd deployments of the pre-Soviet past and its Revolutionary terminus no longer 
inspire cultural consensus. 
 
Sokurov’s Russian Ark: Memory as Antidote to History 
 In truth, the liberal counter-discourse against the conservative/statist use of the 
pre-Soviet past was already taking shape in the early 2000s. In 2002, Alexander 
Sokurov’s Russian Ark provided an important answer to Govorukhin and especially 
Mikhalkov.107 In many ways, Russian Ark is the anti-Barber. Sokurov has repeatedly 
described Russian Ark as arthouse cinema that is trying to stand up for the value of high 
culture and to fight consumer tastes. Sokurov’s articulation of this position makes 
particular sense when put in the context of Mikhalkov’s bombastic speech at the Russian 
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Filmmakers’ Union in 1998, on the eve of the release of Barber. At that time, the most 
successful post-Soviet studio mogul brought his fellow directors to the Palace of 
Congresses at the Kremlin, where he shamed his peers for making commercially unviable 
movies instead of well-produced pictures that would inspire enjoyment and patriotism in 
the viewing public. Several months later, as Stephen Norris reports, Mikhalkov would 
premiere his slick, expensive and appropriately patriotic Barber in the same hall.108 I do 
not know if Sokurov attended either the keynote or the premiere (I doubt it). However, 
thanks or no thanks to Mikhalkov’s suggestions, Sokurov took production quality for his 
2002 arthouse film very seriously, dressing up around two thousand actors and extras in 
the best period costumes money could buy, recruiting Valery Gergiev and his Mariinsky 
Orchestra for the final scene of the grand ball, and then investing in considerable digital 
postproduction after the one-day shoot. As for the shoot itself, this is where Sokurov 
outpaced all of his peers, both in Russia and the West—Russian Ark was the world’s first 
feature-length production shot on SteadyCam as a single 87-minute take, without any 
cuts. So, though Sokurov’s budget was about 8 times smaller than Mikhalkov’s (compare 
Barber at $35 million vs Russian Ark at $4.5 million), it is undoubtedly the case that his 
film is thoroughly ‘Western’—meaning, technically advanced—in production quality and 
methods.109 What differentiates them is the purpose of the picture. 
The film tells the story of two ghosts, a post-Soviet Russian man (the narrator 
voiced by Sokurov) and a nineteenth-century European diplomat (often identified as 
Marquis de Custine, especially in various materials about the film), who wander through 
the halls of the St. Petersburg Hermitage Museum and watch its almost 300 years of 
history unfold in various rooms. The main focus, however is on the late Imperial era, 
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which is generally presented as a Gestalt image of nineteenth-century aristocratic 
Russia—to that effect, the film’s final scene, which is supposed to recall the final grand 
ball given at the Winter Palace by Nicholas II, sometime in the early 1910s, also involves 
Pushkin, Natalia Goncharova and a great number of people from what looks like the 
filmworld of Sergei Bondarchuk’s “War and Peace” (1965-1967) as its attendees (see 
Figures 31 and 32, below). 
The blending of epochs in Sokurov’s rendering corresponds to the film’s most famous 
feature—its single, 87-minute-long SteadyCam shot—and has a direct relation to the 
question of the historicity of the Hermitage. It has been said that Sokurov’s SteadyCam is 
a counterpunch to Sergei Eisenstein’s practice of montage, which not only defined early 
Soviet cinema, but was also specifically associated with the Winter Palace, given that his 
October: 10 Days That Shook the World (1928) was set there. While I do not dispute this 
observation, I do not think that fighting with the ghosts of Soviet propaganda cinema is 
the main goal of Sokurov’s filmic device, especially because by 2002 it was no longer 
just the Soviet rendering of this site that needed to be deconstructed, but also the post-
Soviet Mikhalkovan-type version of Imperial Russia as ‘patriotic Disneyland.’ With the 
success of Barber, state-sponsored historical set-pieces proved to be as adept as their 
Soviet predecessors at re-cutting Russia’s past to suit present-day political messaging 
needs, and Sokurov’s not-one-cut responds to this contemporary discourse at least as 
much as it does to Eisenstein. 
The basic effect of Sokurov’s device is to create an unexpected experience of “the 
transference of straight time onto the film screen.”110 In the context of the Hermitage the 













taken place at this site. When we interact with mainstream cultural or even professional 
historical discourse on the past, we expect to receive past events arranged, re-cut, 
narrativized for us. A historical account without a narrative arrangement of the past is 
essentially impossible, as the philosopher Paul Ricoeur concluded (all that despite trying 
to find a counterexample through Fernand Braudel).111 But any narrative is inherently 
false vis-a-vis the plenitude of the events that had actually transpired. Moreover, in the 
Russian cultural context, it is precisely prominent, authorized historical narratives that 
have been so central to the discourse of various waves of authoritarian Russian states. If 
the montage of Eisenstein’s October literalized the process of state-driven re-cutting of 
the past, then by refusing to cut his long take Sokurov creates the feeling of a spectral 
presence of the whole past in the Hermitage.  
The Russian Ark insists on the permanence of different layers of the past within 
the walls of the museum, and also on the possibility of establishing various forms of 
communication with the past—all of them mediated by the Hermitage as a “lieu de 
memoire,” a singular ‘ark’-like site that contains “a residual sense of continuity,” to 
borrow Pierre Nora’s term.112 This is precisely the point of the scenes in which 
temporalities appear most garbled, where modern-day museum visitors argue with the 
specter of the Marquis about the art that hangs on the walls. Their lifeworlds are 
thoroughly different from each other, they apprehend the art and the museum space in 
entirely different ways. When the Marquis first encounters the modern museum visitors 
wearing their regular clothes he wonders, “who are these people? What estate are they 
from?” On this and other occasions he interacts with them. Sometimes he gets mad at 
them for not looking at the paintings the way he does. Other times, the Marquis meets 
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women who “speak” with the paintings and the sculpture, through movement or with 
their hands. In all of these cases, we see people from completely different worlds, with 
completely different cultural bearings, who nevertheless find their individual ways to 
connect to the articles in the Museum and to enjoy the traces of the past that are left in it. 
This form of connection stands in stark contrast to the “Russia That We Have Lost” type 
of nostalgia industry represented by films like Barber. 
The intended audience response to a film like Barber is a feeling of nostalgia 
about an authentic Russia of yore, a lost object that is restored to the viewer through the 
feeling of patriotism, in which the message is one of uncomplicated inheritance, along the 
lines of: ‘the glorious Imperial Junkers are gone, but you are their descendant and can 
inhabit some of their values and ideas. Also, buy my perfume.’ In contrast, the outcome 
of watching Russian Ark is the recognition of the possibility of communication with the 
part of the past that has been preserved as “culture.”113 Communication with culture for 
Sokurov does not mean inheritance in any easy way— after all, what can we possibly 
understand of the world of the Marquis, or the attendees of the grand ball, or the ghosts of 
Gogolian bureaucrats and spies that chase the Marquis and the narrator throughout the 
film? The Marquis makes this very point to the narrator, when the latter spots Catherine 
the Great with her attendant and chases them out into the wintry garden outside. The 
Marquis does not follow, but we hear his voice on the background, saying: “It is 
impossible [negozhe] for simple mortals to chase after tsars. You will not overtake them.” 
The SteadyCam, proceeding at its even pace, cannot overtake the Empress, who runs off 
into the distance. At this moment, the ghostly narrator stops his movement and gazes out 
at Catherine disappearing into the wintry fog. (See Figure 33, below). The hue of this 
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scene has also been altered in post-production to make it more melancholy.114 The 
extradiegetic music intensifies—it is an elegiac piano work by Mikhail Glinka (who the 
Marquis assumes is a “good German composer”). Altogether, this scene is loaded with 
reflective emotion, but it is not about the ‘lost object’ of the past that can somehow  
	
Figure	33:	Catherine	and	her	servitor	rush	off	into	the	gloomy	distance,	to	a	mournful	tune	from	Glinka. 
be reclaimed through a fetish; rather, in this moment the narrator realizes the past’s 
ineffably distant nature. The narrator spies on the specters inhabiting the Winter Palace, 
but cannot inhabit their experience of this site. But still, the site remains, and communion 
with the past that inheres in it is possible, and in any case, the film’s conclusion suggests 
that the narrator himself ultimately becomes as much a part of this site as his illustrious 
predecessors, and for the same reason—the narrator (voiced by Sokurov himself) has by 
way of Sokurov’s film transformed himself into eternal “culture.” 
For Russian Ark, culture is eternity. About half-way into the film, the Marquis 
stops in front of a painting of peasants by a Flemish master. He looks at their depictions 
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and says, “live on, live on, you will outlive everyone.” Similarly, the film is concluded 
with the words, “look, the sea is all around. And we are to sail forever, and we are to live 
forever.” Eternity is possible, but only in this site, insofar as it is perceived as an “ark,” as 
the place that preserves the bits of the past that have remained in it in the form of 
culture—which includes architecture, paintings, sculpture, the myriad cultural memories 
associated with the site, and now also Sokurov’s film. It is the very approach of the 
Hermitage as an ark-like site that makes communication with it possible. Communication 
with culture on the one hand means recognizing one’s distance from it: that there exists a 
plenitude of the “sea” of the past beyond whatever we might know of it. From the 
standpoint of inheritance of this past, the vast majority of it cannot ever become “ours”—
especially at a place like the Hermitage, the site of Imperial Russian splendor that is quite 
foreign and “impossible” for modern Russian “mere mortals” to grasp. On the other hand, 
however, the encounter with this past culture, which the museum setting both makes 
present and estranged, leaves open the possibility of the past acquiring new meanings. 
The specific contemporary meaning of the past of the Hermitage is, in a way, 
beyond the purview of the film’s unique aesthetic. The camera aesthetics are designed to 
capture the “thunderstrike” of the singular day of filming in the Hermitage, or a singular 
day of walking through this museum115 The meaning-making takes shape in the following 
months of post-production, just as in a post-encounter setting the museum goers might 
very well come away from the Hermitage with a feeling of nostalgia for a “Russia That 
We Have Lost.” However, such a conclusion lies beyond the purview of the cultural 
encounter, and it is the instant of the encounter itself, with its many potentialities of 
future interpretation, that marks the possibility of communication with a past that is both 
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present and distant. And what enables this possibility is the ideology of cultural 
preservation as such—the idea of stewardship of the museum site and the traces of the 
past in it. The late Soviet liberal intelligentsia’s insistence on the high value of the past as 
culture as such comes through here. Valorization of the Imperial era has indeed been put 
to work as a handmaid of the post-Soviet state, but that is not what this past has to mean. 
The past as “culture,” as a site of the encounter, and preservation as guarding the 
possibility of that encounter for the future— Sokurov’s film redeems precisely this kernel 
of Soviet liberal humanism. What kind of properly liberal politics this kind of ideology 
might underpin still remains to be seen—but again, the point of the film is to recognize 
that when one encounters the past, this encounter should be felt as a moment of difficulty. 
The past as culture demands that one work to communicate with it. And such an 
encounter is quite different from Govorukhin’s easy path of lamentation for Stolypin’s 
Russia shot in mid-flight by the roving hordes, or Mikhalkov’s easy path of enjoyment of 
stereotypical, idyllic peasants celebrating Mardi Gras at the Kremlin. 
 
Parfenov, The Nation in Bloom 
 Eleven years after Sokurov’s Russian Ark, after the clarification of the thoroughly 
conservative interpretation of the pre-Soviet past as a fulcrum of the Putinist historical 
imaginary, Russian mainstream liberal discourse had apparently developed some 
antibodies. In 2002, Sokurov had emphasized the distance between the past and present 
as the core of an encounter with culture, and in that way was trying to counter a nostalgic 
consumerist encounter with the past as an appealing narrative. Still, it is likely that in 
2002, the majority of Sokurov’s Russian audience would have interpreted his glittering 
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Hermitage precisely as a “Russia That We Have Lost.” Eleven years later, however, the 
popular liberal TV documentary filmmaker Leonid Parfenov would approach the Gestalt 
image of this glittering past and also insist on its distance, rather than its closeness. The 
same filmmaker who had celebrated the refurbished Imperial aesthetic and social 
bearings of the newspaper Kommersant in 2009, would now question the limits of 
inheriting the Imperial past in his 2013 documentary on Sergei Prokudin-Gorsky, A 
Nation in Bloom [Tsvet Natsii].116 
 The figure and the oeuvre of Prokudin-Gorsky has been so serendipitously helpful 
for post-Soviet Russia’s Imperial nostalgia industry, that ‘if he didn’t exist, he would 
have had to be invented.’ Prokudin-Gorsky himself was a fin-de-siècle Russian scientist 
and innovator of photography, who in the decade prior to World War I traveled the 
breadth of the Russian Empire in an attempt to capture as much of it as possible on his 
own recently invented color photo-plates. He did the project at the behest of Emperor 
Nicholas II, who was the first and most important viewer of these images, which would 
then form the backbone of Imperial school textbooks on the subject of ‘Motherland-love’ 
[Rodinoliubie], as Parfenov explains in the documentary. Thus, the photographer’s 
carefully staged and masterfully shot images would inspire patriotism in Russia’s 
monarchs and their subjects, orchestrating a visual unity between an all-seeing state and 
its hyper-colorful multi-ethnic populace, in the absence of non-statist, “autonomous, 
horizontal ties of nationhood,” to borrow Nancy Condee’s framing of the issue.117 In the 
1990s, Prokudin-Gorsky’s archive was rediscovered at the US Library of Congress 
(where it had languished for decades), and modern digital techniques were applied to 
render Prokudin-Gorsky’s plates into vibrant and highly detailed color images. In the 
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early 2000s, the Library of Congress posted its digital collection of Prokudin-Gorsky’s 
archive online, and since then the photographer’s pictures have circulated throughout the 
Russian internet and on social media, often shared with appended laments, like, ‘what a 
country we’ve flushed down the toilet!’ In 2014, these very laments, as well as Prokudin-
Gorsky’s pictures, inspired Mikhalkov’s extremely well-funded and both critically and 
commercially quite unsuccessful adaptation of Bunin, Sunstroke.118 However, after 2012 
laments about Russia’s pre-Soviet past were starting to feel past their prime and Parfenov 
responded to the shift in the public mood by approaching Prokudin-Gorsky in a much 
more innovative and contemplative way. 
 On the surface, it feels as though Parfenov’s Nation in Bloom is as much a part of 
the nostalgia industry as Mikhalkov’s Sunstroke—both films are made with expensive 
High Dynamic Ranging (HDR) technology and other digital effects in order to make pre-
Revolutionary Russia come off as vibrantly as possible by removing filmic chiaroscuro 
and making the world on screen appear as if one is “looking through a window” at it.119 
Moreover, Parfenov’s project clearly seemed mainstream enough that the state-run 
Channel One happily funded and screened it in November 2013, just a few months prior 
to post-Soviet Russia’s capstone retro-inflected patriotic pageantry event, the 2014 
Winter Olympics. Be that as it may, Parfenov’s use of expensive movie magic has a 
much more motivated and self-conscious relationship to his project. Parfenov uses his 
state-of-the-art technology in order to establish a discursive and aesthetic dialogue with 
Prokudin-Gorsky, his pictures and their original users. His slick renditions of Prokudin-
Gorsky’s images at their contemporary locales are done in order to respond to the photo-
oeuvre of a man who a hundred years earlier had also used hyper-advanced technological 
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means in order to document the Russian Empire. This becomes apparent when about half-
way into the film, Parfenov points out that his own HD camera and our television screens 
are unable to transmit fully the shades of color that Prokudin-Gorsky was able to capture 
on his plates a century ago. Meanwhile, instead of taking up Prokudin-Gorsky’s version 
of late Imperial Russia in a straightforward, unproblematic fashion, Parfenov highlights 
these pictures’ original owners—the late Imperial state and its elite servitors. This is 
precisely why the original Russian title of Parfenov’s documentary, Tsvet natsii is so 
intentionally loaded. Literally meaning both The Color of the Nation and The Crème of 
the Nation, the title highlights that Prokudin-Gorsky’s pictures are first and foremost 
made by and for those who thought of themselves as such—the Russian Imperial elites. 
The emotional and conceptual culmination of Parfenov’s film takes place towards 
the end of the film, when Parfenov delivers a monologue at Paris’s famous Russian 
Orthodox cemetery of St. Genevieve de Bois, where Prokudin-Gorsky is buried, 
alongside many other exiled Russian ancien régime émigrés: 
When you walk about and read the tombstones here, it’s like reading the runes of 
Aztecs and Mayans. It’s all in Russian, but… ‘acting state councilor,’ ‘hereditary 
honorable citizen,’ ‘prince,’ […] ‘merchant of the first guild,’ ‘cavalier of the 
order of St. Anne First Degree,’ ‘Rotmistr.’ […] We cannot understand the point 
of summing-up a life with such inscriptions. It’s like, there were ancient Greeks, 
and the new ones didn't come from them. And ancient Egyptians- the present ones 
aren’t from them. And so us present-day Russians, but we’re not from these ones. 
[…] These people are ancient Russia for us. We’re not from it, we’re from the 
Soviet one. But here lies the crème/color of the former country, which its last 
chronicler managed to depict in color [A tut lezhit tsvet byvshei strany, kotoruiu ee 
poslednii letopisets uspel sniat’ v tsvete] (see Figure 34, below). 
 
The final line’s untranslatable word-play reinforces Parfenov’s point— Prokudin-Gorsky 





 Parfenov’s film further highlights the distance and the difficulty of conversation 
between the past and the present by playfully inserting the director himself into Prokudin-
Gorsky’s photographs or manipulating the Imperial photographer’s images. His HDR 
aesthetic constantly ‘bares the device’ of its own artificiality, highlighting that the 
filmmaker’s own communion with Prokudin-Gorsky’s Russia is a filmic conceit, rather 
than a case of earnest restorative nostalgia. On that note, one of the most telling images in 
the film is that of a German Lutheran church in St. Petersburg. Prokudin-Gorsky had 
photographed the church, which was then defaced and repurposed during the Stalin era. 
Parfenov considers what the church would look like if it were to appear in the modern 
skyline, and we watch the building assemble itself cartoonishly out of its contemporary 
remaining pieces (see Figure 35, below). But as it does so, Parfenov points out that 
‘really’ rebuilding this church would be pointless, because “it’s impossible to restore the 
Petersburgian Babylon on the 60th Meridian, the city in which nearly all bakers and 
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apothecaries were Germans.”  
Along the same lines, but even more categorically, Parfenov chooses to end his 
film on the site of a ruin of a church which could never be rebuilt (see Figure 36, below). 
Industrialization has changed the course of the river, and so today the ruin stands on a 
tiny islet in the middle of the new riverbed. Parfenov wonders: “What’s to restore here? 
Not much already. And to rebuild from scratch? It’ll be even worse, because how can 
there be a functioning church in the middle of water? ...So let’s just fix the ruins in place, 
and let them stand here authentically, like a monument to a country that is no more. And 
when ships pass by, it’ll be a greeting to new Russia.” The distance between “ancient” 
pre-Soviet Russia and ourselves is insisted on here. The act of “fixing the ruins in place,” 
preserving them, would turn traces of imperial Russia into memory sites on which some 
kind of undefined communion between ancients and moderns would take place. Here, 
just as in Sokurov, the past would cease being a lost object to be regained, and instead 
become culture to be encountered, a trace with a plenitude that is inherently inaccessible 













Whereas post-Soviet conservative references to the Imperial era have hinged on 
Govorukhin’s pithy and consequential slogan, “The Russia That We Have Lost,” the 
liberal critique has contested this slogan on three counts. First, it has turned out that 
Imperial Russia is not “ours” in any easy sense of the term. Second, it has become 
increasingly clear that Imperial Russia’s future-past—i.e. its hoped for or dreaded 
Revolutionary terminus—is also not “ours” and is in any case not a politically productive 
perspective for post-Soviet liberals. And third, it has become increasingly evident that a 
productive relation to the past will have to proceed through culture—not through cultural 
capital accrued through elitist ‘intelligentsia’ socialization (as was surmised by the late 
Soviet and Perestroika era liberals), and certainly not through ‘culture’ as grand, 
authoritative history on the past (as was surmised by late- and post-Soviet conservatives). 
Rather, what is required is a relation to culture understood as traces of the past, to be 
encountered and preserved, but not manipulated into some new universal narrative or 
useful historical allegory. These three points of intervention in the history and memory of 
pre-Soviet Russia have taken shape, but sometimes not entirely consciously over the last 
quarter century. However, I do think that after 2012 they have coalesced into a somewhat 
prominent counter-discourse to Putinism, and this coalescence indicates that the Russian 
public consciousness has rounded an important corner of the ‘post-Soviet’ era. 
With all of the above in mind, let me conclude this chapter and this dissertation by 
cautiously suggesting several big-picture ideas about modern Russian cultural discourse: 
1. Within the framework of my project, the post-Soviet era does not really hold together 
as an independent entity. What has emerged instead is an arc of sixty-some years of 
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cultural discourse that may be summed up as the age of surfeit of history—an epoch in 
which various historical narratives and counter-narratives have been proposed as panacea 
for all kinds of Russian sociopolitical ills; an age in which the production of history has 
motivated both liberal and conservative political discourse, an age in which historical 
(false) consciousness has defined liberal and conservative Russian subjectivities.  
2. The cause of this age of surfeit of history is no mystery—it is the logical outcome of 
the weakness of other, more effective forms of political action, socialization, 
institutionalization, and so forth. After 2012, however, I think it has become clear that 
other forms of political action are possible in Russia. Consequently, appeals to simplistic 
historical allegory in the discourse of Russian liberalism are waning, particularly among 
the activist contingent of post-Soviet Russian liberals led by Alexei Navalny.  
3. Meanwhile, a critical counter-discourse against easy inheritance of the past has 
emerged, and this development suggests that the surfeit of history as a hegemonic 
attribute of Russian cultural discourse is coming to an end. The fact that the liberal 
authors of the new paradigm themselves have not necessarily realized the shift in their 
discourse suggests that the old cultural logic will continue for some time longer. 
However, this time of running on empty is undoubtedly shortened with every new brazen 
attempt by an increasingly embattled Putin regime and its increasingly discredited 
cultural defenders to champion the history of a Russia that they did not lose, nor stand 
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